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ABSTRACT  
   
Employees are directly involved in work tasks and processes which are necessary 
to accomplish unit or organizational goals, and accordingly, they may become aware of 
key mistakes, slips, and failures that are unbeknownst to the leader or supervisor 
responsible for the work unit or organization. Given that errors or deviations in work 
tasks or processes can have far-reaching effects within the organization, it may be 
essential for employees to share bad news with their leader or supervisor so that steps can 
be taken to address the issue or ameliorate negative consequences. However, although 
employees' sharing of bad news may be important to the organization and should be 
encouraged, supervisors may respond to the messenger in ways that discourage the 
behavior. Unfortunately, we lack an explanation of why and under what conditions 
supervisors respond positively or negatively to employees who share bad news. Thus, the 
purpose of this dissertation is to address this gap in our understanding. I draw from social 
exchange theory and the transactional theory of stress to develop a conceptual model of 
sharing bad news. I suggest that sharing bad news can be cast as a transaction between 
employees and supervisors that is mediated by supervisors’ appraisals of employees’ 
sharing the message. The quality of the relationship between an employee and supervisor, 
or leader-member exchange (LMX), is strengthened when supervisors appraise the 
sharing of bad news as challenging, or potentially rewarding; however, LMX is 
weakened when supervisors appraise the sharing of bad news as hindering, or potential 
harmful. In turn, LMX influences supervisor responses to the sharing of bad news in the 
form of evaluations of the employee’s effectiveness. In addition to these main effects, I 
also consider how aspects of the message delivery, such as the timeliness with which 
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messages are conveyed and extent to which employees incorporate solutions when they 
share bad news, can influence supervisor appraisals of sharing bad news. Finally, I 
suggest that the extent to which the messenger is responsible for the bad news moderates 
the relationships between appraisals of sharing bad news and LMX. I test this model in 
three studies.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Mistakes are a common occurrence in organizations, and the impact of even 
minor mishaps can be highly consequential. Mistakes, errors, or deviations in work tasks 
or process can result in increased costs to the organization, negative publicity, damaged 
reputation, harm to customers or employees, and decreased customer satisfaction 
(Brodbeck, Zapf, Prümper, & Frese, 1993; Goodman, Ramanujam, Carroll, Edmondson, 
Hofmann, & Sutcliffe, 2011; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). These potentially detrimental 
outcomes suggest the importance of addressing errors when they occur, but being able to 
do so depends on knowing that something has gone wrong in the first place. As 
employees often have a direct role in the work tasks and processes that contribute to unit 
and organizational goals, they are frequently in a position to observe or recognize 
mistakes when they happen, and may become aware of issues prior to their leader or 
supervisor. In these situations, it is crucial that employees share bad news, or critical 
information regarding mistakes, errors, or deviations, with their leader, as possible 
problems are unlikely to be resolved without communication to those individuals 
responsible for the work unit who may have resources and means to effectively manage 
the issue (e.g., van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005).  
Although it is clearly important for employees to convey bad news to leaders, 
whether they choose to do so or not is likely to depend upon the response they expect 
from the recipient, in particular, the response of the supervisor or leader to whom they 
share the news. For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms “supervisor” and “leader” 
will be used interchangeably. On the one hand, employees may speak up because they 
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feel a sense of obligation for improving the work environment (Morrison & Phelps, 
1999), and believe that their supervisor or leader is open and receptive to the information 
being shared (Detert & Burris, 2007). Employees may feel that supervisors encourage 
and support the sharing of critical information (Edmondson, 2003), such as bad news, and 
that doing so will be helpful or beneficial to the organization or work group. Employees 
may subsequently believe that sharing bad news will reflect well upon them as an 
employee and continue to engage in the behavior.  
On the other hand, sometimes employees may choose not to share bad news. 
Employees may be uncomfortable sharing negative information with others, particularly 
if they believe the news is something the recipient, such as a supervisor, may not want to 
hear (Conlee & Tesser, 1973). Further, organizations may have norms or policies that 
discourage employees from expressing their concerns or issues, and employees may be 
afraid of speaking up in ways that contradict the expectations of the organization 
generally or their supervisor specifically (e.g., Sprague & Ruud, 1988). Employees may 
perceive that sharing bad news will result in negative repercussions, such as retaliation or 
punishment for the information shared (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; Morrison & 
Milliken, 2000). To avoid these consequences, employees may choose not to speak up.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand how leaders respond to 
employees who share bad news. Understanding leader responses, as opposed to the 
responses of other potential recipients, is particularly important for a number of reasons. 
First, the interactions that occur between employees and leaders, such as the sharing of 
bad news, can have an influence on the employee-supervisor relationship. The quality of 
the relationship, in turn, has implications for the behaviors enacted by both employees 
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and supervisors (Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997). That is, supervisors may engage in 
behaviors that encourage or discourage employees from sharing bad news in future 
interactions, and employees, in turn, may or may not choose to share bad news or other 
information relevant or critical to work tasks. Second, supervisors have control over 
rewards and resources that are relevant to employees (Graen & Scandura, 1987). The 
sharing of bad news could influence a leader’s decision in allocating certain rewards or 
resources to the employee who has shared. For instance, employees may receive greater 
rewards or resources when their leaders perceive the sharing of bad news as beneficial 
and fewer or no rewards or resources when their leaders perceive the sharing of bad news 
as harmful. Finally, and related to the previous point, supervisors are frequently 
responsible for assessing the overall contributions and effectiveness of employees in the 
workplace. When employees share bad news, it may influence the extent to which 
supervisors view messengers as effective in their job duties and responsibilities. Given 
the extent to which leaders have an influence over outcomes for employees, evaluating 
their responses to the sharing of bad news is highly relevant.  
In order to understand leader responses, I first develop the concept of sharing bad 
news, and clearly define the behavior as the communication of mistakes or errors by 
employees to their leader or supervisor. Based on this definition, I draw on social 
exchange theory and suggest that sharing bad news reflects a transaction between 
employees and leaders, and that this transaction has implications for the exchange 
relationship, or leader-member exchange, between the employee and supervisor. Whereas 
leaders may view the sharing of bad news as a positive transaction, or an exchange that is 
beneficial or rewarding, leaders may also view the sharing of bad news as a negative 
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transaction, or an exchange that is threatening or harmful. Based on the quality of the 
exchange relationship, and the interpretation by leaders of sharing bad news as a positive 
or negative exchange, leaders will reciprocate the exchange to employees. I suggest that 
leaders are likely to reciprocate in the form of evaluations of effectiveness. That is, the 
higher the leader-member exchange, the more likely employees will receive higher 
ratings of effectiveness from supervisors. In contrast, lower leader-member exchange will 
likely lead to lower ratings of employee effectiveness.  
Although considering sharing bad news in terms of social exchange explains why 
sharing bad news can influence leader responses, it does not account for how leaders 
form their responses. I integrate the transactional theory of stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984) with social exchange theory to suggest that the appraisals leaders make about the 
sharing of bad news messages could serve as the intervening mechanism through which 
sharing bad news effects leader-member exchange and subsequently evaluations of 
effectiveness. When employees share bad news, leaders may appraise their behavior as 
helpful or useful because it provides opportunities for growth and gain (e.g., Edmondson, 
1996; Harteis, Bauer, & Gruber, 2008; Janssen, 2000). In this circumstance, the sharing 
of bad news could be perceived as challenging, or potentially rewarding, enhancing 
leader-member exchange and subsequently encouraging leaders to respond to messengers 
with higher rating of effectiveness in their job duties. Yet, leaders may also feel 
threatened when employees share bad news because the information conveyed in the 
message signals that goal attainment could be inhibited and suggests that a leader’s time 
and resources may be required to resolve the issue (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In this 
regard, the sharing of bad news could be considering hindering, or constraining, by 
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leaders, reducing leader-member exchange quality, and subsequently fostering leaders’ 
responses in the form of negative evaluations of effectiveness.  
Additionally, scholars have suggested a number of factors that influence the 
appraisals leaders make when employees speak up (e.g., Whiting, Maynes, Podsakoff, & 
Podsakoff, 2012), and I consider three factors that are particularly relevant to sharing bad 
news. First, I consider how the timeliness of message delivery, or proximity of the 
sharing of bad news to the actual bad news event, can influence a leader’s appraisal. 
When employees deliver bad news messages immediately following the discovery of an 
issue, it maximizes the amount of time available to address an issue, which could provide 
increased opportunity to find effective solutions to the problem. In contrast, a delay in 
sharing bad news could increase the sense of urgency associated with resolving the issue, 
and subsequently enhance feelings of harm or threat as a result of the news. Second, I 
consider the extent to which employees incorporate solutions that address the issue being 
raised when they share bad news. The presence of a solution can help leaders feel that the 
situation is manageable and easily resolved, which could enhance the sense that the 
employee is trying to help, rather than hinder, the achievement of goals.  
Finally, I also consider factors that influence the relationship between each 
challenge and hindrance appraisals and leader-member exchange. In particular, I consider 
the extent to which an employee is responsible for the bad news being shared. When a 
supervisor believes that an employee is responsible for the bad news, they may feel that 
the employee has intentionally acted in a way that is harmful or destructive to the leader 
(e.g., Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999). In this regard, being 
responsible for the bad news is likely to temper the positive relationship between sharing 
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bad news and leader-member exchange and enhance the negative relationship between 
hindrance appraisals and leader-member exchange. Further, decreased leader-member 
exchange quality may make supervisors less inclined to reciprocate their obligations in 
the exchange relationship, or may even encourage retaliation in ways that are harmful to 
the employee, such as lower evaluations of effectiveness.    
By exploring leader responses to the sharing of bad news by employees, I make a 
number of contributions to the existing literature. First, I develop the concept of sharing 
bad news as a unique form of employees’ speaking up in the workplace. I offer a clear 
definition of sharing bad news, and distinguish the behavior from other related concepts 
that have been used to describe speaking up at work. Second, I explore the consequences 
of sharing bad news. That is, I consider how supervisors respond when employees share 
bad news and suggest that sharing bad news reflects an exchange between an employee 
and a leader that influences the quality of their relationship. Whereas prior work has 
largely considered exchanges between individuals to be positive in nature, my 
dissertation introduces the idea that exchanges could have negative valence, and explores 
how a potentially negative transaction can influence employee outcomes. Third, I 
contribute to the emerging body of work regarding cognitive appraisals of workplace 
demands. Whereas prior work has suggested that demands in the work environment are 
consistently evaluated as either challenging or hindering (Cavanaugh, Boswell, Roehling, 
& Boudreau, 2000), I suggest that some demands, such as bad news, have the potential to 
be both. Additionally, I explore factors that influence the appraisal process, and consider 
how each challenge and hindrance appraisals can have unique effects on the exchange 
relationship between an employee and supervisor, and how the quality of the exchange 
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relationship can ultimately influence supervisor ratings of employee effectiveness. 
Finally, and most generally, my study expands our current understanding of speaking up 
in the workplace. Most prior work on speaking up has focused on the antecedents that 
encourage individuals to speak up in the workplace, but significantly less work has 
examined how messages are heard and received by recipients. To this point, only a few 
studies have considered how the content of a message can influence the responses of a 
recipient, and the subsequent consequences to the messenger based on these responses 
(e.g., Chamberlin, Newton, & LePine, 2017; Whiting et al., 2012). My dissertation 
explicitly considers how the type of information a messenger is conveying can influence 
a respondent, such as a supervisor, and more specifically, how speaking up can have 
consequences for the messenger based on the recipient’s response.  
I explore these ideas in three interrelated studies. In the first study, I develop and 
validate a measure of sharing bad news based on the definition I develop in this 
dissertation. Second, I test my conceptual model using a field sample of employees and 
their supervisors at a beverage distribution company. One of the key purposes of this 
field study is to determine covariance between sharing bad news and employee 
effectiveness and offer a preliminary evaluation of the proposed hypotheses. Finally, the 
third study consists of a laboratory experiment designed to test the full conceptual model. 
The laboratory setting helps establish causality for the relationships in my model and rule 
out alternative explanations. I conclude my dissertation with a discussion of the 
implications of my results to both theory and practice.  In sum, I examine how sharing 
bad news could have positive or negative implications for employees in terms of leader 
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evaluations of the employees’ effectiveness. That is, I consider whether leaders reward 
employees who share bad news, or whether they instead shoot the messenger.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, I first review the literature on sharing bad news. Drawing on this 
prior work, I develop a definition of sharing bad news as it relates to employees’ 
speaking up to their supervisor with critical mistakes and errors. Additionally, I compare 
my conceptualization of sharing bad news with other similar constructs that have 
assessed speaking up behaviors at work. Finally, I consider the importance of exploring 
outcomes of employees’ sharing bad news, and focus in particular on the relevance of 
understanding supervisor responses. 
Sharing Bad News:  A Review of the Literature 
 The idea of sharing bad news was initially introduced into the scholarly literature 
by Rosen and Tesser (1970), who loosely defined bad news as messages containing 
undesirable information. In a laboratory study, the authors tested the “common sense 
notion that people will be more reluctant to communicate information which is negative 
rather than positive for the recipient” (p. 253), and indeed, found support for this 
hypothesis. That is, individuals were significantly less likely to share bad news messages 
than good news messages with a recipient. A subsequent field study confirmed these 
findings (Tesser, Rosen, & Tesser, 1971). The authors concluded that individuals were 
uncomfortable sharing negative information, but, perhaps more importantly, found 
evidence supporting the idea that participants in the study were concerned about how 
recipients would view or evaluate them if they shared bad news.  
 From these initial studies, a stream of research grew around what was referred to 
as the MUM effect (keeping Mum about Undesirable Messages; Tesser & Rosen, 1975), 
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and this body of work primarily considered the sharing of bad news from the perspective 
of the messenger. For example, scholars considered how characteristics and mood of the 
messenger influenced the sharing of bad news messages (Bond & Anderson, 1987; 
Tesser, Rosen, & Batchelor, 1972a; Tesser, Rosen, & Waranch, 1973). In addition, 
scholars found that individuals were more willing to share bad news with a bystander 
than with the target of a message (Tesser, Rosen, & Conlee, 1972), and were also more 
likely to delegate the sharing of bad news to someone else (Rosen, Grandison, & Stewart, 
1974). These early studies firmly established the reluctance of individuals to share bad 
news, and the factors that made them more or less likely to share bad news messages.  
As a part of this work, a smaller group of studies emerged that considered the role 
of the recipient in the willingness of the messenger to share bad news, but the findings of 
these studies were somewhat limited. For example, scholars found that qualities of 
recipients (Rosen, Johnson, Johnson, & Tesser, 1973), including their mood and emotion 
or affect (King, 1972; Tesser et al., 1972a), did little to encourage the sharing of bad 
news messages. However, scholars did find that when messengers felt an obligation 
toward the recipient, they were more likely to transmit bad news messages (Tesser, 
Rosen, & Batchelor, 1972b), and further, they were more likely to share bad news when 
the recipient was known to them than when the recipient was unknown (e.g., Rosen & 
Tesser, 1972). This suggests that the relationship between the messenger and recipient is 
important to the sharing of bad news. Additionally, Rosen and Tesser (1972) suggested 
that messengers were concerned about how recipients would evaluate them following the 
sharing of bad news. Specifically, the authors proposed that messengers would be less 
likely to share bad news if they thought they would be evaluated negatively. Although the 
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authors stopped short of testing the actual recipient responses, instead focusing only on a 
messenger’s perceived responses, their study points to the idea that the sharing of bad 
news carries expectations of a response from a recipient, and these responses could be 
important in understanding if or how bad news is shared. However, these ideas were 
never fully developed or tested. In sum, the early work on sharing bad news focused 
primarily on bad news messengers, including whether or not these individuals would 
share bad news and under what circumstances.  
As interest in understanding the sharing of bad news grew within organizational 
settings, this orientation toward the messenger remained prominent in two distinct ways. 
First, in response to the reluctance of messengers to speak up with bad news, scholars 
took a more practical and prescriptive approach to sharing bad news, focusing on how to 
deliver bad news effectively (Legg & Sweeney, 2014; Sweeney & Shepperd, 2007), an 
idea popularized by the media (Andersen, 2013; Bies, 2012; Gallo, 2015; Seim, 2014). 
For instance, Lee (1993) found that using politeness tactics helped convey the 
informational value of bad news messages to recipients. Further, Richter et al. (2016) 
found that training individuals to share bad news improved delivery of the message and 
increased perceptions of fairness among recipients. These studies focus on sharing bad 
news in ways that ensures the message is heard by recipients, but do not account for how 
recipients respond to the news once received.  
Second, current work around sharing bad news in the workplace has focused on 
the manager or leader as “occupational delivers” of sharing bad news (Bies, 2013, p. 
138). For example, managers are often responsible for sharing news about negative 
events, such as downsizing (Bean & Hamilton, 2006; Clair & Dufresne, 2004; Folger & 
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Skarlicki, 1998), hiring and firing decisions (Lavelle, Folger, & Manegold, 2014; Richter, 
König, Koppermann, & Schilling, 2016), and pay cuts (e.g., Greenberg, 1990). 
Supervisors may also be responsible for providing negative feedback when employees 
are not performing effectively (e.g., Ilgen & Davis, 2000; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979), 
or turning down employee requests for resources (Izraeli & Jick, 1986). From this 
perspective, sharing bad news reflects communication about negative events and 
circumstances within the workplace, and is positioned as a behavior that is directed 
downward from managers to employees. In contrast to prior work, which considered the 
sharing of bad news a voluntary act (Rosen & Tesser, 1970; Tesser & Rossen, 1975), this 
perspective implies that sharing bad news is required because it is generally shared by 
leaders who assume this responsibility as part of their role within the organization.  
To summarize, prior research on sharing bad news has largely focused on the act 
of sharing bad news and conditions under which a messenger chooses to share the 
information (or not) with a recipient. Initial work in this area found that individuals were 
hesitant to share bad news, and explored characteristics of the messenger that enhanced a 
willingness to share bad news. Within the workplace, prior work on sharing bad news has 
focused on the practical approaches to crafting a bad news message. In addition, studies 
examining sharing bad news at work have concentrated on significant workplace events 
(i.e., layoffs, downsizing) that are conveyed downward in an organizational hierarchy 
from managers to employees. Although informative, this prior work is limited in a 
number of ways.  
First, by focusing on significant negative events that may occur irregularly within 
the workplace, previous studies have ignored the potentially more frequent opportunities 
   13 
for sharing bad news that arise in organizations, such as the reporting of errors or 
mistakes that occur on a more regular basis in the context of ongoing work within 
organizations (e.g., Sellen, 1994; Zhao & Olivera 2006). In this regard, employees may 
frequently find themselves in a position to share bad news, as they are likely to be aware 
of work-related incidents prior to the leader or supervisor. Thus, it makes sense to view 
the sharing of bad news in terms of these smaller, more frequent events within the 
organization and focus on the role of the employee in conveying these messages.  
Second, although there is value in understanding the best approach to 
communicating bad news messages, this literature has not clearly defined what it means 
to “share bad news,” particularly when bad news is considered in terms of employees’ 
sharing of mistakes or slip-ups (as opposed to leaders’ sharing news about major events, 
such as downsizing or pay cuts). Relatedly, it is also important to distinguish sharing bad 
news from other forms of speaking up. Scholars have offered a number of terms and 
concepts to describe different types of speaking up behaviors, and although sharing bad 
news shares common elements with some of these constructs, sharing bad news provides 
a unique perspective on employee speaking up that has not yet been adequately captured 
within the literature.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the explicit focus on whether or not bad 
news will be shared by messengers has overlooked the outcomes of sharing the news, 
particularly how the recipient responds to a messenger once bad news is delivered. 
Within the workplace, bad news messengers are likely to be employees, making the 
responses of their leader or supervisor particularly salient.  
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In the sections that follow, I offer a new conceptualization of sharing bad news 
that accounts for the sharing of bad news by employees, and offer a potential avenue 
forward for research that explores the importance of leader responses. First, I develop the 
concept of sharing bad news as employee communication of mistakes and errors to a 
leader, and offer a clear definition describing the behavior. Second, I distinguish sharing 
bad news from other constructs in the literature that have been used to describe related 
speaking up behaviors. Finally, having defined the concept, I consider the importance of 
understanding outcomes of sharing bad news, particularly how supervisors or leaders 
respond when employee share bad news.  
A new perspective of sharing bad news in the workplace 
As the previous section implies, bad news is not only communicated by leaders, 
but can also be shared by employees. This perspective deviates from prior research, and 
as such, it is important to establish a definition that clearly describes sharing bad news in 
a workplace context, and specifically as a form of information sharing initiated by 
employees. Prior work has offered some insight into what it means to share bad news. 
Perhaps most obviously, the denotation of “bad” news (as opposed to “good” news) 
implies that the information being shared is potentially harmful, unpleasant, or unwanted 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Thus, sharing bad news reflects 
communication of messages that are undesirable to the potential recipient (Rosen & 
Tesser, 1970). These definitions provide a general sense of what it means to share bad 
news, but they potentially describe a wide range of situation or events, some of which 
may not necessarily reflect “bad news.” In an attempt to clarify and extend the definition 
of sharing bad news, Bies (2013) borrowed from the medical literature and suggested that 
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sharing bad news reflects communication of “information that results in a perceived loss 
by the receiver, and. . . creates cognitive, emotional, or behavioral deficits in the receiver 
after the receiving of the news” (p. 137-8). The definition offered by Bies (2103) hints at 
the idea that bad news messages may require an input of effort, energy, or resources from 
the recipient. Although these existing definitions set the foundation of sharing bad news 
as something inherently unpleasant (e.g., Sweeney & Sheppard, 2007), none specifically 
describe what it means to share bad news within an organizational context, nor what 
constitutes sharing bad news from an employee perspective. Building on the current 
definitions, I suggest that there are a number of specific factors relevant to employees’ 
sharing of bad news within the workplace.  
First, although major events, such as layoffs or pay cuts, are likely to be 
considered bad news due to their highly negative impact on the recipients, they are not 
the only type of situation that can be detrimental in the work environment. Mistakes and 
errors are common in the workplace (Reason, 1990; Zhao & Olivera, 2006), and can have 
distinct sets of causes and consequences. These minor mishaps can include breaking or 
damaging equipment, under- or over-charging customers for services, providing the 
wrong services or products, typos, and miscalculations, among others examples (e.g., 
Green, 2014, 2015; Leahcim, 2014). In addition, issues can arise when unexpected events 
occur, such as changes in environmental or weather conditions, leading to deviations in 
the plan of work (Hällgren, 2007; Söderholm, 2008). The impact of these seemingly 
small events can be equally consequently to the organization as events of a larger scale, 
such as economic costs or damaged reputation (Brodbeck et al., 1993; Goodman et al., 
2011; Green, 2014, 2015; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Thus, mistakes, errors, and deviations 
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can be considered “bad news” in the sense that the potential outcomes are undesired. 
Further, the nature of mistakes and errors suggest that employees are the individuals most 
likely to observe or experience them when they occur. That is, employees are often 
responsible for completion of tasks and duties that are directly tied to unit or 
organizational goals and outcomes (e.g., Aguinis, 2009; Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; 
Gallo, 2011; Rotundo & Sackett, 2002). When mistakes occur within the work unit, 
employees are the most likely individuals to recognize discrepancies between the 
intended and actual goals or outcomes (e.g., Reason, 1990). Consequently, sharing bad 
news within organizations involves communication of these mistakes and errors. 
Second, and implied by the previous point, a key feature of sharing bad news is 
that the information being conveyed is unknown to the recipient. When bad news is 
shared, it creates a disruption in normal routines, and signals a breakdown in taken-for-
granted expectations about what should happen (Maynard, 2003). In organizations, 
leaders expect that goals and objectives of their unit will be met, and bad news in the 
form of mistakes, errors, and deviations, introduces the possibility that these expectations 
will not be achieved. In this regard, sharing bad news suggests an altered view of the 
future that was not anticipated by the recipient (Buckman, 1984). Whereas prior 
definitions have focused exclusively on the negative affect and sense of loss associated 
with the sharing of bad news (Bies, 2013; Maynard, 2003), this perspective shifts 
attention to the unexpectedness of sharing bad news messages that causes the recipient to 
reevaluate their expectations of the situation. 
Finally, in addition to identifying what is communicated, it is also relevant to 
consider with whom the information is begin shared. As the previous paragraph implies, 
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bad news in the form of mistakes and errors can range from begin relatively benign to 
highly impactful, but all bad news messages, regardless of severity, are communicated 
due to an underlying need for resolution or correction. In other words, bad news implies a 
deviation in the plan of work, and that in order to meet expectations or objectives, action 
will need to be taken to resolve the issue. The notion that action may be required aligns 
with Bies (2013) conceptualization of sharing bad news, which alludes to the potential 
investment of the recipient. Further, resolution of the situation likely requires a remedy 
that extends beyond the employees’ knowledge or abilities (e.g., if the employee could 
fix the problem easily, goals and objectives would still be met and there would be no bad 
news to share). As such, bad news is most appropriately directed toward individuals, such 
as supervisors or leaders, responsible for the work unit or team who have a distinct 
interest in addressing the issue and have access to the skills or resources necessary to do 
so (e.g., Judge & Piccolo, 2004). In other words, bad news is likely to be shared with 
individuals whom will be impacted by the news, but who also have the means to help 
resolve the issue.  
In sum, several factors make employees’ sharing bad news in the workplace a 
unique form of communication. Bad news message content is likely to reflect mistakes, 
errors, and deviations related to work tasks and processes, and these events are likely to 
go undetected by others unless shared by employees. Further, bad news messages are 
likely delivered to individuals who may be surprised to hear the news, but can ultimately 
help resolve the situation. In considering each of these points, I formally define sharing 
bad news as communication of closely held information regarding errors, mistakes, 
deviations, or other negatively valenced events which vary in severity and may require 
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action or remediation on the part of the recipient who is not likely to know about the 
issue, but who is responsible for the unit of work in which the issue occurs. Extending 
prior conceptualizations of sharing bad news, the definition and conceptualization I use 
here more firmly grounds sharing bad news within the organizational context and as a 
behavior enacted by employees.  
Comparing sharing bad news to other similar constructs 
Although this revised conceptualization positions the sharing of bad news more 
firmly within the organizational context, it also highlights similarities to a number of 
other constructs. For instance, the current conceptualization of sharing bad news 
incorporates the idea of speaking up at work. Indeed, the “sharing” of bad news directly 
implies communication of messages to relevant others. Consequently, it is important to 
consider other constructs that similarly reflect speaking up, such as voice (generally) and 
prohibitive voice (specifically), whistleblowing, upward communication, and issue 
selling. Further, sharing bad news offers insight to the effectiveness of work tasks and 
processes, suggesting it may also be relevant to compare sharing bad news with feedback, 
and particularly negative feedback. Finally, as the content of bad news messages is likely 
to be mistakes and errors, it is worthwhile to consider how the sharing of bad news 
differs from error reporting. I consider each of these constructs in more detail below.  
Voice. A key aspect of sharing bad news is the implication that individuals speak 
up with critical information. As such, one of the most important constructs to consider 
alongside sharing bad news is voice. Much like sharing bad news, voice is a voluntary 
expression directed internally within the organization (Maynes & Podsakoff, 2014; 
Morrison, 2014). However, unlike sharing bad news, voice is used by employees with the 
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clear intention of influencing the work environment (Maynes & Podsakoff, 2014). More 
specifically, individuals speak up with ideas, suggestions, and concerns in order to 
improve organizational functioning by terminating or changing a current practice 
(Morrison, 2011, 2014; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). When employees use voice, their 
underlying purpose is to alter the status quo. In contrast, when employees share bad 
news, they are calling attention the fact that the status quo has already changed. That is, 
sharing bad news reflects informative communication about events that have already 
happened whereas voice consists of ideas and opinions about work-related issues that 
could change organizational functioning in the future. Thus, sharing bad news differs 
from voice both in the intention behind the communication, as well as the type of 
information being delivered in the message.  
Prohibitive voice. The concept of employee voice generally has manifest in a 
number of more specific forms, and of particular relevance to sharing bad news is 
prohibitive voice. Whereas voice generally consists of work-related ideas or concerns 
intended to change the work environment, prohibitive voice reflects communication 
regarding problems in the work environment (e.g., Morrison, 2011), including work 
practices, incidents, or behaviors that could be harmful to the organization (Liang, Farh, 
& Farh, 2012). In this regard, sharing bad news and prohibitive voice are similar in that 
both types of communication indicate a situation or problem that could have negative 
consequences to the work unit or organization. In spite of the similarities in message 
content, sharing bad news and prohibitive voice differ in the potential implications of the 
message. Prohibitive voice points to organizationally-embedded issues that could be 
harmful generally (Liang et al., 2012), and is proactive in the sense of calling attention to 
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policies or practices that need to be stopped or altered in order to prevent damaging 
outcomes for the organization. Bad news messages are tied directly to specific goals or 
objectives of the unit or organization, and when these messages are shared, it indicates a 
discrepancy in meeting these goals or objectives. Unlike prohibitive voice, sharing bad 
news is reactive, and reflects that mistake or error that has already occurred. Instead of 
potentially preventing a problem, sharing bad news indicates an incident has happened, 
and that remediation is required in order to meet expectations or goals. As an illustration, 
a prohibitive voice message may suggest that current shipping practices are inefficient 
and could result in customers not receiving orders on time. Addressing the issues 
associated with prohibitive voice could benefit the unit or organization by preventing 
current or future problems. Using the same example, sharing bad news may convey that 
an order did not reach a customer within the expected shipping window. In the case of 
sharing bad news, the incident has already occurred and remediation in necessary to 
realign work tasks or processes with the expected unit or organizational goals. In short, 
sharing bad news refers to specific and immediate instances that have the potential to 
disrupt unit or organizational functioning whereas prohibitive voice identifies more 
general issues that could be harmful to the organization.  
Whistle-blowing. As mentioned above, sharing bad news, like prohibitive voice, 
refers to situations or events in the work environment that are undesirable, or could have 
negative consequences. Similarly, whistle-blowing also refers to expressions regarding 
workplace activities which could be damaging to the organization. More specifically, 
whistle-blowing is defined as “organization members’ disclosure of illegal, immoral, or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to parties who may be able to 
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effect action” (Miceli & Near, 1985, p. 525). Although this definition initially sounds 
somewhat similar to the concept of sharing bad news, these two constructs differ in three 
distinct ways. First, and perhaps most critically, whistle-blowing refers explicitly to 
activities that are unethical or illegal, and does not include situations or incidents where 
the behavior or activity is accidental or misguided (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2009). 
Sharing bad news represents communication regarding deviations that are unexpected or 
unplanned. Unlike whistle-blowing, which implies ongoing or even institutionalized 
wrongdoing, sharing bad news describes one-time events which disrupt the expected 
work process. Second, whistle-blowing calls out organizational policies and practices that 
violate legal or ethical norms or values. As mentioned, sharing bad news refers to 
discrepancies related to the work itself, not the policies or practices related to work. Third 
and finally, both sharing bad news and whistle-blowing involve the sharing of 
information with those who have the ability to resolve the problem. However, whereas 
bad news messages are shared only with recipients who are internal to the organization, 
whistle-blowing often involves sharing information to recipients who are external to the 
organization (Miceli & Near, 1985, 2002; Near & Miceli, 1996). Based on these 
differences, sharing bad news can clearly be conceptually distinguished from whistle-
blowing.  
Upward communication. Though not explicitly stated within the definition, 
sharing bad news implies that messages are communicated upward to an individual, such 
as a leader or supervisor, who has the skills, resources, or authority to address the issue. 
As such, it is important to clarify how sharing bad news differs from other constructs that 
capture the notion of conveying messages upward in the organizational hierarchy, such as 
   22 
upward communication. Upward communication refers to the sharing of information by 
lower members to higher members within the organizational hierarchy (Athanassiades, 
1974; Morrison, 2011; Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974), and can include information about the 
subordinate, the work unit, organizational practices or policies, or issues relevant to the 
completion of work tasks (Glauser, 1984). Upward communication is similar to upward 
voice, which reflects the expression of work-related ideas to leaders or supervisors (Liu, 
Song, Li, & Liao, 2017). The concept of upward communication is broad in the sense that 
it can include many different types of messages, which differs from the narrow focus on 
mistakes, errors, or deviations in work tasks or processes inherent to sharing bad news. 
Following from this, sharing bad news presents issues that likely need redress by the 
recipient because they interfere with the effective completion of work. Upward 
communication does not necessarily impose the same urgency on a recipient to respond, 
as the message is likely to convey new ideas, information relevant to tasks, or requested 
reports (Morrison, 2011) and not information regarding problems or issues, as is the case 
when sharing bad news. In sum, upward communication is an encompassing concept that 
describes the sharing of information upward generally whereas sharing bad news 
describes communication regarding specific issues that are potentially problematic to the 
work group or organization. 
Issue selling. Related to the idea of upward communication is the notion of issue 
selling, which describes the voluntary efforts of employees to influence the 
organizational agenda by focusing the attention of those above them on issues that are 
particularly important to the employee (Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, & Dutton, 1998; 
Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton, Ashford, Lawrence, Miner-Rubino, 2002). Issue selling 
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is not just communicating upward, but a distinct attempt to influence supervisors and 
leaders within the organization (Ansari & Kapoor, 1987). In this regard, sharing bad news 
is clearly distinct from issue selling because sharing bad news is not intended to persuade 
leaders that a message is important, but instead to alert the recipient of important 
incidents or situations that have occurred. Further, issue selling involves persuading 
supervisors or leaders that certain ideas or trends merit attention (Dutton & Ashford, 
1993; Morrison, 2011), and suggests that the organization or individual could benefit by 
addressing the particular issue (Ashford et al., 1998). By drawing attention to key issues, 
the underlying purpose of issue selling is to call attention to opportunities that may have 
the potential to affect positive organizational change. The purpose of sharing bad news, 
in contrast, is to identify factors that may directly inhibit the achievement of unit or 
organizational goals or outcomes.   
Negative Feedback.  In addition to constructs that describe different types of 
speaking up in the workplace, sharing bad news also has some potential commonality 
with the concept of feedback, and particularly negative feedback. In a general sense, 
feedback describes the communication of a message from a sender to a recipient that 
provides information about the recipient’s past performance (Ilgen et al., 1979; Larson, 
1984). Although some forms of feedback incorporate subordinate input (e.g., 360 degree 
feedback; Atwater & Brett, 2005; Brett & Atwater, 2001), feedback is most frequently 
delivered by supervisors to their subordinates, or from peer to peer (e.g., Fedor, Eder, & 
Buckley, 1989; Ilgen et al., 1979). Thus, one of the key distinctions between sharing bad 
news and feedback generally is the direction the information is shared, as sharing bad 
news implies communication upward to those who are responsible for the work unit, 
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generally a supervisor or leader. In thinking more specifically of negative feedback, or 
messages that convey a discrepancy between actual performance and the standards or 
expectations for performance (Podsakoff & Farh, 1989), sharing bad news similarly 
conveys a discrepancy between actual and expected outcomes. However, unlike negative 
feedback, the purpose of sharing bad news is not to convey information regarding the 
recipient’s performance. Although mistakes, errors, or deviations could provide an 
indirect indication of a supervisor’s effectiveness within the work unit, the underlying 
reason for sharing bad news is to alert the supervisor that something has gone wrong, not 
to speculate on what these mishaps may imply with regard to the supervisor’s 
performance.   
Error reporting. Finally, sharing bad news is also conceptually distinct from error 
reporting. Error reporting can be defined as formal communication of errors or mistakes 
to supervisors or leaders (Zhao & Olivera, 2006), and this definition is different from 
sharing bad news in two ways. First, error reporting only refers to communication about 
mistakes or errors made by individuals (Zhao & Olivera, 2006) whereas sharing bad news 
has a wider reach, including not only mistakes, but also unexpected events or deviations 
related to the work that potentially inhibit achievement of goals or outcomes. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, error reporting refers to an official process of communicating 
issues when something has gone wrong. Sharing bad news is an informal employee 
behavior. That is, employees choose to share bad news on their own volition, not because 
organizational policy or practice compels them to do so in a certain way or following a 
certain protocol.  
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As these comparisons demonstrate, sharing bad news represents a unique type of 
employee behavior that is distinctly different from other similar constructs, including 
(prohibitive) voice, whistle-blowing, upward communication, issue selling, negative 
feedback, and error reporting. By clearly defining and differentiating the sharing of bad 
news, it is possible to consider the possible implications of sharing bad news within the 
workplace. More specifically, I suggest that sharing bad news could have distinct 
implications for the messenger.  
The importance of understanding responses to sharing bad news 
As my definition of sharing bad news suggests, employees share bad news as a 
means of communicating critical information. Sharing bad news draws attention to issues 
that might otherwise go unnoticed, but are likely to inhibit successful completion of work 
tasks if not addressed. Consequently, employees should be encouraged to share bad news 
because the information communicated could impact organizational functioning. 
However, employees may not always speak up with bad news messages. For instance, 
employees may withhold information when they are in positions of lower power than the 
recipient and do not perceive the recipient to be open to receiving the information 
(Morrison, See, & Pan, 2015). Further, bad news messages have an inherently negative 
tone (e.g., Rosen & Tesser, 1970) because they illuminate problems or discrepancies. 
Negative events or situations are likely to have a stronger impact on the message 
recipient compared to neutral or positively-valenced messages (Baumeister et al., 2001). 
As such, recipients may feel threatened by the sharing of bad news and may reject or 
deny messages that contain this type of unwanted information (e.g., Morrison & Milliken, 
2000; Steelman & Rutkowski, 2004). In the workplace, recipients of bad news messages 
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(i.e., supervisors or leaders) can have a distinct influence on whether or not employees 
are willing to share crucial information. Indeed, scholars have shown that employees are 
sensitive to managerial responses when communicating upward (e.g., Burris, 2012; 
Detert & Burris, 2007; Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, Hayes, & Wierba, 1997). To this end, it 
is important to understand how leaders respond when bad news is shared, as their 
responses are likely to influence whether or not individuals will choose to share bad news 
again in the future.  
Although it may be possible to draw from research on related topics, such as 
voice or whistle-blowing, to identify how negative forms of speaking up at work can 
influence outcomes, such as evaluations of effectiveness (e.g., Chamberlin et al., 2017), 
sharing bad news, as defined here, has unique qualities that make it difficult to apply this 
prior research directly. For example, sharing bad news accounts for the day-to-day 
mistakes or slips that happen in organizations. Other scholarly work that has explored the 
concept of sharing bad news has only considered large-scale organizational events that 
occur infrequently in the workplace. Further, sharing bad news is a reactive behavior: 
when employees share bad news with a leader, their action of doing so indicates that the 
status quo has changed, and that something has occurred which likely hinders or prevents 
task completion or goal attainment. Many forms of speaking up, such as voice, focus on 
proactive behaviors, or offering suggestions to change the status quo in ways that would 
benefit the organization. Finally, sharing bad news requires a response from the leader. 
That is, the nature of the communication suggests that something is wrong and needs to 
be fixed or remediated, and the leader is likely the person responsible for ensuring that 
the issue is resolved. Other forms of speaking up do not require the response or action of 
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a leader or supervisor to this same extent, if at all. In sum, existing constructs within the 
literature do not capture the concept of sharing bad news in the workplace. As such, 
relationships between existing speaking up concepts and outcomes, such as employee 
effectiveness, do not accurately convey how leaders view or respond to sharing bad news 
specifically. In the following chapter, I explore this idea further and develop a model that 
accounts for leader responses when employees share bad news. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop theory and hypotheses that explain the 
relationship between the sharing of bad news by employees and the response of leaders to 
this particular type of information sharing. As discussed earlier, understanding this 
relationship is important, as the content of bad news messages can be critical to the unit 
or organization, and leader responses can influence the extent to which employees are 
willing to speak up (e.g., Chamberlin et al., 2017; Detert & Burris, 2007; Liu, Zhu, & 
Yang, 2010; Milliken et al., 2003). More specifically, I suggest that the relationship 
between sharing bad news and leader responses is not a direct path, and consider the role 
of challenge and hindrance appraisals, as well as the role of social exchange in the form 
of leader-member exchange, as the mediating mechanisms though which the effects of 
sharing bad news are transmitted to leader responses. In addition, I suggest that aspects of 
message delivery, such as timeliness and the inclusion of solutions, may influence how 
supervisors appraise the sharing of bad news. Finally, I consider how the extent to which 
a messenger is responsible for the bad news being shared may influence the exchange 
relationship between the employee and supervisor following the appraisal process. A full 
depiction of my theoretical model is shown in Figure 1. 
Sharing Bad News and Supervisor Evaluations of Employee Effectiveness 
As defined in the previous chapter, sharing bad news describes communication of 
information regarding errors, mistakes, or deviations that may require action on the part 
of the recipient who is not likely to know about the issue, but who is responsible for the 
unit of work in which the issue occurs. Based on this definition, it is possible that sharing 
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bad news could be useful or helpful to leaders in a number of ways. For example, when 
employees share bad news, it directs leaders’ attention to critical issues that could 
influence successful completion of team or organizational goals. Receiving this 
information can offer leaders an opportunity to adapt their plan of work to mitigate the 
potential negative outcomes of the bad news (e.g., LePine, 2003, 2005). Further, 
communication of bad news can also stimulate learning (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; 
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998) and foster innovation (Harteis et al., 2008; van Dyck et al., 
2005) because it initiates a process of problem-solving to address the issue. Sharing bad 
news may allow leaders to eliminate or reduce the negative consequences of mistakes or 
errors and engage in activities that improve work practices (van Dyck et al., 2005). As a 
result of these benefits, leaders may reward employees for sharing bad news with higher 
evaluations of effectiveness.  
However, although sharing bad news could lead supervisors to evaluate 
employees favorably, it may also lead supervisors to rate employees as less effective. For 
instance, employees’ sharing of bad news can place a burden on the supervisor. As the 
definition of sharing bad news suggests, supervisors are likely unaware of the bad news 
event, which implies that they may be unprepared to handle the problem or situation. In 
addition, employees share bad news because a resolution is required, and the supervisor 
is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the issue is addressed. As such, the supervisor 
will likely expend significant energy and resources in addressing the bad news incident 
(e.g., Bies, 2013). These negative implications of sharing bad news for leaders suggest 
that leaders may punish employees for sharing bad news with lower evaluations of 
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effectiveness. Given that leaders may respond to the sharing of bad news with either 
higher or lower evaluations of effectiveness, I propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a:  Sharing bad news is positively related to supervisor evaluations 
of employee effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Sharing bad news is negatively related to supervisor evaluations 
of employee effectiveness. 
Sharing Bad News as a Form of Social Exchange 
One way to understand how employees’ sharing bad news may influence 
supervisor responses is through a lens of social exchange. Rooted in theories of 
psychology and economics, the basic premise of social exchange theory is that “an 
individual who supplies rewarding services to another obligates him. To discharge this 
obligation, the second must furnish benefits to the first in turn” (Blau, 1964, p. 89). In 
other words, when individuals engage in behaviors that provide a tangible or intangible 
item to another individual, that other person must reciprocate with an item in kind in 
order to reduce feelings of obligation. However, unlike strictly economic exchanges, the 
obligations generated through social exchange are unspecified and open-ended (e.g., 
Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), suggesting that although individuals are 
likely to reciprocate an exchange (e.g., Gouldner, 1960), how and when they choose to do 
so are not necessarily clear or direct. Further, social exchange theory does not account for 
isolated events, but instead describes an exchange relation as a series of interactions that 
generate obligations (Emerson, 1972b, 1976; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). That is, 
there is an ongoing flow of reciprocated behavior between each participant in the 
exchange. Behaviors are voluntary and motivated by the potential benefits of expected 
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reciprocity (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960; Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000). 
Individuals continue to initiate exchanges, or transactions, because they believe that 
doing so will elicit a desired response from the other participant. In this regard, 
exchanges are mutually reinforcing (Emerson, 1972a; Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1958) 
wherein the behavior of one participant in the exchange will influence the way in which 
the other participant chooses to respond.  
In the workplace, one of the most important exchange relations that can develop is 
that between an employee and supervisor, and scholars have shown that employees 
distinguish their exchange relationships with leaders from their relationships to the 
organization more generally (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000; Settoon, 
Bennett, & Liden, 1996; Wayne, Shore, Bommer, & Tetrick, 2002; Wayne et al., 1997). 
Indeed, scholars have studied this type of relationship extensively (e.g., Gerstner & Day, 
1997), and the idea of social exchange forms the foundation of leader-member exchange 
theory (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Liden, Sparrowe, & Wayne, 1997). Whereas social 
exchange theory emphasizes the ongoing exchange process that creates mutual 
obligations between individuals, such as supervisors and their employees (Blau, 1964; 
Emerson, 1972a; Homans, 1958), leader member-exchange theory has grown to focus on 
the quality of the exchange relations between leaders and their followers and the 
implications of this dyadic structure (e.g., Liden, et al. 1997). The leader-member 
exchange construct (LMX) captures the social exchange relationship that exists between 
employees and their supervisors (Masterson et al., 2000; Settoon et al., 1996; Wayne et 
al., 1997). Exchange relations between employees and leaders are based upon the valued 
resources that each can offer the other (Liden, et al. 1997). At the most basic level, 
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leaders provide their followers with the necessities to perform their job and employees 
reciprocate by completing job tasks and duties (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). As exchange 
relationships grow over time, the types of resources exchanged can become more varied 
as both supervisors and employees develop personal feelings of obligation, gratitude, and 
trust (Blau, 1964).  
Our understanding of exchange relations between supervisors and employees is 
informed by considering more specifically the types of resources that are exchanged 
during transactions. To this end, Foa & Foa (1974, 1980) offer a typology of resources 
that categorizes the content of an exchange into six categories, including money, goods, 
services, status, affiliation, and information. Money reflects any form of currency with a 
standardized exchange value; goods refer to material objects or products; services 
involves acts performed for another individual; status reflects perceptions of value or 
esteem; affiliation generally refers to expressions of affectionate regard, warmth, and 
support; information describes the sharing of data, knowledge, advice, opinions, or 
instruction (Foa & Foa, 1980; Wilson, Sin, & Conlon, 2010). Bad news is a specific type 
of information that can be shared between supervisors and employees.  
Although supervisors and employees can have transactions involving any of these 
resources, Wilson, Sin, and Conlon (2010) suggest that certain resources are more likely 
than others to be exchanged, and that the patterns of exchange between employees and 
supervisors can be understood in terms of the underlying dimensions of resources. 
According to Foa and Foa (1974, 1980), resources vary along two dimensions, 
particularism and concreteness. The first dimension, particularism, describes the extent to 
which the value of the resource is based on its source, or individual initiating the 
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exchange (Foa & Foa, 1974, 1980). For instance, exchanges that involve money may be 
considered less particularistic because the source is likely irrelevant as long as payment is 
made. In contrast, exchanges that involve status or friendship may be more particularistic 
because these resources are likely to be more meaningful or valuable when delivered by a 
specific individual, not just any source. The second dimension, concreteness, describes 
the extent to which a resource is tangible or specific (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). A 
resource is considered more tangible in nature when the meaning of the exchange is 
easily observable or certain. When the meaning of the exchange is ambiguous or 
representative, the resource is instead considered symbolic in nature. Thus, resources are 
more concrete when they are more tangible and less symbolic. For example, goods and 
services may be considered more concrete because they involve the exchange of material 
products or a set of clearly defined behaviors. Information, such as bad news, may be 
considered less concrete in that the meaning of the behavior represents something beyond 
the message itself, and is open to greater interpretation by the receiver.   
Taken together, these two dimensions, particularism and concreteness, help 
distinguish the types of exchanges that occur between supervisors and employees. For 
instance, when resources are less particularistic and more concrete, the exchange tends to 
be economic in that it likely addresses “financial needs and tends to be tangible” 
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005, p. 881). In these economic transactions, both parties tend 
to view the exchange as a direct trade or barter because the resource being given, such as 
money or goods, is quantifiable in terms of costs, value, or time (e.g., Blau, 1964). As 
mentioned previously, these types of exchanges can form the basis of transactions 
between supervisors and employees, but as Wilson et al. (2010) point out, these 
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exchanges are more likely to be initiated by supervisors. That is, supervisors are more 
likely to have access to money (e.g., pay raises) or goods (e.g., tangible resources) that 
they can exchange with employees, whereas employees are less likely to be able to 
directly provide supervisors with either money or goods.  
However, employees do have greater flexibility to provide supervisors with 
resources that are less concrete and more particularistic, such as status, affiliation, 
service, and information (Wilson et al., 2010). For instance, employees can provide 
leaders with respect and admiration (status), commitment and loyalty (affiliation), effort 
and performance (service), and information regarding other employees or departments 
(information) (Wilson et al., 2010). It should be noted that although leaders can also 
exchange these resources with employees, the specific form of each resource that leaders 
provide to employees differs from what employees provide to supervisors. As this 
dissertation focuses on employee behaviors (i.e., sharing bad news) that stimulate leader 
responses, I maintain a focus on resources that employees can share upward with leaders. 
Of the resources that employees potentially share with leaders, I focus in particular on 
information because it can have direct implications to the exchange relationship.  
Exchange relations between employees and supervisors are built on trust, and 
each transaction between an employee and supervisor reinforces the exchange 
relationship by building on a sense of mutual trust (Blau, 1964; Brower, Schoorman, 
&Tan, 2000). Employees’ sharing information reflects a transaction that influences a 
leaders’ sense of trust of the employee. When information is shared, it offers the recipient 
new insight and can influence her or his judgment (Davenport & Prusak, 1998), not only 
about the situation, but also about the messenger. That is, the act of sharing information 
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may lead supervisors to infer characteristics of the employee, and in particular, sharing 
information can have implications for how supervisors perceive an employees’ 
trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is a key antecedent of trust and helps facilitate the 
mechanism of social exchange (Blau, 1964; Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Mayer, 
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Zapata, Olsen, & Martins, 2013). Thus, when employees 
share information, they send signals about their own trustworthiness, and supervisors’ 
perceptions of employees’ trustworthiness can facilitate the exchange relationship by 
influencing supervisors’ feelings of trust and obligation.  
A key underlying assumption of social exchange is that transactions, such as 
sharing information, will enhance the exchange relationship because they increase an 
employees’ perceived trustworthiness. However, this assumption does not necessarily 
hold true when specifically considering the sharing of bad news. Sharing bad news 
reflects a unique type of information exchange in that the transaction could enhance or 
weaken perceived trustworthiness of the messenger. For instance, sharing bad news 
reflects critical information that a supervisor is not likely to know about immediately, but 
has a responsibility to resolve. Receiving bad news could therefore be beneficial to 
supervisors because it draws their attention to important issues. To this end, supervisors 
may feel that employees have acted with benevolence, or a desire to “do good” toward 
the supervisor without any profit motive (Mayer et al., 1995). Sharing bad news reflects 
employees’ care and support of the supervisor, and suggest a willingness to be open, 
factors that all contribute to positive perceptions of trustworthiness and subsequent trust 
(Colquitt et al., 2007; Zapata et al., 2013). In addition, sharing bad news may suggest that 
employees are reliable and willing to do what they believe is right, factors that could 
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increase supervisors’ perceptions of an employee’s integrity, or adherence to a set of 
clear moral or ethical principles (Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). Employees 
perceived to have greater integrity are more likely to be trusted by supervisors (Zapata et 
al., 2013), which in turn, is likely to enhance the exchange relationship between 
supervisors and employees, as reflected by LMX.  
Although sharing bad news can enhance the exchange relationship, there are also 
reasons to believe that the exchange relationship may be weakened when employees 
share bad news. For example, sharing bad news creates an expectation that supervisors 
need to take action in order to resolve the issue. Thus, sharing bad news may increase a 
supervisor’s workload and supervisors may feel that this increased demand inhibits their 
personal growth (e.g., Cavanaugh et al., 2000; LePine, Podsakoff, & LePine, 2005). 
Supervisors may believe employees to be less trustworthy because they are not looking 
out for the supervisors’ best interests. Further, when employees share bad news, 
supervisors may conclude that employees lack the ability, or skills and competencies 
necessary for the job (Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995), to complete their assigned 
duties or tasks effectively. Employees who are perceived as less competent in job tasks 
are less likely to develop strong exchange relations with supervisors (e.g., Graen & 
Scandura, 1987). In addition, sharing bad news may reflect a behavior that deviates from 
expected interactions. Supervisors are more likely to feel trusting of employees when 
their behavior is predicable (e.g., Butler, 1991; Gabarro, 1978; Whitener, Brodt, 
Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998), and sharing bad news may reflect a lack of consistency that 
destabilizes the exchange relationship by reducing trust. In sum, sharing bad news may 
weaken the exchange relationship between employees and supervisors because it depletes 
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a sense of trust and leads supervisors to believe that they are not valued by their 
employees, or that their employees lack competency or ability in work tasks. As such, 
sharing bad news could also be negatively related to LMX.   
Hypothesis 2a:  Sharing bad news is positively related to LMX. 
Hypothesis 2b:  Sharing bad news is negatively related to LMX. 
 The exchange relationship that employees form with their leaders also has 
implications for how leaders respond to the sharing of bad news. As sharing bad news 
reflects an exchange that is more particularistic and less concrete, it can be considered 
more socially-based (as opposed to economically-based). That is, when employees share 
bad news, it obligates their supervisor to reciprocate, and a supervisor’s particular 
response could take many forms (e.g., Blau, 1964) For instance, supervisors may respond 
to social exchanges by sharing resources, offering opportunities, providing social support 
to employees, or assessing employee effectiveness (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Liden et 
al., 1997). Although each of these responses may be valuable, perhaps most significant is 
how leaders respond in terms of employee effectiveness. Evaluations of effectiveness can 
have distinct implications for employees, such as the extent to which they receive access 
to benefits (e.g., Aguinis, Joo, & Gottfredson, 2013) or have opportunities to advance 
within the organization (Igbaria & Baroudi, 1995). Empirically, scholars have 
demonstrated that supervisors play a significant role in whether or not employees choose 
to speak up in the workplace (Burris, 2012; Chamberlin et al., 2017; Detert & Burris, 
2007; Morrison, 2011, 2014), and when supervisors make assessments of an employee’s 
effectiveness in the workplace, it can subsequently encourage or discourage employees 
from sharing bad news in the future. 
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When employees share bad news, it triggers an exchange between an employee 
and supervisor. As hypothesized above, this transaction could increase or decrease the 
quality of the exchange between an employee and supervisor, or LMX. In turn, the 
exchange relationship is likely to influence how supervisors reciprocate the sharing of 
bad news in terms of evaluations of employee effectiveness. Prior work has suggested 
that higher quality exchange relationships will positively influence the extent to which 
employees are rated favorably (Gerstner & Day, 1997), suggesting that to the extent 
sharing bad news enhances LMX, supervisors will be more likely to evaluate employees 
with higher levels of effectiveness.   
Hypothesis 3:  LMX is positively related to supervisor evaluations of employee 
effectiveness.  
Hypothesis 4a: LMX mediates the relationship between sharing bad news and 
supervisor evaluations of employee effectiveness such that the indirect effect is 
positive. 
Hypothesis 4b: LMX mediates the relationship between sharing bad news and 
supervisor evaluations of employee effectiveness such that the indirect effect is 
negative. 
Using a social exchange perspective helps to explain the relationship between 
employees’ sharing of bad news and leader responses, specifically supervisor responses 
in terms of employee effectiveness. Employees develop ongoing exchange relations with 
their supervisor (i.e., LMX) that are maintained through mutually reinforcing behaviors 
(Homans, 1958). When employees share bad news, it reflects the initiation of an 
exchange that is socially-based, and obligates supervisors to respond, which they are 
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likely to do with evaluations of employee effectiveness. However, although social 
exchange theory suggests supervisors will reciprocate when employees share bad news, 
we still lack clarity on how supervisors view these messages and subsequently respond. 
As bad news contain critical information relevant to the completion of work tasks and 
goals, supervisors may construe the sharing of these messages as a useful and valuable 
behavior. Thus, supervisors would likely respond to sharing bad news with positive 
evaluations of employee effectiveness. At the same time, sharing bad news could arouse 
feelings of threat or stress, and supervisors may respond with negative evaluations of 
employee effectiveness. The next section explores each of these potential pathways in 
more detail.  
The Appraisal Process 
The process of social exchange offers insight as to why leaders react to employees 
who share bad news, but it does not explain how they form assessments about the bad 
news that determine whether they will respond by rewarding or punishing the employee. 
One approach to understanding the mechanism through which sharing bad news 
influences LMX and subsequent leader responses is through the transactional theory of 
stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). According to this theory, individuals encounter 
demands in the environment which have the potential to tax their resources and endanger 
their well-being. Individuals then engage in a cognitive appraisal process to understand 
the meaning and significance of the demand. Although Lazarus and Folkman (1984) 
distinguished between a primary appraisal, or assessment of the relevance of the demand, 
and a secondary appraisal, or assessment of how demands can be managed, the 
conceptualization of appraisal in this study refers specifically to the primary appraisal. 
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During the appraisal process, individuals reconcile the realities of a situation with their 
personal interests, and assess the degree to which demands relate to goal relevance, goal 
congruence, and personal well-being (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991). 
Demands are determined to be irrelevant or benign when they have little to no impact on 
goals and individuals do not have a personal stake in the issue. In contrast, demands are 
considered stressful when they are directly connected to goals and individual well-being 
is tied to outcomes.  
The sharing of bad news can be viewed as this type of stress-inducing demand. 
That is, bad news messages are inherently tied the goals of the unit or organization and to 
the extent that a leader’s success within the organization is tied to goal attainment (e.g., 
Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981; Wright, George, Farnsworth, McMahan, 1993), 
bad news messages will fuel leader’s personal interest and influence their well-being. In 
other words, when bad news messages are shared, it alerts leaders to discrepancies in 
work task or processes that interfere with the unit or organizational goals or outcomes for 
which the leader is responsible, making it likely that they will invest resources and effort 
in order to resolve the issue. 
Demands that are judged to be stressful can more readily be considered as those 
which are challenging, or have the potential for rewards, gain, growth, and mastery of 
desired outcomes, and those which are hindering, or have the potential for harm, loss, or 
constraint of desired outcomes (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 
1986; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; LePine, Zhang, Crawford, & Rich, 2016; Webster, 
Beehr, & Love, 2011). Whereas many demands in the work environment have been 
commonly associated with one type of appraisal (Cavanaugh et al., 2000; LePine et al., 
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2016), some demands, such as the sharing of bad news, have the potential to be appraised 
as both (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Webster et al., 2011). For instance, sharing bad news 
highlights mistakes and errors that could, through the process of correcting or resolving 
the issue, lead to learning, innovation, and adaptation (Harteis et al., 2008; Edmondson, 
1996; Sitkin, 1992; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). In this regard, leaders may view the sharing 
of bad news as an opportunity to make work tasks and processes more effective and 
realign goals and expectations with actual outcomes. In addition, sharing bad news could 
enhance personal growth by encouraging skill-building and mastery of job 
responsibilities in ways that help prevent similar mistakes in the future. Thus, leaders 
could perceive the sharing of bad news to be rewarding because employees are pointing 
to ways in which work processes or practices could be improved (Harteis et al., 2008) 
and simultaneously providing development opportunities for the leader (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984) that make them more willing to invest their time and resources (e.g., 
Crawford, LePine, & Rich, 2010).  
Yet at the same time, the sharing of bad news messages could also be conceived 
as threating or harmful because signals a deviance in task completion or goal 
achievement. Addressing the specific issue contained within a bad news message could 
incur costs (Brodbeck et al., 1993) or reflect losses in productivity due to time spent 
correcting an issue (e.g., van Dyck et al., 2005). When employees share bad news, they 
may also expose problems that are not easily remedied or for which the leader does not 
have the skills or experience to fix. Consequently, leaders may view the sharing of bad 
news as constraining, and because they believe that the time and effort invested will not 
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be rewarded (LePine et al., 2016), leaders may disengage from the issue or ignore it 
completely (e.g., Crawford et al., 2010; Pearsall, Ellis, & Stein, 2009).  
Hypothesis 5a:  Sharing bad news is positively related to challenge appraisals. 
Hypothesis 5b:  Sharing bad news is positively related to hindrance appraisals.  
Outcomes of appraisals 
A leader’s appraisal of sharing bad news messages has a distinct impact on the 
exchange relationship between the leader and the employee. When leaders evaluate 
messages as challenging, they believe that they have the capacity to resolve the issue, and 
that they will be rewarded for successful mastery of the situation. Thus, the outcome of 
the message will ultimately enhance a leader’s personal well-being (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984; Lazarus, 1991; LePine et al., 2016; Webster et al., 2011), suggesting that by 
sharing bad news, a messenger has contributed directly to a leader’s growth and gain. 
Further, challenge appraisals are often accompanied by feelings of excitement or 
eagerness (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991; Skinner & Brewer, 2002), and 
these positive emotions are likely associated with the messenger. Consequently, leaders 
are likely to feel that by sharing bad news, employees have exchanged information that is 
useful and beneficial. More specifically, sharing bad news is a symbolic gesture in the 
sense that the value of the bad news extends beyond the message itself (e.g., Foa & Foa, 
1974; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). When leaders make a challenge appraisal, they 
interpret an employee’s sharing of bad news messages as a sign of goodwill and 
helpfulness. Stated more directly in terms of social exchange, when supervisors appraise 
the sharing of bad news as challenging, their exchange relationship with employees is 
likely to be enhanced because they believe the transaction (the exchange of bad news 
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information) is beneficial, and based on norms of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), will 
likely respond to the employee positively. Thus, challenge appraisals will have a positive 
relationship with LMX.  
With regard to hindrance appraisals, leaders are likely to feel thwarted from 
reaching goals and believe that their personal well-being is in danger because they will 
have to invest time and effort into resolving issues that will likely not be rewarding 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991; LePine et al., 2016; Webster et al., 2011). 
Additionally, hindrance appraisals can arouse leaders’ negative emotions, making it 
likely that they will associate feelings of fear, anxiety, and anger with the messenger 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991; Skinner & Brewer, 2002). Unlike challenge 
appraisals of sharing bad news, which reflect an exchange that is useful and well-
meaning, hindrance appraisals of sharing bad news suggest that employees are 
exchanging something harmful that will likely hurt a leader’s personal development and 
achievement. Leaders may feel a sense of loss that is attributed to the employee, 
weakening their exchange relationship with the employee. That is, hindrance appraisals 
will relate negatively to LMX. 
Hypothesis 6a:  Challenge appraisals are positively related to LMX. 
Hypothesis 6b: Hindrance appraisals are negatively related to LMX.  
Mediation through appraisals 
 The act of sharing bad news by employees has the potential to influence the 
exchange relationship between employees and their supervisor. Further, sharing bad news 
could have either a positive or negative impact on LMX. By integrating the transactional 
theory of stress, the nature of the relationship between sharing bad news and LMX 
   44 
becomes clearer. Specifically, leaders appraise the sharing of bad news as either 
challenging or hindering, and the appraisals leaders make transmit the effects of sharing 
bad news to LMX. Although prior research has tended to overlook the importance of 
appraisals, recent work has supported the appraisal process as a critical step in 
determining how individuals perceive demands in the work environment, and how 
subsequent actions and behaviors are influenced by these appraisals (LePine et al., 2016; 
Skinner & Brewer, 2002; Webster et al., 2011). Here, I suggest that the type of appraisal 
leaders make about sharing bad news messages influences their perception of their 
relationship with their employee. That is, when leaders appraise the sharing of bad news 
as challenging, they perceive that their employee has exchanged important and useful 
information, strengthening LMX. When leaders appraise the sharing of bad news as 
hindering, they perceive that their employee has exchanged information that is damaging, 
weakening LMX. In sum, I position challenge and hindrance appraisals as the intervening 
variables through which the effects of employees’ sharing bad news are transferred to 
LMX, and formally hypothesize:   
Hypothesis 7a:  Challenge appraisals mediate the relationship between sharing 
bad news and LMX such that the indirect effect is positive. 
Hypothesis 7b: Hindrance appraisals mediate the relationship between sharing 
bad news and LMX such that the indirect effect is negative. 
Moderators of the appraisal process 
In order to determine the extent to which a demand is viewed as challenging or 
hindering, individuals consider a number of different factors, and with regard to sharing 
bad news, three aspects are particularly salient to leaders. First, leaders consider the 
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amount of control they have over the situation. Control refers to the degree to which 
individuals feel that they can influence their environment (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), 
and derives from Bandura’s (1977) concept of efficacy expectation, which describes an 
individual’s conviction that they possess the skills, knowledge, or resources necessary to 
execute the behaviors required to produce the desired outcomes. In the context of sharing 
bad news, control describes whether or not leaders believe they have the capabilities to 
achieve the desired outcome of resolving the discrepancy identified by the bad news 
message. Leaders who feel a sense of control are more likely to view the bad news 
messages as an opportunity, and will invest the time, effort, and attention necessary to 
resolve the issues raised because they believe that doing so will be rewarding (e.g., 
Bandura, 1982). Additionally, increased control can also facilitate mastery of one’s role 
as a leader because it enhances the skills and experience necessary for improved 
performance (e.g., Gist, 1987). Thus, when leaders feel a greater sense of control 
regarding the bad news, they are likely to appraise the sharing bad news behavior as 
challenging because the messenger has provided an opportunity for growth or gain. In 
contrast, leaders who do not believe they have the capabilities or resources necessary to 
address the bad news are more likely to view messages as a threat. (Bandura, 1977; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Stated differently, when leaders feel that they lack sufficient 
control of the situation described by the bad news message, they are more likely to doubt 
the extent to which investing their efforts will be rewarded, and instead feel more 
vulnerable to the potential consequences of the message. As such, supervisors will 
appraise the sharing of bad news as hindering when they feel little or no control over the 
bad news because they believe the messenger has threatened their personal growth.   
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The second factor that influences leaders’ appraisals of bad news is the degree to 
which the message evokes feelings of uncertainty. Uncertainty arises when the event (i.e., 
bad news) is known, but the degree to which it is harmful is unknown (e.g., Monat, 
Averill, & Lazarus, 1972), and resolution of the issue is ambiguous (e.g., Greco & Roger, 
2001). Thus, leaders are likely to feel uncertain when they are not clear on the full impact 
or range of consequences implied by the bad news, and are unsure how to resolve the 
issue. Uncertainty stimulates feelings of anxiety and fear, which are associated with a 
sense of threat and a focus on the possibility of loss (Argote, Turner, & Fichman, 1989; 
Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007; Greco & Roger, 2001, 2003; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). Consequently, increased uncertainty will likely lead leaders to appraise 
the sharing of bad news as a hindrance because they believe that the messenger’s 
behavior signals something threatening or undesired. In contrast, when leaders are more 
certain about bad news, in that they have a greater understanding of the consequences and 
can readily address the issue, they are more likely to view the sharing of bad news as 
challenging because the supervisor’s investment of effort and resources is more likely to 
be rewarded.  
The third component that features into the appraisal of sharing bad news messages 
is the imminence of the situation. Imminence describes the amount of time between the 
occurrence of the bad news event, and the onset of consequences of the event (e.g., 
Lazarus &Folkman, 1984; McGrath, 1970). That is, the effects of the mistakes or errors 
that form the content of bad news messages can be immediate or occur in the future, and 
this difference in proximal or distal impact can influence the extent to which leaders 
consider messages as challenging or hindering. For instance, when leaders receive bad 
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news, but the consequences occur in the future, leaders potentially have greater 
opportunity to evaluate the situation, and consider multiple approaches to overcoming the 
demand (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Additionally, distal consequences of bad news 
provide leaders increased time to process all relevant information (e.g., De Dreu, 2003), 
and allow leaders to develop a more comprehensive set of strategies for resolving the 
issue (e.g., Kerstholt, 1994). This suggests that leaders have greater flexibility to find 
solutions that are potentially more innovative in nature. Similarly, fully understanding the 
details of the mistake or error could enhance learning and prevent similar issues in the 
future. Further, when the situation is not imminent, leaders can maximize potential for 
effective resolution of the issue by engaging in the right action at the right moment 
(Lazarus, 1999). The ability to adjust how and when to correct bad news suggests that 
leaders also have greater potential to adapt to bad news messages when the consequences 
occur in the future. In contrast, when consequences of bad news are immediate, leaders 
may not have time to consider multiple options, and feel limited in their ability to find an 
adequate resolution (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) or adapt to the 
situation. Rather than concentrating on the potential opportunities of bad news messages, 
leaders may instead focus on the negative consequences (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; 
Edland & Svenson, 1993; Wright, 1974). In short, when consequences are not imminent 
and leaders have more time to resolve the issues inherent in bad news messages, they are 
more likely to see potential opportunity and benefit in the messages. Thus, leaders may 
appraise the sharing of bad news as a challenge. However, when the effects of bad news 
messages are immediate, leaders’ may feel inhibited in their ability to address the 
situation adequately and instead appraise the sharing of bad news as a hindrance.  
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As leaders evaluate the sharing of bad news by employees based on these three 
factors (control, uncertainty, and imminence), their appraisals are likely influenced by 
aspects of the message delivery (Bies, 2013; Lee, 1993; Legg & Sweeny, 2014; Richter et 
al., 2016, Sweeny & Sheppard, 2007). In particular, I suggest that the timeliness of 
message communication and the inclusion of a solution when sharing bad news are 
particularly relevant in the extent to which sharing bad news is construed as challenging 
or hindering. Whereas sharing bad news in a timely manner (i.e., closely following the 
bad news event) can help reduce feelings of imminence, the incorporation of a solution 
within a bad news message can help reduce a leader’s uncertainty and increase their sense 
of control. I explore each of these aspects of message delivery in more detail below.  
Timeliness. The first aspect of message delivery that is relevant to how leaders are 
likely to appraise a message is the idea of timeliness. Timeliness refers to the interval of 
time between the bad news event occurring, and the actual sharing of the incident with 
the leader. Messages that are timely are delivered immediately or shortly following a bad 
news incident, whereas untimely messages reflect a significant delay between the event 
occurrence and the delivery of the message. Research on feedback provides some insight 
as to why timeliness could be influential. In order for feedback to be effective, 
individuals need to be able to pair their responses to the behavior in question, and when 
there is a substantial delay between the behavior and delivery of feedback, it can 
influence the extent to which individuals are able to respond with the appropriate 
corrective action (Ilgen et al., 1979). In other words, delayed feedback can make it 
difficult for individuals to recall the behavior that the feedback is meant to address, and 
subsequently make it less clear how to effectively manage the behavior. A similar logic 
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can be applied to the sharing of bad news. That is, when employees are timely in sharing 
bad news messages, leaders, in turn, may more readily recall and understand the incident, 
making it more likely that they can respond with a course of action that effectively 
resolves the issue (e.g., Lazarus, 1999). In this regard, timeliness could enhance the 
extent to which leaders perceive the sharing of bad news as an opportunity and reduce the 
extent to which sharing bad news is perceived is hindering or threatening.  
In addition, recent work related to employee voice suggests a more direct 
implication of the timing of bad news messages. That is, when messages are timely, it 
provides more opportunities for leaders to develop and implement potential solutions, as 
opposed to delayed messages, which may preclude the possibility of finding an adequate 
solution (e.g., Whiting et al., 2012). When presented with bad news, leaders need a 
sufficient period of time to gather information and fully explore possible ways of 
addressing the issue (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The prompt delivery of messages 
enhances the sense that leaders have adequate time to review their options before the 
onset of consequences. This suggests that timely reporting of messages can enhance the 
degree to which sharing bad news is perceived as challenging and reduce the extent to 
which sharing bad news is perceived as hindering. That is, timely sharing of bad news 
allows leaders the opportunity to find alternatives that best resolve the issue, increasing 
the perception that the sharing of bad news has the potential for growth or gain, and 
reducing the perceived threat or impediment imposed by the sharing of bad news. In sum, 
timely sharing of bad news suggests to leaders that the consequences of the bad news 
event are less imminent, and that leaders have ample opportunity to address the issue. As 
such, timeliness is likely to strengthen the relationship between sharing bad news and 
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challenge appraisals and weaken the relationship between sharing bad news and 
hindrance appraisals.   
Hypothesis 8a:  Timeliness positively moderates the relationship between sharing 
bad news and challenge appraisals such that the positive relationship becomes 
stronger when timeliness is high.  
Hypothesis 8b: Timeliness negatively moderates the relationship between sharing 
bad news and hindrance appraisals such that the positive relationship becomes 
weaker when timeliness is high.  
Inclusion of solution. Another characteristic of message delivery that can have a 
distinct impact on the appraisal of sharing bad news is the extent to which employees 
include a solution as part of the message. When employees incorporate solutions into the 
sharing of bad news messages, they offer leaders a constructive path for approaching and 
resolving the discrepancy identified in the message (Whiting et al., 2012). In this regard, 
including a solution in the bad news message can enhance a leader’s perception of 
control. That is, sharing a solution alongside the bad news helps leaders to identify the 
skills and resources that will be necessary to resolve the issue. Leaders are subsequently 
more likely to feel confident that they can resolve the issue and that investing effort and 
energy into addressing the issue will be worthwhile (e.g., Bandura, 1982). When leaders 
believe that they have greater control in the form of a solution, it enhances the extent to 
which they appraise a messenger’s sharing of bad news as challenging and reduces the 
extent to which a messenger’s sharing of bad news is appraised as hindering.  
Offering resolution to bad news incidents is also likely to reduce a leader’s 
feelings of uncertainty. When a solution is presented, leaders have a clear idea of how the 
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issue may be addressed. Further, the inclusion of a solution with the sharing of bad news 
can also reduce uncertainty by illuminating the degree to which bad news may be useful. 
For example, the ideas and suggestions offered by employees often point to new and 
innovative approaches to addressing concerns in the work environment (e.g., Liang et al., 
2012; Morrison, 2011, 2014; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998), and it is possible that the 
potential benefits of bad news messages are more salient when they are accompanied by 
solutions. That is, leaders may be more likely to perceive the sharing of bad news 
messages as leading to beneficial outcomes, such as innovation and learning, when they 
are accompanied by a solution. In other words, offering solutions can enhance a leader’s 
general perception that messengers are offering an opportunity when they share bad news 
messages, and reduce the perception of sharing bad news as a threat.  
Hypothesis 9a:  Offering solutions positively moderates the relationship between 
sharing bad news and challenge appraisals such that the positive relationship 
becomes stronger when offering solutions is high.  
Hypothesis 9b: Offering solutions negatively moderates the relationship between 
sharing bad news and hindrance appraisals such that the positive relationship 
becomes weaker when offering solutions is high.  
Moderators of the exchange process 
In addition to factors that influence how the sharing of bad news is appraised, I 
also consider factors that influence the exchange relationship between an employee and 
supervisor once an appraisal has been made. More specifically, I suggest that the degree 
to which a messenger is personally responsible for the bad news may influence LMX. 
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Responsibility for the bad news. Responsibility for the bad news refers to the idea 
that the messenger may be sharing bad news for which s/he is responsible (i.e., “I made 
this mistake”), partially responsible (i.e., “Our team made this mistake”), or not at all 
responsible (i.e., “This mistake was caused by external factors”). That is, bad news 
messengers may be the culprits of the bad news or may, in fact, just be the messenger. 
The extent to which messengers are responsible for the bad news they are sharing is 
important with regard to the exchange relationship, as supervisors are likely to respond 
differently if they believe the messenger is to blame for the bad news event. For example, 
scholars have shown that when individuals hold another person accountable for a 
behavior or action they find offensive, they are more likely to retaliate against the 
offending individual (Aquino et al., 2001; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999). As suggested 
previously, bad news messages are generally undesirable, and supervisors may find the 
sharing of bad news to be an unwelcomed behavior. If supervisors also find the 
messenger responsible for the bad news, the quality of the exchange relationship may be 
diminished because supervisors believe that the messenger has caused them harm. 
Specifically, these negative perceptions of the messenger are likely to influence the 
exchange relationship in that supervisors may be less willing to act cooperatively or 
fulfill their obligations within the exchange, and may instead respond in a way that is 
unfavorable to the messenger (e.g., Foa & Foa, 1974). However, the exchange 
relationship may be preserved if the messenger is not directly responsible for the bad 
news event. For instance, scholars have shown that when responsibility is distributed 
among group members, no one person can be at fault (e.g., Mynatt & Sherman, 1975; 
Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1964). If the source of the mistake or error cannot be attributed 
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directly to the messenger, supervisors are less likely to hold the messenger accountable 
for the issue, and the quality of the exchange relationship is less likely to be depleted.  
Applied more directly to the relationships between each challenge and hindrance 
appraisals and LMX, being responsible for the bad news being shared is likely to inhibit 
the positive exchange relationship that forms as a result of a supervisor’s challenge 
appraisal of bad news and enhance the negative exchange relationship that results when 
supervisors appraise bad news sharing as a hindrance. Stated differently, responsibility 
for the bad news is likely to suppress the positive relationship between challenge 
appraisals and LMX, but strengthen the negative relationship between hindrance 
appraisals and LMX.  
Hypothesis 10a:  Responsibility for bad news negatively moderates the 
relationship between challenge appraisals and LMX such that the positive 
relationship becomes weaker when responsibility is high.  
Hypothesis 10b: Responsibility for bad news positively moderates the relationship 
between hindrance appraisals and LMX such that the negative relationship 
becomes stronger when responsibility is high. 
Sharing bad news: Moderated Mediation 
 In sum, I suggest that the exchange relationship between an employee and 
supervisor acts as a mechanism through which an employee’s sharing of bad news 
influences supervisor evaluations of the employee’s effectiveness. Further, I suggest that 
a supervisor’s challenge or hindrance appraisal of the sharing of bad news facilitates the 
exchange relationship between an employee and supervisor. Thus, I suggest two possible 
mediation pathways between sharing bad news and evaluations of employee 
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effectiveness: one in which the relationship between sharing bad news and employee 
effectiveness is mediated by challenge appraisals and LMX, and a second pathway in 
which the relationship between sharing bad news and employee effectiveness is mediated 
by hindrance appraisals and LMX. Additionally, I propose that each of these mediation 
pathways is moderated in the first stage by the timeliness with which bad news is shared, 
as well as by the extent to which an employee offers solutions to resolve the bad news 
issue being shared. Finally, I suggest that each of these pathways is moderated in the 
second stage by the degree to which the bad news messenger is personally responsible for 
the bad news being shared. These propositions can be summarized in the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 11a:  The indirect effect of sharing bad news on leader evaluations of 
employee effectiveness through challenge appraisals and LMX is moderated in 
the first stage by timeliness such that the indirect positive effect is stronger when 
timeliness is high. 
Hypothesis 11b:  The indirect effect of sharing bad news on leader evaluations of 
employee effectiveness through challenge appraisals and LMX is moderated in 
the first stage by offering solutions such that the indirect positive effect is stronger 
when offering solutions is high. 
Hypothesis 11c:  The indirect effect of sharing bad news on leader evaluations of 
employee effectiveness through hindrance appraisals and LMX is moderated in 
the first stage by timeliness such that the indirect negative effect is weaker when 
timeliness is high. 
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Hypothesis 11d:  The indirect effect of sharing bad news on leader evaluations of 
employee effectiveness through hindrance appraisals and LMX is moderated in 
the first stage by offering solutions such that the indirect negative effect is weaker 
when offering solutions is high. 
Hypothesis 12a:  The indirect effect of sharing bad news on leader evaluations of 
employee effectiveness through challenge appraisals and LMX is moderated in 
the second stage by responsibility such that the positive indirect effect is weaker 
when responsibility is high. 
Hypothesis 12b:  The indirect effect of sharing bad news on leader evaluations of 
employee effectiveness through hindrance appraisals and LMX is moderated in 
the second stage by responsibility for bad news such that the negative indirect 
effect is stronger when responsibility for bad news is high. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHOD 
In order to evaluate the hypotheses proposed in the previous chapter, I designed 
three separate studies. In the first study, I develop and validate a scale of sharing bad 
news. In the second study, I conduct a preliminary test of the conceptual model. In 
particular, study two is intended to assess the covariance between sharing bad news and 
supervisor evaluations of employee effectiveness. Finally, study three is designed to 
extend the findings of study two by helping to establish causality and rule out alternative 
explanations for the findings. In the following section, I describe the procedures I used to 
conduct each of these three studies. 
Study 1:  Sharing Bad News Scale Development 
Scholars have developed a number of different measures for assessing different 
forms of speaking up at work. For instance, scholars have developed measures of voice 
(Maynes & Podsakoff, 2014; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, & Mainous, 1988; Van Dyne & 
LePine, 1998) and its promotive and prohibitive forms (Liang et al., 2012), information 
sharing (Durham, 1997); upward communication (Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974a, 1974b), 
and issue selling (Ashford et al., 1998). Further, scholars have considered the concept of 
whistle-blowing (Miceli & Near, 1985; 1988; 2002), and scales of speaking up have been 
inclusive of this concept (Rusbult et al., 1988). Although each of these measures capture 
important aspects of sharing ideas or information in the work environment, none directly 
focus on employees’ sharing bad news (as defined in this dissertation) with a leader or 
supervisor. Consequently, the purpose of this first study is to develop and validate a 
measure of sharing bad news in the workplace. 
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 To develop a scale of sharing bad news, I followed the guidelines offered by 
Hinkin (1998). The first step in this process is the creation of items. In order to generate 
items for the sharing bad news construct, I used a deductive approach, which is 
appropriate as the concept of sharing bad news is theoretically grounded in the extant 
literature. That is, I created a set of items derived from the definition of sharing bad news. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, sharing bad news is described as the communication of 
closely held information regarding errors, mistakes, deviations, or other negatively 
valenced events which vary in severity and may require action or remediation on the part 
of the recipient who is not likely to know about the issue, but who is responsible for the 
unit of work in which the issue occurs.  
In addition to utilizing the definition of sharing bad news, I also considered 
previously validated measures of speaking up behaviors to determine whether or not 
existing items could be used to describe sharing bad news. To this end, I first examined 
the scale of voice offered by Van Dyne & LePine (1998), which has been the most 
widely used measure of voice by scholars (e.g., Chamberlin et al., 2017). However, most 
of the items included in this scale refer to proactively speaking up about issues or 
concerns that generally might have an effect on the work group. For example, “Develops 
and makes recommendations concerning issues that affect this work group,” “Speaks up 
and encourages others in this group to get involved in issues that affect the group,” “Gets 
involved in issues that affect the quality of work life here in this group,” each refer to 
unspecified issues that may have an impact on the work unit at a future point in time. In 
contrast, sharing bad news reflects an immediate concern about a specific incident or 
event that has occurred. Additionally, items such as “Communicates his/her opinions 
   58 
about work issues to others in this group even if his/her opinion is different and others in 
the group disagree with him/her,” “Keeps well informed about issues where his/her 
opinion might be useful to this work group,” and “Speaks up in this group with ideas for 
new projects or changes in procedures,” suggest that voice is inclusive of ideas and 
opinions shared with the intent of improving the work environment generally. Sharing 
bad news does not reflect ideas or opinions, nor is it an attempt to change the status quo. 
Instead, sharing bad news conveys critical information directly related to work tasks and 
processes. Consequently, none of the items offered by Van Dyne & LePine adequately 
reflected the concept of sharing bad news.  
In addition to voice generally, I also considered the more specific measures of 
promotive and prohibitive voice offered by Liang et al. (2012). The promotive voice 
measures were similar to the measure of voice offered by Van Dyne & LePine (1998) in 
that they refer to making suggestions or sharing ideas, the implementation of which will 
benefit the organization in the future. As such, none of the promotive voice items were 
appropriate for inclusion in the scale of sharing bad news. In contrast, the prohibitive 
voice items developed by Liang et al. (2012) were much closer to the idea of sharing bad 
news than either promotive voice or the general measure of voice because each of the 
prohibitive voice items highlighted potential problems in the workplace. However, the 
prohibitive voice items were still ineffective in fully capturing the essence of sharing bad 
news. For example, one item focused on proactively reporting issues (e.g., “Proactively 
report coordination problems in the workplace to management”) as opposed to reactively 
sharing information when a problem occurs. Another item focused on speaking to 
colleagues about general issues (e.g., “Advise other colleagues against undesirable 
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behaviors that would hamper job performance”), as opposed to speaking with a 
supervisor or leader about a specific incident or event. Further, some of the prohibitive 
voice items confounded the notion of speaking up with how the act (of speaking up) may 
impact the messengers’ relationship with others in the group. For example, items such as 
“Speak up honestly with problems that might cause serious loss to the work unit, even 
when/though dissenting opinions exist,” “Dare to voice out opinions on things that might 
affect efficiency in the work unit, even if that would embarrass others,” “Dare to point 
out problems when they appear in the unit, even if that would hamper relationships with 
other colleagues,” not only emphasize speaking up about problems, but also highlight 
how speaking up could go against others, embarrass others, or create conflict with others, 
making it difficult to know which part of the phrase respondents are considering when 
they assess the item. More generally, the prohibitive voice items reflect problems that 
may commonly occur in the work unit, are possibly ongoing, or are embedded within the 
organizational policy, as opposed to sharing bad news, which conveys a single unique 
instance in which a mistake or error has inhibited goal attainment or task completion.  
Although a substantial body of research has explored the concept of whistle-
blowing, there is not an explicit measure of this construct. However, scholars have 
included whistle-blowing items in measures of voice. Specifically, I considered a 
measure of voice developed by Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, and Mainous (1988) that 
referenced whistle-blowing items, including: “When things are seriously wrong and the 
company won’t act, I am willing to “blow the whistle,” and “I have at least once 
contacted an outside agency (e.g., union) to get help in changing working conditions 
here.” Both items imply that the general work environment is problematic, and that 
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speaking up involves contacting someone external to the organization. In contrast, 
sharing bad news refers to an explicit issue directly related to the work, not a practice or 
policy as is the case in whistle-blowing. Further, sharing bad news is reported internally 
to someone, such as a leader or supervisor, who is likely to have the resources to help 
resolve the issue. As such, these whistle-blowing items were not included in the scale of 
sharing bad news being developed here. 
Finally, I considered the measure of issue selling created by Ashford, Rothbard, 
Piderit, and Dutton (1998). These items referred to past success in issue selling (e.g., “I 
have been successful in the past in selling issues to organizations”), the likelihood of 
successful issue selling (e.g., “I believe that I could get the critical decision makers in my 
work organization to buy this issue”) and the willingness to speak up with issues (e.g., 
“How much effort would you be willing to devote to selling this issue in your 
organization?”). In general, the issue selling items focus on past success in selling issues, 
as well as one’s current potential to sell issues, whereas sharing bad news reflects a 
necessary sharing of critical information. Additionally, with regard to issue selling, the 
issues that employees bring to the attention of their supervisors reflects personal interest 
or opinion in the idea being suggested. Sharing bad news is not an expression of opinion, 
but calling attention to a critical situation that likely needs to be resolved. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, none of the issue selling items fit the current conceptualization of sharing 
bad news.  
Having determined that none of the existing measures or items adequately 
represented the concept of sharing bad news, I developed my own unique set of items. I 
carefully constructed each item to ensure that each statement used simple and direct 
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language, addressed a single-issue, and were not redundant with other items (Hinkin, 
1998). This process resulted in 16 sharing bad news items. Example of these items 
include: “I advise my supervisor of serious work-related errors that s/he might not know 
about,” “I have no problem sharing bad news with my supervisor,” “I inform my 
supervisor about significant work-related mistakes that are not immediately obvious,” “I 
communicate bad news regarding work tasks or outcomes to the supervisor,” and “I 
avoiding telling my supervisor bad news (R).” A complete list of all 16 items can be 
found in Appendix D. 
After creating the items, I next evaluated the substantive validity of the scale. 
Substantive validity assesses the extent to which items within a measure reflect a given 
construct (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991), and differs slightly from content validity in that it 
is more focused on individual items whereas content validity considers the scale more 
holistically (Holden & Jackson, 1979). Further, a scale will not have content validity if its 
items do not have substantive validity. To assess substantive validity, I conducted an 
item-sort task (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991) using a sample of 156 undergraduate students 
at a large public university in the southwestern United States. The average age of 
participants was 21.33 years old (SD = 2.42) and the majority (67%) were male. Students 
received course credit for participating in the study. 
As evident in the literature review in chapter two and in the review of voice scales 
above, scholars have introduced a number of constructs to capture elements of speaking 
up in the workplace. For the item-sort task, participants were provided the definition for 
sharing bad news, as well as definitions for promotive voice, prohibitive voice, and 
whistleblowing. These three constructs were selected as they are most conceptually 
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similar to the concept of sharing bad news. Participants were then provided a list of 31 
items, included in Appendix D, and asked to assign each item to one of the four defined 
constructs. The items used in this task included the 16 items of sharing bad news, 5 items 
reflecting promotive voice, 5 items reflecting prohibitive voice (Liang et al., 2012), and 5 
items from Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, and Mainous (1988) that have been associated with 
whistle-blowing. Although some scholars have suggested that participants should be 
allowed to specify if an item does not relate to any of the constructs provided, Anderson 
and Gerbing (1991) suggest that this is not necessary for non-expert samples, as is the 
case here. 
I examined the results of this item-sort task using two indices of substantive 
validity (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991). First, I considered the proportion of substantive 
agreement, which reflects the number of respondents (out of the total number of 
respondents) who assign an item to its intended construct. Each of the 16 of the sharing 
bad news items was assigned to the sharing bad news definition by a majority of the 
participants. Agreement ranged from 50% to 80% across the 16 items. Second, I 
examined the coefficient of substantive validity, or the extent to which each item was 
assigned to its intended construct more than any other construct. The substantive validity 
coefficient ranged from .03 to .72 across the 16 sharing bad news items. Although a 
higher coefficient of substantive validity generally suggests greater substantive validity, 
this coefficient can also be evaluated for statistical significance to determine whether or 
not items have been assigned to the intended construct more than accounted for by 
random chance (Ferris, Brown, Berry, & Lian, 2008). Using a binomial test (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1991), the coefficient of substantive validity was determined to be significant 
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for 15 of the 16 sharing bad news items. That is, 15 of the items were assigned to the 
sharing bad news definition more frequently than would be expected by random chance. 
The item that did not have a significant coefficient of substantive validity, “If an 
important mistake is made at work, I let someone else tell the supervisor (R)” was 
removed from the scale. The 15 items retained in the sharing bad news scale are reported 
in Appendix E. 
In addition to evaluating substantive validity, I also examined the discriminant 
validity of the sharing bad news scale. Discriminant validity indicates whether a measure 
is unique or overlaps with other constructs and is particularly important for ensuring that 
a new construct is not redundant with existing established constructs (Schwab, 2005). To 
conduct an evaluation of discriminant validity, I utilized a sample of 221 individuals 
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The majority of participants were 
male (69.63%) and were 33.77 years old (SD = 9.96) on average. Individuals largely 
identified as ethnically Caucasian/white (66.82%) and most had some college or held a 
bachelor’s degree (67.29%). Individuals were recruited from a range of industries and the 
majority of participants (74.19%) had between 1 and 6 years of work experience. 
Procedure and measures. Participants were provided with the items from the 
sharing bad news scale, as well as the items from the scales for promotive and prohibitive 
voice, whistle-blowing, and issue-selling. A full list of each of these measures is included 
in Appendix E. Participants were then asked to evaluate the extent to which they engaged 
in each of these items within the workplace. Participants rated each item using a five-
point Likert scale (1= Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = 
Agree, 5 = Strongly agree).  
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Sharing bad news. Sharing bad news was measured using the 15-item scale that 
resulted following the check of substantive validity. The reliability of this scale was .94. 
Promotive voice and prohibitive voice. Promotive and prohibitive voice were 
evaluated using the scales developed by Liang et al. (2012). The promotive voice scale 
included five items, such as “Proactively suggest new projects which are beneficial to the 
work unit.” The reliability of the promotive voice scale was .93.  The prohibitive voice 
scale also included five items, a sample of which is “Advice other colleagues against 
undesirable behaviors that would hamper job performance.” The reliability of the 
prohibitive voice scale was .86.   
Whistle-blowing. In order to assess whistle-blowing, I used a scale developed by 
Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, and Mainous (1988) that was intended to measure speaking up, 
but includes whistle-blowing items. A sample item of this scale is “When things are 
seriously wrong and the company won’t act, I am willing to ‘blow the whistle.’” The 
reliability of this scale was .67. 
Issue selling. I included a measure of issue selling developed by Ashford, et al. 
(1998). This scale includes items such as “I am known as a successful issue seller,” and 
the reliability of this scale was .96. 
 To assess the discriminant validity of the sharing bad news measure, I utilized a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) approach (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Using this 
approach, a baseline model is established in which each construct is represented as its 
own unique factor. For this study, the baseline model is a five-factor model in which 
sharing bad news, promotive voice, prohibitive voice, whistle-blowing, and issue selling 
are each designated as a unique factor. This baseline model is then compared to a series 
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of models in which the focal construct is combined with one of the established constructs. 
For this analysis, I compared the five-factor baseline model to a series of four-factor 
models in which the items for sharing bad news were loaded onto the same factor as the 
items for promotive voice, prohibitive voice, whistle-blowing, and issue selling, 
respectively. The model fit of the five-factor model was then compared to model fit of 
each of the subsequent four-factor models. Results of this analysis are reported in the 
chapter that follows.  
Study 2:  Field Study of Sharing Bad News  
The primary purpose of this study is to explore the substantive relationships 
described in the hypotheses within a field setting. In particular, this study is intended to 
explore the relationship between sharing bad news and supervisor evaluations of 
employee effectiveness.  
Sample. The participants in this study were employees and their supervisors at 
the Southwest regional location of a large multinational beverage distributor based in the 
United States. Surveys were distributed to 246 employees and 240 surveys were returned 
for a response rate of 97.56%. Even though 240 employees responded to the survey, I 
was unable to obtain supervisor rating for several of these individuals. Only individuals 
who could be matched with supervisor ratings were retained in the data set. Further, a 
number of participants were removed from the data set because they exhibited careless 
responses, which have the potential to influence study results in ways that are not entirely 
predictable (e.g., Meade & Craig, 2012). The final data set included 202 participants, a 
strong majority of whom (90.05%) were male. On average, participants were 36.37 years 
of age (SD = 10.39) and had worked at the organization for 8.23 years (SD = 8.28). 
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Additionally, participants had worked within their current job for an average of 5.10 
years (SD = 6.16) and had worked with their current supervisor for an average of 1.62 
years (SD = 2.32).  
Procedure. This study was completed in two phases. In the first phase, 
employees received a survey regarding the extent to which they share bad news within 
the workplace. This survey was administered to participants using a pencil and paper 
approach, and results were later recorded electronically. Approximately one month 
following the completion of the employee surveys, supervisors received an electronic 
survey in which they rated each of their employees on the remaining focal variables 
within the model. Specifically, supervisors rated the degree to which employees’ sharing 
of bad news was appraised as challenging or hindering, as well as their employees’ 
timeliness, offering solutions, and taking responsibility when sharing bad news. 
Additionally, supervisors rated the overall performance of each employee. On average, 
the span of control for supervisors at this organization was 17 employees, with a range of 
7 to 31 employees per supervisor. Following completion of the supervisor survey, 
supervisor responses were matched to employee surveys.  
Employee measures. All measures were evaluated on a five-point Likert scale (1 
= Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = 
Strongly agree). A full list of the items used in each measure can be found in Appendix F.  
Sharing bad news. Sharing bad news was measured using the 15-item measure 
developed in study 1. The reliability for this scale was initially much lower than 
reliability reported for this scale in the first study (.94). However, the item-total statistics 
reported in SPSS suggested that removal of the single reverse coded item in the scale 
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would substantially improve reliability (e.g., Schmitt & Stults, 1985). In looking at the 
factor loadings for each of the items, the reverse coded item also had a particularly low 
factor loading (.56) relative to the other items in the scale (all .90 or higher). This item, “I 
avoid telling my supervisor bad news,” was removed from the measure. Thus, the final 
measure used in this study included the 14 positively phrased sharing bad news items. 
Sample items from this measure include “I have no problem sharing bad news with my 
supervisor” and “I inform my supervisor about significant work-related mistakes that are 
not immediately obvious.”  The reliability of this 14-item sharing bad news scale was .93.   
Supervisor measures. As with the employee measures, all measures used in the 
supervisor survey were evaluated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = 
Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree). A full list of the 
items used in each measure can be found in Appendix F. It should be noted that many of 
the measures used in the supervisor survey have been abbreviated from their full length. 
This was due to restrictions imposed by the organization that the survey be kept as short 
as possible. As mentioned above, supervisors in this organization are responsible for 
managing a large number of employees (17 on average). In order to capture supervisor 
ratings for each of the focal variables and still maintain brevity in the survey, the number 
of items in each measure was reduced to ensure that supervisors would be able to 
maintain the focus and attention required to adequately rate each of their employees for 
each of the study variables.  
Challenge and hindrance appraisals. The degree to which bad news was 
appraised as challenging and hindering was evaluated using an adapted version of the 
scale offered by LePine, Zhang, Crawford, and Rich (2016). Two items were used to 
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assess challenge appraisal, a sample of which includes “This employee shares 
information that helps me achieve the goals of our work group.” The coefficient alpha of 
the challenge appraisal scale was .86. Two items were also used to assess hindrance 
appraisal, a sample of which is “This employee speaks to me about issues that hinder me 
in improving the growth and well-being of our work group.” The coefficient alpha of the 
hindrance appraisal scale was .66.   
Leader-member exchange. I evaluated LMX using a two-item measure adapted 
from Graen and Uhl-Bein (1995). A sample item from this measure is “I would use my 
power to help this individual solve problems in his/her work.” The coefficient alpha for 
this measure was .83.   
Evaluations of employee effectiveness. In order to assess each employee’s overall 
effectiveness in the organization, supervisors responded to a 1-item measure adapted 
from the measure of employee performance created by Motowidlo and Van Scotter 
(1994). This item was: “This employee exceeds standards for overall job performance.” 
Timeliness. Timeliness refers to the length of time between the occurrence of a 
bad news event, and the actual sharing of bad news. A one-item measure was created to 
capture timeliness, and this item was: “This employee waits too long to share information 
about slip-ups that occur on the job.”  
Offering solutions. A single item was used to evaluate the extent to which 
employees provide solutions when sharing bad news. This item was: “This employee 
includes a solution when s/he shares a work-related problem with me.” 
Responsibility for the bad news. Responsibility for the bad news captures the idea 
that the employee is personally to blame for the bad news incident. However, as this 
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study was not evaluating a specific event, this concept was assessed by considering the 
extent to which an employee tends to take responsibility for work-related situations or 
events. Thus, responsibility was evaluated using a single item measure adapted from the 
measure of felt responsibility offered by Morrison and Phelps (1999). This item was: 
“This employee takes responsibility for correcting problems.”  
Control variables.  In this study, I controlled for several factors. First, I controlled 
for employees’ previous performance. Prior performance could influence the sharing of 
bad news in that individuals who have received higher evaluations of performance in the 
past may be more likely to share bad news, whereas those who have received lower 
evaluations of performance may be less likely to share bad news. Thus, supervisors may 
be more likely to rate certain employees’ sharing of bad news simply because they are 
more likely to engage in the behavior. Further, supervisors may perceive that individuals 
who have performed highly in the past may be more likely to share bad news in ways 
which are viewed as beneficial, whereas the sharing of bad news by previously low 
performers may be viewed as more threatening. Prior performance was rated by 
supervisors using a one-item measure, “During the prior performance period, this 
employee exceeded standards for overall job performance.”  
Additionally, a supervisor’s evaluation of sharing bad news could be influenced 
by the supervisor’s personality traits, specifically neuroticism and trust propensity. 
Neuroticism describes the extent to which an individual is prone to experience 
psychological distress (Costa & McCrae, 1992), and may be heightened when negative 
events occur, such as when bad news messages are shared (Judge, Higgins, Toresen, & 
Barrick, 1999). Consequently, highly neurotic leaders may be more likely to evaluate the 
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sharing of bad news as threatening and subsequently provide lower ratings of employee 
effectiveness. Neuroticism was measured using four-items from the neuroticism 
dimension of the Mini-IPIP (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006). Sample items 
include “I get stressed out easily” and “I worry about things.” The coefficient alpha of 
this measure was .92. Trust propensity describes a general willingness to trust others 
(Mayer et al., 1995), and supervisors who are highly trusting may be more likely to view 
the actions and behaviors of subordinates as helpful or beneficial. Thus, supervisors may 
be more likely to perceive sharing bad news as challenging, or they may not interpret the 
sharing of bad news as a demand. Trust propensity was measured using the five-item 
measure adapted from MacDonald, Kessel, and Fuller (1972). Sample items include “I 
expect other people to be honest and open” and “I feel that other people can be relied 
upon to do what they say they will do.” The coefficient alpha of trust propensity was .84. 
Analysis. To analyze the proposed hypotheses, I used two different approaches. 
First, several of the hypotheses evaluated the relationships between the focal variables in 
the study (Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3, 5a, 5b, 6a, and 6b). For these hypotheses, I used 
path analysis to assess whether or not the predicted nature of the specified relationship 
was supported. For each of these hypotheses, I specified a simple path model in MPlus 
7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). In the case of competing hypotheses, I considered the 
direction of the unstandardized regression weight between the focal independent and 
dependent variable to determine which of the two predictions would be supported, if 
either. Using path analysis allowed me to examine the predicted relationship for each 
hypothesis while also controlling for other factors (e.g., prior performance) that could 
potentially influence the focal relationship.  
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 The remaining hypotheses in the study included mediation (Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 
7a, and 7b) moderation (Hypotheses 8a – 10b), and moderated mediation (Hypotheses 
11a – 12b). For these hypotheses, I utilized structural equation modeling (SEM) with 
maximum likelihood estimation. Using MPlus 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), I specified 
the model that corresponded with each separate hypothesis and evaluated the resulting 
effects. These analyses and results are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.   
Study 3:  Lab Study of Sharing Bad News  
One of the key purposes of study two is to demonstrate covariance between 
sharing bad news and evaluations of employee effectiveness by supervisors, suggesting 
that the theory I have proposed could potentially explain this relationship. The purpose of 
study 3 is to extend the findings of the second study by helping to establish causality and 
rule out alternative explanations for the findings, such as the notion that evaluations of 
performance could drive employees’ sharing of bad news.  
Sample. Participants in this study were undergraduate students recruited from a 
large public university in the Southwest United States. Students received course credit for 
their participation in the study, and were also entered into a drawing for a gift card at the 
end of each semester the study was conducted. The initial number of participants 
included in this study was 120. However, five participants were removed from the data 
set because they accurately assessed the intent of the study when asked to describe the 
purpose of the experiment during the debriefing period at the conclusion of the lab. 
Further, and as is described in more detail below, this study involves four distinct 
manipulations executed by a confederate. An additional three participants were removed 
because they responded exactly the opposite of what would be expected for at least three 
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of the four conditions being manipulated within the study. Stated more simply, these 
individuals did not pass the manipulation check for at least three of the four study 
manipulations. Finally, one participant was removed from the study because the 
confederate did not correctly execute the predetermined script for the lab session. The 
resulting sample consisted of 111 individuals. The average age of participants was 21.81 
(SD = 1.74) years old and a slight majority were male (56.25%). 
Procedure. This study took place in a laboratory using a one-hour firefighting 
simulation. Prior to beginning the experiment, participants responded to a short survey 
assessing personal characteristics. Following completion of the survey, participants 
received a brief tutorial from the experimenter explaining how the simulation is played. 
In this simulation, groups of participants sit at networked computers that show a grid 
labeled horizontally from A-Z and vertically from 1-30. The grid is depicted as a map 
containing houses, schools, hospitals, forested areas, and grass. Each participant in the 
group is assigned a unique firefighting role, and group members work together to 
extinguish the multiple fires that arise on the grid during the simulation. Groups receive 
points when landmarks (i.e., houses, schools, and hospitals) and geographic features 
(forested areas and grass) are destroyed. In this study, groups receive .25 points for each 
grid square of grass burned, 1 point for each grid square of forested area burned, 25 
points for every house burned, and 50 points for every school or hospital burned. The 
goal of each team is to maintain the lowest score possible by extinguishing fires. Within 
this study, I utilized teams of three individuals, two of whom were unaware of the 
purpose of the study, and a third individual who was a trained confederate.  
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The two non-confederate participants were randomly assigned the roles of Fire 
Chief and Firefighter. The non-confederate participants received a hard copy of the 
instructions for the simulation, as well as a description of their roles. An example of these 
instructions for both the Fire Chief and the Firefighter are provided in Appendix G. The 
Fire Chief is the group leader and is responsible for coordinating the actions of the group 
in order to fight the fire. The Fire Chief has moderate skills for putting out fires, but is the 
only participant in the simulation who can see fires across the entire screen. In contrast, 
the Firefighter is highly capable of extinguishing fires, but can only see fires when they 
are within one of the grid squares surrounding the Firefighter’s position. Thus, the 
Firefighter is dependent on the Fire Chief for direction to existing fires. It should be noted 
that because the intent of the study is to understand supervisor responses to the sharing of 
bad news by subordinates, the Fire Chief is the respondent of interest. To be clear, the 
sample of 111 participants consists entirely of individuals who played the role of Fire 
Chief during the simulation; responses of individuals who played the Firefighter role 
were not examined in this dissertation.  
In this study, the confederate was assigned the role of the Water Carrier. Within 
the simulation, the Water Carrier has limited ability to fight fires, but has a larger water 
supply than either the Fire Chief or the Firefighter. More specifically, the water carrier is 
responsible for keeping the team supplied with water, including refilling other players as 
their water supplies are depleted. Like the Firefighter, the Water Carrier can only view 
fires if they are within the grid squares surrounding her/his position and is dependent on 
the Fire Chief for direction.  
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 Following the tutorial, participants played a practice round of the simulation. The 
practice round lasted 5 minutes, and provided participants with the opportunity to learn 
how to move their player on the map, put out fires, and refill their water. Additionally, 
participants were told that they would not be allowed to talk out loud during the 
simulation, and the practice round allowed participants to become familiar with using the 
online chat tool for communicating with one another. At the end of the practice round, 
participants were offered the opportunity to ask questions regarding the simulation before 
beginning the scored round.  
 The scored round was 12 minutes in length. The scored round consisted of 
multiple fires of varied severity that begin every 2-3 minutes. Just before the halfway 
point of the simulation (during minute 5 of the simulation), the confederate, in his role as 
the Water Carrier, initiates the set of manipulations for the study. During this study, four 
conditions were manipulated: the severity of bad news shared, timeliness of message 
sharing, offering a solution (or not) once the bad news had been shared, and taking 
responsibility (or not) for the bad news event. The confederate followed a specific script 
for each of these manipulations, and an example of this script is included in Appendix H.  
The first condition that I manipulated in this study was the severity of the bad 
news. As the goal of the simulation is to maintain a low point total by extinguishing fires 
before they burn key landmarks or geographic features, a critical aspect of the game is the 
amount of water available to put out fires. As such, the bad news event focused on the 
possibility of running out of water before the end of the simulation. Running out of water 
would inhibit the team’s ability to fight fires, and likely result in an accumulation of 
points, as the team would not be able to prevent landmarks or geographic features from 
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burning. Further, the simulation was set up such that the confederate, in the role of the 
Water Carrier, had exclusive responsibility for the team’s water supply. The other players 
were limited in their ability to obtain water in order to ensure that sharing bad news 
regarding a depletion in the water supply could not be ignored or remedied by either the 
Fire Chief or the Firefighter. In the “severe bad news” condition, the confederate stated 
the following: “I have really bad news. We won’t have enough water to put out the fires.” 
In the “mild bad news” condition, the confederate stated: “Hey. We might have an issue 
with our water supply.” In both instances, the confederate stated these phrases out loud. 
Each of these phrases were then typed into the online chat tool following a scripted 
reminder from the experimenter that talking was not allowed during the simulation.   
The other three manipulations in the study focused on the hypothesized aspects of 
how news was shared, such as the timeliness in sharing the news, and factors related to 
the sharing of the bad news, such as whether or not a solution for the issue was offered, 
or whether or not the messenger was responsible for the bad news event. Although the 
confederate shared bad news at exactly the same point in time during each simulation, I 
manipulated timeliness by creating a sense of how long the confederate had known about 
the situation prior to sharing the bad news. In the “timely” condition, the confederate 
began the sharing of the bad news with the statement “I just realized. . .”  In the 
“untimely” condition, the confederate began sharing the bad news with the statement “I 
should have said something earlier, but I noticed when we started. . .” These statements 
conveyed that the confederate shared the bad news as soon as the situation was apparent, 
or had known about the problem for some time before sharing the information. 
Additionally, I manipulated was whether or not the confederate offered a solution to the 
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bad news event. In this study, the bad news event was a problem with the water supply, 
monitored by the Water Carrier, which made it questionable whether or not there would 
be enough water to finish the simulation. In the “solution” condition, the confederate 
explicitly stated “I have a solution. . .” shortly following the sharing of bad news and then 
described an idea for refilling his water. In the “no solution” condition the confederate 
made no statement, and did not offer any ideas for refilling the water supply. The final 
condition that was manipulated during this study was whether or not the confederate took 
responsibility for the bad news. In the “responsible” condition, the confederate followed 
the sharing of bad news with the statement: “This is completely my fault. I should have 
read my instructions.” In the “not responsible” condition, the confederate stated “This is 
not my fault. It wasn’t in my instructions.”  
The manipulation of these four factors resulted in a 2 (highly severe/mildly severe 
bad news) X 2 (timely/untimely sharing of bad news) X 2 (solution/no solution) X 2 
(responsible/not responsible) study design. The average sample size for each of these 
conditions was 7 individuals, with a range of 5 to 9 individuals in each condition. Again, 
the sample sizes reported here reflect the number of individuals playing the role of Fire 
Chief for each of the 16 conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of these 
16 resulting conditions, which are summarized in Table 11.  
After the confederate instigated the manipulation, the team used the remaining 
time to finish playing the simulation. When the simulation ended, participants completed 
a second survey with questions regarding their commitment to the team’s goals and their 
sense of psychological safety on the team. In addition, participants assigned the role of 
Fire Chief were asked a series of questions to ensure the manipulations were effective, as 
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well as questions regarding their experiences with the Water Carrier during the 
simulation.  
Measures.  A full list of the items used in each measure can be found in 
Appendix I. As in study 2, I evaluated each of these measures on a five-point Likert scale 
(1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = 
Strongly agree).   
Challenge and hindrance appraisals. I evaluated the degree to which bad news 
was appraised as challenging and hindering using an adapted version of the scale offered 
by LePine, Zhang, Crawford, and Rich (2016). Each challenge and hindrance appraisals 
were assessed using three items. A sample challenge appraisal item is “The water carrier 
shared information that helped me achieve the goals of our team.” The coefficient alpha 
of the challenge appraisal scale was .86. A sample hindrance appraisal item is “The water 
carrier spoke to me about issues that hindered me in improving the growth and well-being 
of our team.” The coefficient alpha of the hindrance appraisal scale was .83.   
Leader-member exchange. LMX was evaluated using a seven item measure 
adapted from Graen & Uhl-Bein (1995). Items in this measure include “I defend and 
justify this individual’s [the water carrier’s] decisions” and “I have an effective working 
relationship with this individual [the water carrier].” The coefficient alpha for this 
measure was .87.   
Evaluations of effectiveness. The Fire Chief’s evaluations of Water Carrier 
(confederate) effectiveness was assessed using a four-item measure adapted from the 
measure of performance offered by Motowidlo and Van Scotter (1994). Sample items 
include “The water carrier exceeded standards for overall job performance” and “I would 
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work with this individual in future simulations.” The coefficient alpha for this scale was 
.73. 
Control variables. In addition to the focal variables in the study, I also evaluated 
several control variables. As in Study 2, neuroticism was captured with the scale offered 
by Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, and Lucas (2006), and the coefficient alpha of this scale 
was .87. I also assessed trust propensity using the measure offered by MacDonald, 
Kessel, and Fuller (1972). The measure of trust propensity had a coefficient alpha of .80. 
As discussed in study 2, conceptually, these variables are likely to influence the 
relationships in the proposed model. For instance, individuals who score highly on 
neuroticism are more prone to stress and are more likely to experience negative moods 
(Judge et al., 1999), increasing the likelihood of evaluating the sharing of bad news 
negatively. Additionally, the degree to which individuals are prone to be trusting could 
influence the extent to which they believe the actions and behaviors of other are intended 
to be beneficial. In this study, trust propensity could specifically influence the extent to 
which sharing bad news is perceived as a challenge or hindrance.  
In addition to trust propensity and neuroticism, I also measured psychological 
safety and goal commitment. Psychological safety captures the extent to which 
individuals believe it is safe to share information on their team (Edmondson, 1999), and 
could influence how participants in the role of the Fire Chief perceive the sharing of bad 
news messages by the Water Carrier. That is, the Fire Chief may be more accepting of 
bad news messages if they believe that their group offers a safe space for this kind of 
information to be shared. Psychological safety was evaluated using a seven-item measure 
(Edmondson, 1999), sample items of which include “If you make a mistake on this team, 
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it is held against you,” and “It is safe to take risks on this team.” The coefficient alpha of 
this scale was .63. Goal commitment refers to a continued effort or determination to 
achieve a goal (Locke et al., 1981). Goal commitment is likely to relate to sharing bad 
news because individuals who are highly committed to the goals of their work unit or 
team will likely want to find resolution for mistakes or deviations that would impede goal 
achievement. Individuals who are more committed to the goals of the team may be more 
driven to enhance team performance (Hollenbeck, Klein, O’Leary, & Wright, 1989), and 
may view potential setbacks to goal achievement, such as bad news, more detrimental 
than individuals who are less committed to goals. Goal commitment was measured using 
a five-item scale adapted from Hollenbeck, Klein, O’Leary, and Wright (1989) and 
Hollenbeck, Williams, and Klein (1989). Sample items include “I am strongly committed 
to pursuing our team’s goals” and “I think our team goals are good goals to shoot for.” 
The coefficient alpha of the goal commitment scale was .89.  
Finally, I controlled for the effect of the confederate. Three separate individuals 
played the role of the Water Carrier during the course of the study, and although each of 
these confederates received the exact same training, and were required to execute the 
same script, it is possible that participants in the study responded to each of these 
confederates differently. I controlled for the confederate by including two dummy 
variables (leaving third confederate as the baseline) to account for any differences that 
may be attributed to the confederate.  
Analysis. I analyzed my initial set of hypotheses (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 5a, 5b, 6a, and 
6b) using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). This approach is appropriate given the 
dichotomous nature of the sharing bad news variable in this study. Further, it allows for 
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examination of the focal relationships with the inclusion of control variable in the 
analysis. I evaluated Hypotheses 3, 6a, and 6b by specifying a simple path model in 
MPlus 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). To evaluate the mediation (hypotheses 4a, 4b, 7a, 
and 7b) moderation (hypotheses 8a – 10b), and moderated mediation (hypotheses 11a – 
12b) relationships proposed in the model, I utilized the same approach outlined in Study 
2. Specifically, I examined these hypotheses using SEM with maximum likelihood 
estimation. For each hypothesis, I specified the proposed set of relationships in MPlus 7.3 
(Muthén & Muthén, 2012). I discuss the results of these analyses in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
The results of each of the three studies are reported in the following section. I first 
describe the results of study 1 in which I evaluated the discriminant validity of the 
sharing bad news scale. Next, I report the results of study 2, a field study which was 
designed to evaluate the hypotheses proposed in this study. Finally, I report the results of 
study 3, a lab study that manipulated the sharing of bad news, as well as the hypothesized 
moderating conditions, for a more complete evaluation of the proposed hypotheses.  
Results of Study 1 (Evaluation of Discriminant Validity) 
To determine whether sharing bad news was distinct from other constructs, I 
evaluated the discriminate validity of the scale by comparing it to similar constructs that 
have been previously established within the literature, including promotive and 
prohibitive voice, whistle-blowing, and issue selling. The descriptive statistics and 
correlations for each of these variables are reported in Table 1. In examining the 
correlations, sharing bad news is strongly correlated with both promotive voice (r = .52, p 
< .05) and prohibitive voice (r = .42, p < .05). The relatively high correlations between 
sharing bad news and each promotive and prohibitive voice is not unexpected, as the 
constructs similarly reflect speaking up in the workplace regarding issues related to the 
task or work environment. In addition, sharing bad news is moderately correlated with 
issue selling (r = .25, p < .05). Sharing bad news was not significantly correlated with the 
measure of whistle-blowing. Although the lack of a significant correlation with whistle-
blowing is somewhat surprising from a conceptual perspective, the low reliability of the 
whistle-blowing measure may indicate that the measure is not fully capturing the whistle-
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blowing concept. The lack of adequacy in the whistle-blowing measure may account for a 
non-significant correlation with sharing bad news.  
As described in the methods section, I utilized a CFA approach for evaluating the 
discriminant validity of the sharing bad news construct. The results of this analysis are 
reported in Table 2. Using MPlus 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), I specified a model in 
which sharing bad news, promotive voice, prohibitive voice, whistle-blowing, and issue 
selling were each designated as distinct factors. Based on the guidelines offered by Hu 
and Bentler (1999), this model had good fit: χ2(682) = 1312.37, p < .01; RMSEA = .07; 
CFI = .91; TFI = .90; SRMR = .07. Using this five-factor model as a baseline, I then 
compared these fit statistics to a series of four-factor models in which the sharing bad 
news items were combined with the items of one of the established constructs. For 
example, I first specified a model in which the sharing bad news items and the promotive 
voice items were designated on a single factor, and each prohibitive voice, whistle-
blowing, and issue selling were designated as unique factors. This four-factor model had 
worse fit (χ2(686) = 2064.47, p < .01; RMSEA = .10; CFI = .79; TFI = .78; SRMR = .14) 
and also had a significant chi-squared difference test (Δχ2(4) = 752.09, p < .01), 
indicating that the five-factor model fit significantly better than this four-factor model. I 
repeated this process, next combining the items of sharing bad news and prohibitive voice 
on a single factor. Again, the fit statistics for this model were not as strong as for the five-
factor model (χ2(686) = 1629.85, p < .01; RMSEA = .08; CFI = .86; TFI = .85; SRMR = 
.12), and the chi-squared difference test was significant (Δχ2(4) = 317.47, p < .01). I 
found similar results when I combined sharing bad news and whistle-blowing items onto 
a single factor (χ2(686) = 1530.49, p < .01; RMSEA = .08; CFI = .87; TFI = .86; SRMR = 
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.12), and again obtained a significant chi-squared difference test (Δχ2(4) = 218.11, p < 
.01). The fit of the four-factor model in which I combined sharing bad news and issue 
selling items was also worse than the five-factor model (χ2(686) = 2368.59, p < .01; 
RMSEA = .11; CFI = .75; TFI = .73; SRMR = .19). Additionally, the chi-squared 
difference test for this model was significant (Δχ2(4) = 1056.22, p < .01). Finally, I ran a 
model in which all of the items of each of the constructs were loaded onto a single factor. 
This model had significantly worse fit (χ2(692) = 3172.17, p < .01; RMSEA = .13; CFI = 
.63; TFI = .60; SRMR = .16), and also had a significant chi-squared difference test 
(Δχ2(10) = 1858.80, p < .01). Based on these results, I determined that the five-factor 
model in which sharing bad news was designated as its own unique factor alongside 
factors of promotive voice, prohibitive voice, whistle-blowing, and issue selling, was the 
best fitting model. Thus, these results support the discriminant validity of the sharing bad 
news scale. 
As a supplemental analysis to these findings, I also examined the sharing bad 
news scale using the approach offered by Fornell and Larcker (1981). First, I considered 
the composite reliability of the scale, which is calculated using the formula: 
(∑𝜆𝑖)
2
(∑𝜆𝑖)2 + ∑𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖)
 
where lambda is the standardized factor loading for item “i” and “var(𝜀𝑖)” is the error 
variance for each item. The error variance is calculated by subtracting the squared 
standardized factor loading of an item from 1. The composite reliability for the sharing 
bad news scale was .94, which indicates strong construct validity.   
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 Second, I considered convergent validity of the sharing bad news scale, or amount 
of variance captured by the scale relative to the amount of variance accounted for by 
measurement error (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Convergent validity can by assessed by 
examining the average variance extracted (AVE), or the average of the squared 
standardized factor loadings of the items in the scale. Measures with an AVE greater than 
.50 are considered to have acceptable convergent validity. For the sharing bad news scale, 
all of the standardized factor loadings were significant, and the AVE of the scale was .53. 
Consequently, the sharing bad news scale also has adequate convergent validity.  
 Finally, I further examined discriminate validity by comparing the AVE of the 
sharing bad news scale with the variance shared with each of the other constructs 
(promotive and prohibitive voice, whistle-blowing, and issue selling). A scale has good 
discriminant validity if the AVE of the focal variable (sharing bad news) is higher than 
the shared variance between the focal variable and a related construct (each promotive 
and prohibitive voice, whistle-blowing, and issue selling). The shared variance of two 
variables can be calculated by squaring the correlation between the variables. As shown 
in Table 3, the AVE of sharing bad news (.53) is higher than the shared variance between 
sharing bad news and each promotive voice (r2 = .31), prohibitive voice (r2 = .23), 
whistle-blowing (r2 = .12), and issue selling (r2 = .07). These results reinforce the 
findings of the CFA approach reported above, and suggest that the sharing bad news 
scale also has discriminant validity.  
Results of Study 2: Field Study of Sharing Bad News 
Evaluation of hypotheses. The sample used in study 2 consisted of employees 
nested within work groups led by a single supervisor. As such, I first evaluated the data to 
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determine whether or not there was significant between-group variance. Following the 
guidelines offered by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), I tested the null models for each of 
the endogenous variables in my path model (i.e., challenge and hindrance appraisals, 
LMX, and evaluations of effectiveness). Each of the variables were found to have 
significant between-group variance: challenge appraisal (τ2 = .13, p < .05, ICC(1) = .21), 
hindrance appraisal (τ2 = .58, p < .05, ICC(1) = .71), LMX (τ2 = .28, p < .05, ICC(1) = 
.73), and evaluations of effectiveness (τ2 = .17, p < .05, ICC(1) = .20). Given that all of 
the endogenous variables utilized in the focal analysis had significant between-group 
variance, I conducted my analyses for this study using a multilevel approach. Using a 
multilevel approach allowed me to control for the between-group variance of the 
variables in my model, even though all of the relationships within the proposed model are 
hypothesized at a single level of analysis.  
In addition to evaluating the between-level variance of the endogenous variables, 
I also use a CFA to assess the fit of the hypothesized model prior to examining the 
individual hypotheses. The results of the CFA analysis are reported in Table 4. I first 
assessed the fit of my conceptual model. For this analysis, I included sharing bad news, 
challenge and hindrance appraisals, and LMX (4-factors). The moderating variables, as 
well as evaluations of effectiveness were not included in this initial CFA because each of 
these variables was only a single item. My proposed model had a moderate fit:  χ2(189) = 
556.17, p < .01; RMSEA = .10; CFI = .87; TFI = .85; SRMR = .07. I next compared my 
conceptual model to a series of alternative models that each had a reduced number of 
factors. First, I compared my proposed model in which sharing bad news and LMX were 
individual factors and the items from the challenge and hindrance appraisal scales were 
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combined onto a single factor. Next, I examined an alternative model in which sharing 
bad news was a single factor, challenge and hindrance appraisal items were combined 
onto a single factor, and the LMX items were combined with the one employee 
effectiveness item to comprise the third factor. Finally, I considered a 1-factor model. 
The difference in the chi-squared was significant for each of these alternative models, 
suggesting that my proposed model was the best fit for the data.  
The means, standard deviations, and correlations of the study variables are 
reported in Table 5. The first four hypotheses examined the exchange relationships 
proposed in my model. First, I considered whether sharing bad news would be positively 
(Hypothesis 1a) or negatively (Hypothesis 1b) related to evaluations of employee 
effectiveness. As shown in Table 5, the correlation between sharing bad news and 
evaluations of employee effectiveness is positive and significant (r = .15, p < .05), 
providing some initial support for the idea that leaders reward employees who share bad 
news with higher evaluations of effectiveness. However, using path analysis to control 
for prior performance, I find that there is no significant relationship between sharing bad 
news and supervisor evaluations of employee effectiveness (B = .04, p > .05). 
Consequently, neither Hypothesis 1a nor Hypothesis 1b are supported. Hypotheses 2a 
and 2b similarly consider whether the relationship between sharing bad news and LMX is 
positive (2a) or negative (2b). Neither of these hypotheses is supported, as the correlation 
between sharing bad news and LMX is not significant (r = .10, p > .10), nor is there a 
significant effect when examining this relationship using path analysis (B = -.00, p > .05). 
My third hypothesis predicted that LMX would relate positively to evaluations of 
employee effectiveness. The correlation between LMX and evaluations of employee 
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effectiveness was positive and significant (r = .40, p < .05), but when considered using 
path analysis, I find no significant relationship between LMX and evaluations of 
effectiveness (B = .10, p > .05).  As such, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Building on 
these prior three hypotheses, I next hypothesized a positive (4a) and negative (4b) 
indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of employee effectiveness through 
LMX. Table 6 reports the results for these hypotheses, showing that neither 4a nor 4b 
was supported (indirect effect = .002, 95% CI = -.002, .01). It should be noted that all 
confidence intervals reported in this study have been corrected for bias using a Monte 
Carlo re-sampling approach (Preacher & Selig, 2012). Using an R program, I estimate 
confidence intervals using 20,000 re-samples.  
After exploring the relationships associated with social exchange, I next examined 
the set of hypotheses related to challenge and hindrance appraisals (Hypotheses 5 -7). 
First, I predicted that sharing bad news would related positively to both challenge 
appraisals (5a) and hindrance appraisals (5b). Looking again at the correlations reported 
in Table 5, sharing bad news is positively related to challenge appraisals (r = .14, p < 
.05), but not significantly related to hindrance appraisals (r = -.07, p > .10). Although 
these correlations lend support to the idea that sharing bad news influences challenge 
appraisals, but not hindrance appraisals, results of the path analysis reveal that sharing 
bad news is not significantly related to either challenge appraisals (B = -.01, p > .05) or 
hindrance appraisals (B = .02, p > .05). Thus, neither Hypothesis 5a nor Hypothesis 5b is 
supported.  
Hypothesis 6a predicted that challenge appraisals would be positively related to 
LMX, whereas Hypothesis 6b predicted that hindrance appraisals would be negatively 
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related to LMX. In again referring first to correlations, challenge appraisals were found to 
be positively related to LMX (r = .41, p < .05) and hindrance appraisals were found to be 
negatively related to LMX (r = -.33, p < .05). A similar pattern of relationships emerged 
though path analysis. That is, challenge appraisals had a significant positive relationship 
with LMX (B = .12, p < .10), and hindrance appraisals has a significant negative 
relationship with LMX (B = -.34, p < .05), even when controlling for prior performance. 
In other words, both Hypothesis 6a and 6b were supported.  
Next, I predicted the indirect effect of sharing bad news on LMX through each 
challenge and hindrance appraisals. In Hypothesis 7a, I suggested that sharing bad news 
would have a positive indirect effect on LMX through challenge appraisal. As Table 6 
shows, this hypothesis was not supported (indirect effect = -.00, 95% CI = -.01, .01). 
Hypothesis 7b examined the indirect effect of sharing bad news on LMX through 
hindrance appraisals, and this hypothesis was also not supported (indirect effect = -.01, 
95% CI = -.03, .02).  
Having explored the indirect effects of the focal variables, I considered the effects 
of potential moderators, specifically timeliness, offering solutions, and responsibility for 
the bad news (Hypotheses 8-12). Each of these moderators, as well as the sharing bad 
news construct and control variables, were group-mean centered in these analyses. 
Although I did capture both supervisor neuroticism and trust propensity with the intention 
of using these variables as controls in the analyses, I removed them when it became 
apparent that the results of the analyses were unchanged regardless of whether these 
variables were included or excluded (Atinc, Simmering, & Kroll, 2012; Becker, 2005; 
Carlson & Wu, 2012). However, prior performance was retained as a control variable, as 
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it was found to correlate significantly with a number of the focal variables and accounted 
for variance within the analyses. 
In Hypothesis 8a, I predicted that timeliness moderated the relationship between 
sharing bad news and challenge appraisals such that the positive relationship was stronger 
when timeliness was high. The maximum likelihood estimation results for this analysis 
are reported in Table 7. In model 1, I show the effects of sharing bad news on challenge 
appraisals when controlling for prior performance. Model 2 also shows these variables, 
but includes timeliness, and the interaction between sharing bad news and timeliness. In 
looking specifically at the interaction term, I find no significant effect on challenge 
appraisals (B = .17, p > .10), meaning that Hypothesis 8a is not supported.  
I also considered the interaction of sharing bad news and timeliness on hindrance 
appraisals. That is, I proposed in Hypothesis 8b that timeliness moderates the relationship 
between sharing bad news and hindrance appraisals such that the positive relationship is 
weaker when timeliness was high. In looking at Model 4 of Table 7, the effect of 
timeliness on hindrance appraisals is significant (B = -.26, p < .05), but the effect of the 
interaction between sharing bad news and timeliness on hindrance appraisals is not 
significant (B = .06, p > .10). Therefore, Hypothesis 8b is also not supported.  
 The next set of hypotheses considered the moderating effects of offering 
solutions. Hypothesis 9a predicted the effect of offering solutions on the relationship 
between sharing bad news and challenge appraisals. As model 1 in Table 8 shows, 
sharing bad news does not have a significant direct effect on challenge appraisals when 
controlling for prior performance; however, there is a significant direct effect of offering 
solutions on challenge appraisals (B = .27, p < .05; shown in model 2). Further, the 
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interaction between sharing bad news and offering solutions also has a significant effect 
on challenge appraisals (B = .18, p < .05). In order to better understand the meaning of 
this interaction, I plotted the simple slopes, shown in Figure 2. Both of the simple slopes 
were significant (simple slope when offering solutions is high = .15, p < .05; simple slope 
when offering solutions is low = -.16, p < .05). As predicted, this interaction suggests that 
positive relationship between sharing bad news and challenge appraisals is enhanced 
when offering solutions is high, but that the relationship is weakened when offering 
solutions is low. Consequently, Hypothesis 9a is supported and the implications of this 
finding will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
 Similar to Hypothesis 9a, Hypothesis 9b examined the moderating effects of 
offering solutions on the relationship between sharing bad news and hindrance appraisals. 
In looking at models 3 and 4 of Table 8, it is clear that sharing bad news does not have a 
significant direct effect on hindrance appraisal. Although, offering solutions is 
significantly related to hindrance appraisals (B = -.15, p < .10), there is not significant 
effect of the interaction between sharing bad news and offering solutions on hindrance 
appraisals. Based on these findings, Hypothesis 9b is not supported.  
 Hypothesis 10a considers the influence of responsibility for the bad news on the 
relationship between challenge appraisal and LMX. In first looking at model 1 of Table 9, 
challenge appraisals have a positive and significant relationship with LMX, even when 
controlling for prior performance (B = .12, p < .10). In model 2, I add responsibility and 
the interaction between challenge appraisals and responsibility to the regression. Neither 
of these terms are significant. As such, Hypothesis 10a is not supported.  
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 A similar pattern of results emerges with regard to Hypothesis 10b, which 
predicted that responsibility for the bad news would strengthen the negative relationship 
between hindrance appraisals and LMX. As shown in model 4 of Table 9, hindrance 
appraisals have a significant negative direct effect on LMX (B = -.44, p < .05), but 
neither responsibility, nor the interaction between hindrance appraisals and responsibility 
for the bad news has a significant effect on LMX, suggesting that Hypothesis 10b is also 
not supported.  
 Finally, my last group of Hypotheses (11 – 12) considers how timeliness, offering 
solutions, and responsibility could moderate the indirect effect of sharing bad news on 
evaluations of effectiveness through the appraisal mechanism (either challenge or 
hindrance appraisals) and LMX. However, given that many of the moderation effects 
were not supported in previous hypotheses, most of these relationships are not supported. 
For example, Hypothesis 11a suggested that the positive indirect effect of sharing bad 
news on evaluations of employee effectiveness through challenge appraisals and LMX 
would be strengthened when timeliness was high. However, the interaction of sharing bad 
news and timeliness on challenge appraisals was not significant, meaning that Hypothesis 
11a is not supported. Similarly, Hypothesis 11c predicted that high levels of timeliness 
would weaken the negative indirect effect of sharing bad news on supervisor evaluations 
of effectiveness though hindrance appraisals and LMX. However, the interaction between 
sharing bad news and timeliness was not significant; consequently, Hypothesis 11c is not 
supported. Hypothesis 11d, which predicted that high levels of offering solutions would 
weaken the negative indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of effectiveness 
through hindrance appraisals and LMX, was also not supported, as the interaction 
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between sharing bad news and offering solutions did not have a significant relationship 
with hindrance appraisals.  
 The moderated mediation effects of responsibility in the second stage of the path 
model were also not supported. That is, the interaction between challenge appraisals and 
responsibility did not have a significant effect on LMX, nor did the interaction between 
hindrance appraisals and responsibility have a significant effect on LMX. As such, 
Hypothesis 12a, which predicted that the positive indirect effect of sharing bad news on 
evaluations of employee effectiveness though challenge appraisals and LMX would be 
weaker when responsibility was high, was not supported. Hypothesis 12b, which 
predicted that the negative indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of employee 
effectiveness through hindrance appraisals and LMX would be stronger when 
responsibility was high, was also not supported.  
 However, based on the results of Hypothesis 9a, the interaction between sharing 
bad news and offering solutions did have a significant effect on challenge appraisals. 
Hypothesis 11b extended the predictions of Hypothesis 9a, suggesting that the positive 
indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of effectiveness through challenge 
appraisals and LMX would be strengthened when offering solutions is high. I examined 
this hypothesis by first looking at the difference between the indirect effects of sharing 
bad news on LMX through challenge appraisals when offering solutions was high versus 
when offering solutions was low. As shown in Table 10, the difference in these indirect 
effects was not significant (difference = .05, 95% CI = -.01, .12). Next I considered the 
indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of employee effectiveness though 
challenge appraisals, and found that the difference in the indirect effects between high 
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levels of offering solutions and low levels of offering solutions was significant 
(difference = .24, 95% CI = .05, .44). Finally, I examined the indirect effect of sharing 
bad news on evaluations of effectiveness through both challenge appraisals and LMX. 
The difference in this indirect effect at high levels of offering solutions and low levels of 
offering solutions was not significant (difference = .04, 95% CI = -.01, .09). Based on 
these findings, Hypothesis 11b was not supported.  
 To summarize, although I was able to find some significant correlations among 
many of the focal variables in the analysis, the majority of my proposed hypotheses were 
not supported. Perhaps most notably, I did find a significant interaction effect of sharing 
bad news and offering solutions on challenge appraisals, and this effect was in the 
direction predicted. I consider the reasons for this particular finding in the next chapter. I 
follow my analysis of the field sample by next exploring the results of my analysis for the 
lab study.  
Results of Study 3:  Lab Study of Sharing Bad News  
Manipulations. Before examining the results of Study 3, it is first important to 
establish that the manipulations executed within the study were effective. For each of the 
manipulations, participants were provided a single-item statement, included in Appendix 
I, and asked to rate the extent they agree with the statement using a five-point Likert scale 
(1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = 
Strongly agree). For example, in the “offering solutions” condition, participants were 
provided the statement “The water carrier offered a solution for addressing any news 
about an error or mistake that had or could have had really bad implications for our 
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team’s ability to put out the fires.” A rating of 4 or 5 in response to this statement 
suggests that the participant believed the water carrier had offered a solution.  
Each manipulation was evaluating using a t-test analysis, the results of which are 
reported in Table 12. In first considering the severity of bad news condition, the mean of 
the severe bad news condition (M = 3.30, SD, 1.14) was significantly higher than the 
mild bad news condition (M = 2.56, SD = 1.39, t(96) = -2.87, p < .01). This suggests that 
participants tended to experience the severe bad news condition as significantly more 
severe than in the mild condition. In next looking at the timeliness condition, the mean of 
the timely condition (M = 2.92, SD, 1.22) was significantly higher than the untimely 
condition (M = 2.54, SD = 1.04, t(108) = -1.77, p < .10). That is, participants in the 
timely condition rated the sharing of bad news by the confederate as more timely than did 
participants in the untimely condition. For the offering solutions condition, the mean of 
the solution condition (M = 3.96, SD, .99) was significantly higher than the no solution 
condition (M = 3.05, SD = 1.20, t(109) = -4.28, p < .01). Thus, participants in the 
solution condition believed the confederate offered a solution significantly more than did 
participants in the no solution condition. Finally, the mean of the responsible condition 
(M = 2.94, SD, 1.17) was significantly higher than the not responsible condition (M = 
2.39, SD = 1.16, t(109) = -2.44, p < .01), meaning that individuals in the responsible 
condition believed the confederate was at fault significantly more than participants in the 
not responsible condition. In sum, each of the manipulations was found to be significant, 
suggesting that each was effective in creating the desired condition.  
Evaluation of hypotheses. After ensuring that the manipulations were effective, I 
conducted a CFA to evaluate the fit of the hypothesized model to the data. As in Study 2, 
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I first examined my proposed model, and then compared the fit of my proposed model to 
a series of alternative models. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 13. The 
proposed model consisted for four distinct factors (challenge and hindrance appraisals, 
LMX, and evaluations of effectiveness), and had acceptable fit: χ2(113) = 162.26, p < .01; 
RMSEA = .06; CFI = .94; TFI = .93; SRMR = .07. I next considered a 3-factor model in 
which the items for challenge and hindrance appraisals were combined on the same 
factor, and LMX and evaluations of effectiveness were kept as unique factors. I also 
considered a 2-factor model in which the items for challenge and hindrance appraisals 
were combined on a single factor, and the items for LMX and evaluations of 
effectiveness were combined on a single factor. Finally, I evaluated a 1-factor model. As 
in Study 2, the difference in the chi-squared value for each of the alternative models was 
significant, indicating that my proposed model was the best fit.  
Having assessed model fit, I next considered the hypotheses proposed in this 
study. The means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for each of the study 
variables are reported in Table 14. Further, a summary of the hypothesized relationships 
for the lab study is shown in Figure 3.  
My initial group of hypotheses (Hypotheses 1 -4) considered the exchange 
relationship between sharing bad news and evaluations of effectiveness with LMX as the 
key exchange variable transmitting this effect. My first hypotheses postulated that sharing 
bad news would be positively (1a) or negatively (1b) related to evaluations of 
effectiveness. In looking at the correlation between sharing bad news and evaluations of 
effectiveness, the value of the correlation is small and negatively valenced, but is not 
significant (r = -.07, p > .10). The results of the ANCOVA also demonstrate a non-
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significant relationship between sharing bad news and evaluations of effectiveness (F(1, 
105) = .18, p = .67, ƞ2 = .00). Consequently, neither Hypothesis 1a nor 1b is supported. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b similarly offer competing predictions regarding the relationship 
between sharing bad news and LMX. However, these hypotheses were also unsupported 
as the correlation between sharing bad news and LMX was found to be non-significant (r 
= .07, p > .10), and the results of the ANCOVA again indicated a non-significant 
relationship (F(1, 105) = .85, p = .36, ƞ2 = .01). The third hypothesis suggested that LMX 
would be positively related to evaluations of effectiveness. The correlation between LMX 
and evaluations of effectiveness was positive and significant (r = .41, p < .05). I also 
considered the relationship between LMX and evaluations of effectiveness using path 
analysis and obtained a significant result (B = .29, p < .05). As such, Hypothesis 3 is 
supported. Finally, I considered the indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of 
effectiveness through LMX. As shown in Table 15, the indirect effect was not significant 
(indirect effect = .03, 95% CI = -.04, .10). The confidence intervals were corrected for 
bias using 5,000 bootstrapped samples (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; MacKinnon, 
Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). It should be noted that all 
reported confidence intervals in this study have been corrected for bias using this 
bootstrapping approach. 
In the next group of hypotheses (Hypotheses 5 -7), I considered relationships 
between challenge and hindrance appraisals and the other focal variables in the model. 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b predicted that sharing bad news would be positively related to both 
challenge and hindrance appraisals. Referring to the correlations reported in Table 14, 
sharing bad news was not significantly correlated with either challenge appraisals (r = -
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.04, p > .10) or hindrance appraisals (r = -.07, p > .10). Using ANCOVA to further 
explore these relationships, I find a similar pattern. That is, sharing bad news was not 
significantly related to either challenge appraisals (F(1, 105) = .01, p = .91, ƞ2 = .00) or 
hindrance appraisals (F(1, 105) = .35, p = .56, ƞ2 = .00). Based on these findings, neither 
Hypothesis 5a nor 5b is supported.  
Hypothesis 6a predicted that challenge appraisals would be positively related to 
LMX, and a significant correlation between these variables provides some initial support 
for this hypothesis (r = .40, p < .05). I test this relationship more thoroughly using path 
analysis, and find that this effect is also positive and significant (B = .24, p < .05), 
providing stronger evidence that Hypothesis 6a is supported. Hypothesis 6b predicted that 
hindrance appraisals would be negatively related to LMX, but I do not find a significant 
correlation between these variables (r = -.05, p > .10), nor are the results of the path 
analysis significant (B = .05, p > .10). These findings suggest that Hypothesis 6b is not 
supported. Hypotheses 7a and 7b considered the indirect effect of sharing bad news on 
LMX through each challenge and hindrance appraisals. Specifically, Hypothesis 7a 
predicted a positive indirect effect of sharing bad news on LMX through challenge 
appraisals, whereas Hypothesis 7b predicted a negative indirect effect of sharing bad 
news on LMX through hindrance appraisals. In referring to Table 15, the indirect effect 
of sharing bad news on LMX was not significant through challenge appraisals (indirect 
effect = -.00, 95% CI = -.07, .07) and was also not significant through hindrance 
appraisals (indirect effect = -.01, 95% CI = -.04, .03). Thus, neither Hypothesis 7a nor 7b 
are supported.  
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 Hypotheses 8 – 10 examined the potential moderating conditions of sharing bad 
news. For these hypotheses, sharing bad news was centered using grand mean centering, 
as were each of the moderating conditions (timeliness, offering solutions, and 
responsibility) and control variables. Further, although neuroticism and trust propensity 
were anticipated to be included as controls in these analyses, neither of these variables 
had significant correlations with the focal variables. Additionally, the results of these 
analyses when neuroticism and trust propensity were included were no different than the 
results when these variables were excluded from the analysis. Consequently, neuroticism 
and trust propensity were not included in the analyses, based on the guidelines offered by 
Atinc, Simmering, and Kroll (2012), Becker (2005), and Carlson and Wu (2012).   
Hypothesis 8a suggested that timeliness moderated the relationship between 
sharing bad news and challenge appraisals such that the positive relationship was stronger 
when timeliness was high. Table 16 reports the maximum likelihood estimation results 
for this analysis. Model 1 reflects the effects of sharing bad news on challenge appraisal 
when controlling for psychological safety, goal commitment, and the confederate. Model 
2 shows the results when the moderator (timeliness) and the interaction term (sharing bad 
news x timeliness) are added to the regression. Sharing bad news (B = -.02, p > .10), 
timeliness (B = .22, p > .10), and the interaction between sharing bad news and timeliness 
(B = -.35, p > .10) were all found to have a non-significant relationship with challenge 
appraisals. Consequently, Hypothesis 8a is not supported.  
Hypothesis 8b predicted that timeliness moderated the relationship between 
sharing bad news and hindrance appraisals such that the positive relationship would be 
weaker when timeliness was high. Referring again to Table 16, Model 3 shows that 
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sharing bad news is not significantly related to hindrance appraisals when controlling for 
psychological safety, goal commitment, and the confederate. However, as shown in 
Model 4, the interaction term between sharing bad news and timeliness is significant on 
hindrance appraisals (B = -.65, p < .10), even though the direct effects of sharing bad 
news (B = -.10, p > .10) and timeliness (B = -.08, p > .10) on hindrance appraisals are not 
significant. A plot of this interaction is shown in Figure 4, and, as is noted in the figure, 
the simple slope for high timeliness is significant (simple slope at high timeliness = -.67, 
p < .10), but the simple slope at low timeliness is not significant (simple slope at low 
timeliness = -.12, p > .10). This interaction suggests that when the sharing of bad news is 
very timely (high timeliness), the extent to which individuals appraise the sharing of bad 
news as hindering is reduced. Consequently, Hypothesis 8b is supported.  
 Hypotheses 9a and 9b predict a similar pattern of relationships with offering 
solutions as a moderator of sharing bad news on challenge and hindrance appraisals. 
Table 17 shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimations for these hypotheses. 
First, Hypothesis 9a posits that high levels of offering solutions will increase the positive 
relationship between sharing bad news and challenge appraisals. Although Model 2 
demonstrates a strong, significant direct effect of offering solutions on challenge 
appraisals (B = .46, p < .05), the interaction between sharing bad news and offering 
solutions was not significant (B = -.07, p > .10). Thus, Hypothesis 9a was not supported.  
 In considering Hypothesis 9b, which suggested that high levels of offering 
solutions would decrease the positive relationship between sharing bad news and 
hindrance appraisals, Model 3 in Table 17 shows the effects of sharing bad news on 
hindrance appraisals with just the control variables whereas Model 4 includes offering 
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solutions and the interaction between sharing bad news and offering solutions. As shown 
in Model 4, the interaction term of sharing bad news and offering solutions has a 
significant positive effect on hindrance appraisals (B = .73, p < .10). To further examine 
this effect, I graphed the interaction, shown in Figure 5. Although neither of the simple 
slopes were significant (simple slope when offering solutions is high = .61, p > .10; 
simple slope when offering solutions is low = -.10, p < .05), the direction of the 
interaction suggests that when bad news is shared, high offering of solutions is likely to 
increase hindrance appraisals whereas low offering of solutions is likely to decrease 
hindrance appraisals. Though significant, this effect was opposite of what was predicted; 
consequently, Hypothesis 9b is not supported.  
 The next two hypotheses explored the influence of responsibility for the bad news 
on the relationships between challenge and hindrance appraisals and LMX. Hypothesis 
10a predicted that responsibility for bad news would suppress the positive relationship 
between challenge appraisals and LMX. In looking at Table 18, Model 1 shows a 
significant relationship between challenge appraisals and LMX (B = .23, p < .05), even 
when controlling for psychological safety, goal commitment, and the confederate. 
However, as shown in Model 2, neither responsibility, nor the interaction of challenge 
appraisals and responsibility, has a significant effect on LMX. As such, Hypothesis 10a is 
not supported.  
 Hypothesis 10 predicted that high levels of responsibility for the bad news would 
enhance the negative relationship between sharing hindrance appraisals and LMX. In 
looking at Model 3 on Table 15, hindrance appraisals do not have a significant direct 
effect on LMX. In looking at Model 4, the direct effect of neither hindrance appraisals 
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nor responsibility is significant on LMX; however, the interaction of hindrance appraisals 
and responsibility is significant (B = .25, p < .05). A plot of this interaction is depicted in 
Figure 6. As shown in the figure, the simple slope of high responsibility is significant 
(.33, p < .05) and the simple slope of low responsibility is not significant (.07, p > .10). 
The direction of this interaction suggests that when supervisors make a hindrance 
appraisal, high levels of responsibility are likely to increase LMX whereas low levels of 
responsibility are likely to decreases LMX. Again, this outcome is opposite of what was 
hypothesized; thus, Hypothesis 10b is not supported, in spite of the significant result.  
 The last group of hypotheses (11 – 12) built upon the prior hypotheses and 
predicted a series of possible moderated mediation effects. Hypothesis 11a predicted that 
timeliness would moderate the indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of 
effectiveness though challenge appraisals and LMX such that the indirect effect would be 
more positive when timeliness was high. Similarly, Hypothesis 11b predicted that 
offering solutions would the indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of 
effectiveness though challenge appraisals and LMX such that the positive indirect effect 
would be stronger when offering solutions was high. However, as the interaction terms of 
sharing bad news and timeliness and sharing bad news and offering solutions were not 
significant on challenge appraisals, neither of the moderated mediation hypotheses were 
found to be significant. Thus, hypotheses 11a and 11b are not supported. Similarly, the 
interaction term of challenge appraisals and responsibility was not significant when 
regressed on LMX. This suggests that Hypothesis 12a, which postulated that the positive 
indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of effectiveness though challenge 
appraisal and LMX would be weaker when responsibility was high, is also not supported.  
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 However, as significant moderation effects were found for hypotheses 8b, 9b, and 
10b, the corresponding moderated mediation hypotheses can be explored. I first consider 
Hypothesis 11c, which suggested that timeliness moderates the indirect effect of sharing 
bad news on evaluations of effectiveness through hindrance appraisal and LMX such that 
the negative effect is weaker when timeliness was high. Table 19 shows the results of this 
analysis. I first examined the effect of timeliness on the indirect effect of sharing bad 
news through hindrance appraisals with LMX as the dependent variable. The difference 
between the indirect effect at high levels of timeliness and low levels of timeliness was 
not significant (difference = -.03, 95% CI = -.14, .07). Next I considered the effect of 
timeliness on the indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of effectiveness 
though hindrance appraisals. Again, the difference of the indirect effect at high levels of 
timeless and low levels of timeliness was not significant (difference = -.19, 95% CI = -
.42, .04). Finally, I examined the effect of timeliness on the indirect effect of sharing bad 
news on evaluations of effectiveness through both hindrance appraisal and LMX. The 
difference of the indirect effect at high levels of timeliness and low levels of timeliness 
was again not significant (difference = -.01, 95% CI = -.04, .02). Based on these results, 
the moderated mediation predicted in Hypothesis 11c was not supported.  
 I used a similar approach to examine Hypothesis 11d, which predicted that high 
levels of offering solutions would weaken the negative indirect effect of sharing bad 
news on evaluations of effectiveness though hindrance appraisal and LMX. First, as 
noted in Table 20, the difference between high levels of offering solutions and low levels 
of offering solutions was not significant when considering the indirect effect of sharing 
bad news on LMX through hindrance appraisals (difference = .04, 95% CI = -.07, .13). 
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Next, I examined the effect of offering solutions on the indirect effect of sharing bad 
news on evaluations of effectiveness though hindrance appraisals. The difference 
between high levels of offering solutions and low levels of offering solutions was not 
significant for this indirect effect (difference = .21, 95% CI = -.03, .40). I then considered 
the difference between high levels of offering solutions and low levels of offering 
solutions on the indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of effectiveness 
though both hindrance appraisals and LMX. The difference in this indirect effects was 
also not significant (difference = .01, 95% CI = -.02, .04). Thus, Hypothesis 11d was not 
supported.  
 The final Hypothesis (12b) predicted that responsibility for the bad news would 
moderate the indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of effectiveness such that 
the negative indirect effect would be stronger when responsibility for the bad news was 
high. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 21. To examine this hypothesis, I 
first considered the difference between high levels of responsibility and low levels of 
responsibility on the indirect effect of hindrance appraisals on evaluations of 
effectiveness through LMX. The difference in this indirect effect was not significant 
(difference = .08, 95% CI = -.01, .17). Next, I considered the effect of responsibility on 
the indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of effectiveness through both 
hindrance appraisal and LXM. The difference between high levels of responsibility and 
low levels of responsibility was not significant (difference = -.01, 95% CI = -.04, .02). 
Consequently, Hypothesis 12b was not supported.  
 In sum, the results of the analysis for the lab study suggest that many of the 
hypothesized relationships were not supported. However, significant moderation was 
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found for both timeliness and offering solutions with respect to the relationship between 
sharing bad news and hindrance appraisals. Additionally, a significant moderation effect 
was also found for responsibility on the relationship between hindrance appraisals and 
LMX. The implications of these findings are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
Prior research has largely associated the sharing of bad news with leader-initiated 
communication to employees regarding significant workplace events that occur 
infrequently, such as downsizing or pay cuts. However, this perspective has ignored the 
idea that “bad news” can occur much more regularly in the workplace, and often on a 
much smaller scale. Within the workplace, minor mistakes or errors are a frequent 
occurrence, and often it is employees, as opposed to leaders, who are the first to become 
aware of these issues. Thus, the first purpose of this study is to develop the concept of 
sharing bad news as a form of communication from an employee to a supervisor 
regarding these critical mistakes or errors. Although some prior work has considered the 
sharing of bad news as an employee behavior, this work has primarily focused on the 
factors that encourage an employee to share the information, such as personal 
characteristics or situational factors. This focus on the antecedents of sharing bad news 
has ignored the potential consequences of the behavior to the messenger, both in terms of 
the quality of the messengers’ relationships with their supervisor, as well as how 
supervisors rate employees’ effectiveness. As such, the second key purpose of my 
dissertation is to consider the outcomes of sharing bad news, in particular, exploring the 
mechanisms through which sharing bad news influences supervisor evaluations of 
employee effectiveness. My dissertation consisted of three studies designed to explore 
these limitations in the literature, and I discuss the studies, as well as the implications of 
my findings, in more detail below. 
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Summary of results 
 
Study 1. The purpose of the first study was to clearly define the concept of 
sharing bad news and to develop a scale to capture the newly created construct. I first 
compared the definition of sharing bad news to other established measures of speaking 
up, including promotive and prohibitive voice, whistle-blowing, and issue selling. When 
none of the items within these measures adequately captured the sharing bad news 
construct, I created my own set of 16 items. After evaluating the items for substantive 
validity, I removed one of the items. I then considered the discriminant validity of the 15-
item sharing bad news scale, again comparing it to promotive and prohibitive voice, 
whistle-blowing and issue selling. Using CFA, I determined that the best fitting model 
was one in which each of the constructs was designated as its own factor. The results of 
the CFA provide support for the uniqueness of the sharing bad news measure. In addition, 
I further examined the validity of the sharing bad news scale by using the guidelines 
offered by Fornell and Larcker (1981). The sharing bad news scale not only had high 
composite reliability, but also acceptable convergent and discriminate validity using this 
approach. In sum, Study 1 not only helped establish the concept of sharing bad news, but 
provided a viable measure for use in this study, as well as for scholars who are interested 
in understanding the impact of sharing bad news in the workplace.  
Study 2 (Field) and Study 3 (Lab). Using the measure of sharing bad news 
developed in Study 1, Study 2 was designed as a test of the conceptual model within a 
field setting. The lab study (Study 3) was also designed to test the full conceptual model 
with the intention of helping to establish causality of the relationships and rule out 
alternative explanations. Although many of the hypotheses were unsupported in either of 
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these studies, my dissertation did reveal some important findings. For example, one of the 
key purposes of this dissertation was to understand the relationship between sharing bad 
news and evaluations of employee effectiveness. In examining the field data, I did find a 
positive and significant correlation between sharing bad news and evaluations of 
effectiveness. However, this association was not supported when path analysis was used 
to examine the relationship. I was also unable to find a significant relationship between 
sharing bad news and evaluations of employee effectiveness in my analysis of the lab 
data. Regardless, the significant correlation in the field study hinted at the possibility of a 
relationship between sharing bad news and evaluations of employee effectiveness, and 
provided motivation to further examine the how these variables may be linked.  
To explain why sharing bad news and evaluations of effectiveness might be 
related, I considered the sharing of bad news in terms of a social exchange between an 
employee and supervisor, and explicitly examined LMX as a critical transmitter of the 
effect between sharing bad news and evaluations of effectiveness. I was unable to find 
support for the relationship between sharing bad news and LMX in either the field study 
or the lab study, but in the lab study, I did find strong support for the relationship 
between LMX and evaluations of effectiveness. This finding supports prior work in the 
literature which has found a significant relationship between LMX and employee 
performance. Finally, my hypotheses for LMX as a mediator of the relationship between 
sharing bad news and evaluations of employee effectiveness (hypotheses 4a and 4b) was 
not supported in either the field data or the lab data. On the surface, these findings seem 
to suggest very little support for the notion of exchange as the primary mechanism for 
transmitting the effects of sharing bad news to evaluations of effectiveness. However, 
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Rucker et al. (2011) has suggested that mediation may still be present even when a direct 
effect does not exist, meaning that there could be an indirect effect of sharing bad news 
on LMX. Thus, I was still able to assess my hypotheses regarding the potential mediating 
effects of challenge and hindrance appraisals in the relationship between sharing bad 
news and employee effectiveness. 
In considering the possible mediating effects of challenge and hindrance 
appraisals more specifically, I proposed that each challenge and hindrance appraisals 
would mediate the relationship between sharing bad news and LMX, but was unable to 
find support for these indirect effects in either the field or lab study. It is possible that the 
lack of significant findings for the indirect pathways is in part due to the direct 
relationships between sharing bad news and challenge and hindrance appraisals. In 
examining these links specifically, I found that neither study supported a significant 
relationship between sharing bad news and challenge appraisals, nor did either study 
support a significant relationship between sharing bad news and hindrance appraisals. 
Although it is possible that these variables are simply unrelated, as there was no evidence 
to support these relationships in either study, it is also possible that the relationships 
between sharing bad news and each challenge and hindrance appraisals are conditional, 
and I subsequently considered the effects of the proposed moderators, specifically 
timeliness and offering solutions.  
With regard to timeliness, I proposed that the positive relationship between 
sharing bad news and challenge appraisals would be strengthened at high levels of 
timeliness. I did not find support for this hypothesis in either the field study or the lab 
study. However, I also proposed that the positive relationship between sharing bad news 
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and hindrance appraisals would be weakened at high levels of timeliness. Although I did 
not find support for this relationship in the field study, I did find significant results for 
this interaction in the lab study. That is, when individuals shared bad news, being very 
timely (high timeliness) decreased the hindrance appraisals made by leaders whereas low 
levels of timeliness increased supervisors’ hindrance appraisals. These findings suggest 
that when employees share bad news, supervisors are less likely to perceive the news as 
threatening or hindering when the news has been delivered promptly as opposed to when 
messengers allow some time to pass before sharing the information. Conceivably, timely 
delivery of bad news messages provides supervisors with greater opportunity to resolve 
the issue and more flexibility in determining when and how the issue will be fixed. In this 
regard, supervisors would feel less hindered or impeded by the sharing of bad news. 
When messengers are untimely in message delivery, the consequences of the bad news 
event may be more imminent, and supervisors may be forced into dealing with the issue 
right away, disrupting other work tasks or not allowing for effective resolution of the bad 
news event. Consequently, supervisors may appraise the sharing of bad news with low 
timeliness are more hindering, or threatening to their goal achievement. More generally, 
the results of the lab study suggest that timeliness is highly relevant to the sharing of bad 
news point to a need for more research on the role of timeliness in the relationship 
between sharing bad news and appraisals, particularly hindrance appraisals. 
In addition to considering the moderating role of timeliness, I also examined how 
offering solutions could influence the relationships between sharing bad news and each 
challenge and hindrance appraisals respectively. In looking first at the relationship 
between sharing bad news and challenge appraisals, I hypothesized that the positive 
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relationship would be strengthened when offering solutions was high. Although this 
hypothesis was not supported in the lab study, I did find support for this relationship in 
the field study. This finding lends credence to the notion that when leaders are presented 
with a solution, it fosters a belief that the issue being raised may have beneficial 
outcomes. For instance, offering a solution when bad news is shared may highlight the 
opportunities for growth or gain that may be possible by resolving the issue. Offering a 
solution may also introduce ideas or suggestions that could have longer term benefits to 
task effectiveness or efficiency, or could similarly encourage thinking in ways that help 
improve the workplace more generally. In sum, it is possible that offering a solution helps 
bring out the “silver lining” of the bad news event, and as such, leaders appraise the 
sharing of bad news as challenging when the news is accompanied by a solution.   
I next hypothesized that the positive relationship between sharing bad news and 
hindrance appraisals would be weakened when offering solutions was high. Though I did 
not find support for this hypothesis in the field data, I did obtain a significant interaction 
between sharing bad news and offering solutions in the lab data. Specifically, I found that 
high levels of offering solutions enhanced the relationship between sharing bad news and 
hindrance appraisals whereas low levels of offering solutions weakened the relationship 
between sharing bad news and hindrance appraisals. At first glance, these results seem 
counterintuitive, as offering solutions is generally viewed as a helpful, not inhibiting, and 
provides actionable steps forward for resolving the bad news event. However, offering 
solutions may also serve as an informal assignment of unexpected tasks to the supervisor. 
In other words, being provided with solutions may create the expectation that the 
supervisor must take action and do something to resolve the issue. Thus, it is possible that 
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offering solutions creates a greater demand on the supervisor’s time, attention, and 
resources in ways that are unanticipated and likely interfere with task completion or goal 
attainment. That is, the demand created by the sharing of bad news may be exacerbated 
when the supervisor is pushed into a position of having to address the issue, as when a 
solution is presented alongside the sharing of the bad news. The notion that helpful 
behaviors, such as offering solutions, could create additional work for supervisors is an 
interesting idea that could be examined further in future research. It is possible that well-
intentioned efforts to mitigate the negative aspects of bad news, such as offering 
solutions, by employees actually lead supervisors to evaluate the sharing of the news 
more negatively than when employees refrain from being helpful. Along these lines, it 
may be worthwhile to consider who is responsible for executing the solutions (i.e., 
employee or supervisor) proposed by the messenger when bad news is shared, as 
ownership of the solution may influence the extent to which sharing bad news is 
appraised as more hindering when solutions are offered.  
To summarize, the results of both the field and the lab study suggest that offering 
solutions is important to the sharing of bad news, and additional work is needed to fully 
understand the implications of how supervisors appraise the sharing of bad news when a 
solution is also included in the message. For example, in considering the findings of both 
studies together, it is possible that offering solutions with bad news triggers a stress 
response in supervisors more generally. That is, it may be the case that supervisors are 
more likely to appraise the sharing of bad news as demanding when it is accompanied by 
a solution, and whether the sharing of bad news is more specifically appraised as 
challenging or hindering when a solution is offered may be contingent on other factors, 
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such as individual difference in the messenger, or situational factors in the work 
environment. Future research could explore this possibility in more detail.  
 Another important link examined in my dissertation was the relationship between 
each challenge and hindrance appraisals and LMX.  The results of the field study suggest 
that challenge and hindrance appraisals were related to LMX as predicted. That is, 
challenge appraisals were found to be positively related to LMX and hindrance appraisals 
were found to be negatively related to LMX. In the lab study, I also found support for the 
relationship between challenge appraisals and LMX, but did not find significant results 
for the relationship between hindrance appraisals and LMX. The findings in both of these 
studies suggest that the way in which supervisors evaluate the demands of their work 
environment can influence the quality of their relationships with their employees. More 
specifically, this suggests that when leaders assess workplace demands as more 
challenging, or likely to result in reward or gain, the exchange relationship with 
employees is enhanced. However, when supervisors view demands as hindering, or likely 
to prevent growth or goal attainment, the quality of their relationships with employees are 
likely to be diminished. Additionally, whereas prior work has often considered exchange 
relationships in terms of the positive resources exchanged between leaders and followers, 
this study provides some evidence that the quality of the exchange relationship can be 
influenced by negative transactions, such as hindrance appraisals of sharing bad news. 
 In addition to examining the direct pathway between each challenge and 
hindrance appraisals and LMX, I also explored potential moderating factors of these 
respective relationships. In particular, I hypothesized that being responsible for the bad 
news being shared would weaken the positive relationship between challenge appraisals 
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and LMX and strengthen the negative relationship between hindrance appraisals and 
LMX.  I did not find support for my hypothesis along the challenge pathway in either the 
field study or the lab study. The interaction effect of responsibility and hindrance 
appraisals on LMX was also not supported in the field study. However, I did find a 
significant interaction effect between hindrance appraisals and responsibility in the lab 
study, but instead of further diminishing the exchange relationship, being responsible for 
the bad news when a hindrance appraisal had been made actually enhanced LMX. One 
possible explanation for this finding is that the act of taking responsibility was seen as a 
positive action on the part of the messenger that suppressed the potentially negative 
consequences of having caused the issue in the first place. For example, in the lab study, 
the confederate actively claimed responsibility (“This is completely my fault. . .”) for the 
bad news event, and it is possible that leaders viewed this behavior as a proactive effort 
on the part of the confederate to help resolve the issue or maintain good relationships 
with the leader and team. Conversely, in the not responsible condition, the confederate 
denied responsibility (“This is not my fault. This wasn’t on my instructions…”), and it is 
possible that leaders interpreted the confederate’s behavior as refusing to take ownership 
for the problem, or more simply, making an excuse for the situation. Future research 
could further examine the influence of responsibility on the relationship between 
appraisals and LMX, and more clearly distinguish the influence of actively taking 
responsibility (or actively denying responsibility) on this relationship. Scholars could also 
explore how being at fault (or not) can influence relationships between appraisals and 
LMX when this information is not actively communicated with the sharing of bad news 
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and the degree to which a messenger is responsible for the bad news is obtained by 
leaders from sources other than the messenger.  
Finally, I predicted a number of moderated mediation hypotheses. Specifically, I 
suggested that each timeliness, offering solutions, and responsibility for the bad news 
would moderate the indirect effect of sharing bad news on evaluations of effectiveness 
though a pathway mediated by challenge appraisals and LMX as well as through a 
pathway mediated by hindrance appraisals and LMX. The significant interaction between 
timeliness and sharing bad news on challenge appraisals in the field study, the significant 
interactions between sharing bad news and each timeliness and offering solutions on 
hindrance appraisals in the lab study, as well as the significant interaction between 
hindrance appraisals and responsibility on LMX in the lab study all suggest a potential to 
find moderated mediation; however, none of the hypothesized moderated mediation 
effects were found to be significant in either the field or the lab study. One potential 
reason for the lack of findings could be the lack of significant indirect effects found in the 
model. Another possible reason why I may not have found significant moderated 
mediation may be related to the overall complexity of the model and the limited sample 
size in both the field and lab study. The relatively small samples could have reduced 
statistical power such that moderated mediation effects were unable to be detected. 
Future research could evaluate these relationships using a larger sample. 
Theoretical implications. This dissertation contributes to the existing literature in 
a number of ways. First, this research expands our current understanding of employees’ 
sharing of bad news within the workplace. In addition to offering a definition of sharing 
bad news that is focused on employees’ communication behaviors within the work 
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environment, I explore the consequences to employees when they share bad news. This 
focus on the outcomes of sharing bad news not only answers the question “do we shoot 
the messenger?,” but it also contributes to the literature on speaking up more broadly, as 
very few studies have considered the positive and negative implications for employees 
who share ideas or voice concerns. In this regard, my study is one of the first to consider 
how supervisors respond to employees who speak up, particularly those who speak up 
with negatively-valenced information.  
Second, my research offers new insight to the theory of social exchange. Prior 
scholarly work has suggested that exchanges are generally based on the ongoing 
exchange of positive resources. However, my study introduces the idea that not all 
exchanges, particularly within the work environment, may be positive. That is, 
sometimes the resources employees share with supervisors, such as bad news, have 
negative connotations. Supervisors may reciprocate these less-than-desirable exchanges 
with outcomes for the employees that are equally less-than-desirable, such as lower rating 
of employee effectiveness. Although this idea was not fully supported, my analysis did 
offer some hints that both positive and negative exchanges may occur within the 
workplace. For example, in the field study, challenge appraisals were positively related to 
LMX whereas hindrance appraisals were negatively related to LMX. Future research 
could continue to explore the possibility that exchange relationships are built on both 
positive and negative transactions. 
Finally, my study also has implications for the transactional theory of stress. In 
particular, I suggest that some demands within the work environment can be appraised as 
both challenging and hindering, even though prior research has tended to categorize 
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workplace demands as either one or the other. In addition, most of the significant 
interactions in my study occurred along the hindrance pathway (timeliness and offering 
solutions were found to moderate the relationship between sharing bad news and 
hindrance appraisals and responsibility was found to moderate the relationship between 
hindrance appraisals and LMX). This suggests that hindrance appraisals may be 
particularly important in understanding the effects of sharing bad news in the workplace. 
Future research on sharing bad news could further explore the relationship with hindrance 
appraisals and potential outcomes in the workplace.  
Future Research Directions. My dissertation provides a number of possible 
directions for future research. As has been mentioned, the hindrance pathway linking 
sharing bad news to LMX, and ultimately evaluations of effectiveness seems particularly 
relevant to understanding supervisor responses. Indeed, I found significant interaction 
effects for each of the moderators along the hindrance pathway. However, it may also be 
worthwhile to further investigate the pathway through challenge appraisals. For example, 
results of the field study indicated that sharing bad news with a solution enhances 
challenge appraisals. In addition, both the field and lab study indicated a strong 
relationship between challenge appraisals and LMX. Although more limited than the 
findings related to the hindrance pathway, these results do suggest that the challenge 
pathway may also be relevant to supervisor responses to sharing bad news, but that 
further research is needed to better understand this potential mechanism.  
Additionally, it is possible that there are additional moderating effects not 
captured in this study. For example, scholars have noted that forecasting, or the extent to 
which employees prepare supervisors for bad news in advance before actually delivering 
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the bad news message can influence supervisor responses (Maynard, 2003). More 
specifically, research has suggested that supervisors respond more favorably to 
individuals who forecast the sharing of bad news events because it removes surprise or 
uncertainty by allowing the recipient time to anticipate and prepare for the news 
(Maynard, 1996). Further, forecasting also has implications for the relationship between 
messenger and recipient (Maynard, 1996), making it potentially relevant to the ideas of 
exchange introduced here. As another example, frequency may also have an important 
moderating effect. Employees who speak up with bad news frequently (i.e., sharing 
numerous bad news events in a given period of time) may be viewed differently by 
supervisors than employees who speak up more rarely, and scholars could further explore 
how frequent versus infrequent sharing of bad news could influence the relationships 
proposed in this dissertation. Exploring additional moderators seems to be a particularly 
important direction for future research, as most of the significant findings in the 
hypothesized model were related to moderating effects.   
Another possible direction for future research is related to the possible 
endogeneity in the current conceptual model. That is, individuals may share bad news 
because they have a strong relationship with their supervisor (high LMX), or because 
they are a high performer. To some extent, this possibility was accounted for in both the 
field and lab study. In the field study, ratings of LMX and employee effectiveness were 
collected one month after employees rated the sharing of bad news. Additionally, prior 
performance was used as a control variable in the analysis of the field data. Within the 
lab study, sharing bad news was a manipulated condition, and leaders rated both LMX 
and effectiveness following the simulation. However, exploring the possibility of 
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feedback loops within the current conceptual model could provide additional insight to 
the process of sharing bad news and supervisor responses. Specifically, future work could 
consider the effects of a feedback loop between LMX and sharing bad news, but also a 
feedback loop between evaluations of effectiveness and sharing bad news.  
Finally, although both the field and the lab study examine supervisor responses to 
sharing bad news, each study takes a different perspective of the sharing bad news 
experience in the workplace. In the field study, sharing bad news is captured as a 
behavior in which employees generally engage. Similarly, the supervisor surveys 
assessed how supervisors likely appraise and respond to employees when bad news is 
shared. In essence, the field study captures tendency, or how employees tend to share bad 
news, and, in turn, how supervisors tend to respond. In contrast, the lab study captures a 
specific instance of sharing bad news, and considers how supervisors react given a 
particular bad news event. The notion of tendency versus instance may influence the 
proposed set of relationships within the study. For example, it is possible that the 
mechanisms that explain supervisor responses when sharing bad news is viewed as a 
tendency may differ from the mechanisms that explain supervisor responses in a given 
instance of sharing bad news. Relatedly, the moderators that are most relevant regarding 
the tendency to share bad news may also be different than those that are relevant to an 
instance of sharing bad news. The distinction between tendency and instance of sharing 
bad news offers new directions for future work, but more broadly suggests that scholars 
should account for speaking up as a tendency or instance in their work. 
Limitations. My dissertation is also subject to several limitations. First, I am 
limited by the sample size in each of my studies. For the field study, the sample consists 
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of 201 employees; however, these individuals are nested within 18 leaders. 
Unfortunately, given the complexity of the model, I could not analyze all of the 
relationships within the model simultaneously, as the number of parameters required to 
test the fully specified model exceeded the number of clusters (i.e., supervisors). In spite 
of this limitation, I was able to analyze the path models specified in each unique 
hypothesis. However, it is possible that I may have been able to obtain more robust 
results with a larger sample, and a greater number of clusters relative to the complexity of 
the model. Sample size was also a concern for the lab study (Study 3), as there were only 
111 useable responses. Even though I was able to find several significant interactions, the 
low statistical power that results from a small sample size may have hindered my ability 
to find more significant relationships within my model. I recommend that scholars further 
test these relationships in the future using more robust samples.  
A second limitation in this study is the source of the rater. Many of the focal 
variables included within the study (timeliness, offering solutions, responsibility, 
challenge and hindrance appraisals, LMX, and evaluations of effectiveness) were rated 
by the same individual at the same point in time. Same source raters can lead to common 
method bias, which is problematic because it can lead to measurement error, and 
subsequently, inaccurate conclusions regarding hypothesized relationships (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003). For the lab study, some of the concern regarding 
common method bias was mitigated by manipulating the independent variable (sharing 
bad news) and moderators (timeliness, offering solutions, and responsibility) within the 
study. However, the field study is more problematic, and thus the results should be 
interpreted with caution. Future research could examine these relationships using a study 
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design that (1) collects data for mediators, moderators, and dependent variables at 
different points in time, and (2) utilizes different sources to evaluation the mediators, 
moderators, and dependent variable. 
Related to the above point, a third potential limitation is rating source of 
evaluations of effectiveness. For both the field study and the lab study, evaluations of 
effectiveness were rated subjectively by the supervisor or leader. Although these scores 
are meaningful in that they reflect how the supervisor (or leader) feels about the 
employee’s performance, it may be worthwhile to consider more objective measures of 
performance. Utilizing an objective measure of performance would help reduce concerns 
regarding common method bias, but could also provide contrast with a supervisor’s 
personal evaluation of the employee. 
 Fourth, it is possible that the study design for the field, as well as the study design 
for the lab is not the most effective approach for capturing employees’ sharing of bad 
news and leaders’ subsequent responses. With regard to the field sample, survey items 
asked employees if they tended to engage in sharing bad news behavior, not whether or 
not they had shared bad news following a specific incident. Similarly, supervisors were 
asked to appraise employee sharing of information as challenging or hindering in general. 
Supervisors were also asked if employees tended to be timely in sharing news, whether 
they regularly offered solutions, and if they usually took responsibility when sharing 
critical information. As with the employee survey, supervisors are rating employees’ 
behavior on average, but are not reporting how they may respond to an employee sharing 
a specific bad news event. One approach that may better capture the sharing of bad news 
and supervisor responses is an experienced sample modeling (ESM) study design. 
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Employing an ESM design would allow employees to be asked about their sharing bad 
news behavior on a daily basis, and would provide opportunities to examine specific 
instances in which bad news is shared. Leaders’ could correspondingly be asked how 
they responded to news shared by the employee. An ESM study design may better 
capture the sharing of bad news as it occurs within the workplace.  
 With regard to the lab study, it is possible that the nature of the simulation was 
not completely effective in capturing the variables of interest. For example, it may be 
difficult for team leaders to develop LMX in the true sense of the construct in a single 
hour of working together. Further, it is possible that the extreme nature of the firefighting 
context itself influenced how leaders perceived the sharing of bad news by employees. 
Additionally, the lab study required the use of three separate confederates, and it is 
possible that using three different individuals in this role had an influence on the results. 
To mitigate this possible concern, I controlled for the effect of the confederate in the 
analysis. However, future research may consider an alternative simulation, or employ a 
study design with a single individual in the confederate role.  
 Finally, a fifth limitation that applies specifically to the field study is the 
organizational context. Although bad news events are likely to occur in any work 
environment, it is possible that some work environments may be more prone to mistakes 
or errors. That is, it is possible that the potential for critical mistakes or errors is higher in 
some organizations than in others. Further, it is possible that the nature of small mistakes 
or slips in some organizations could have more severe consequences, and thus, supervisor 
responses toward messengers may be more extreme when news of these mistakes is 
shared. For instance, a minor error at a hospital could lead to harm or loss of life whereas 
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a minor mishap in a call center is likely less life-threatening. A supervisor at a hospital 
may respond more negatively to an employee who shares bad news than does a 
supervisor at a call center. Future research should consider replicating the findings of 
these studies in a variety of different organizational settings. 
Practical implications. In addition to the theoretical contributions of my work, 
my study also has practical implications for managers and employees. First, sharing bad 
news can be perceived as a risky behavior for employees, even though the information 
they share is often highly critical to the functioning of the work unit or organization. 
Supervisors can work to mitigate factors that might impede employees from sharing bad 
news. This may, in part, include training for supervisors regarding how bad news should 
be addressed and how to help employees take ownership for implementing solutions to 
the issues raised. Second, results of the study suggest that sharing bad news is likely to 
influence LMX and evaluations of effectiveness through a hindrance pathway. Given the 
potential for negative outcomes for employees through this pathway, employees could be 
trained on best practices for sharing bad news. For example, employees could be 
encouraged to limit the number of solutions they provide to a supervisor, but could also 
be encouraged to take responsibility when they are at fault for the bad news event they 
are sharing. These approaches may help organizations maximize the benefits of 
employees’ sharing of bad news without inadvertently punishing them for the behavior.  
Conclusion. This dissertation had two primary purposes. First, I intended to 
explore the concept of sharing bad news, and to this end, I offer a definition and a scale 
of sharing bad news that captures employees’ sharing of mistakes and errors with a 
supervisor within a workplace setting. Second, I sought to understand why and under 
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what conditions supervisors respond either positively or negatively when employees 
share bad news. In other words, I explored the possibility that messengers may be 
rewarded, or alternatively “shot,” for sharing bad news with their leader or supervisor. 
Though not all of the hypothesized relationships were supported, my dissertation 
provides some evidence to explain the mechanism that transmits the effects of sharing 
bad news to LMX and ultimately employee evaluations of effectiveness. Specifically, 
sharing bad news was shown to have an effect on hindrance appraisals, but only in the 
presence of the moderating factors of timeliness or offering solutions. Further, the degree 
to which one is responsible for the bad news influenced the relationship between 
hindrance appraisals and LMX. These linkages offer a first step in understanding how 
and why sharing bad news influences evaluations of employee effectiveness. In sum, this 
study opens the door for scholars to continue to explore the consequences of sharing bad 
news at work, or stated differently, explore the conditions under which we may, or may 
not, shoot the messenger.  
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Study 1, Scale Development) 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Sharing Bad News 4.01 .66 (.94)     
        
2. Promotive Voice 3.75 .83 .52** (.93)    
        
3. Prohibitive Voice 3.63 .77 .42** .66** (.86)   
        
4. Whistle-blowing 3.16 .72 .02 .47** .41** (.67)  
        
5. Issue Selling 3.34 .93 .25** .70** .51** .58** (.96) 
Note. N = 221. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation. Reliabilities of each variable are 
reported along the diagonal.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05 
  
    
1
4
0 
Table 2 
Results of CFA for Sharing Bad News Discriminant Validity (Study 1, Scale Development) 
Models χ2 df RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR Δχ2 Δdf 
1. 5-Factor Model 1312.37** 682 .07 .91 .90 .07   
         
2. 4-Factor Model         
     Sharing Bad News and  
     Promotive Voice combined 
2064.47** 686 .10 .79 .78 .14 752.09** 4 
         
3. 4-Factor Model         
     Sharing Bad News and  
     Prohibitive Voice combined 
1629.85** 686 .08 .86 .85 .12 317.49** 4 
         
4. 4-Factor Model         
     Sharing Bad News and  
     Whistle-blowing combined 
1530.49** 686 .08 .87 .86 .12 218.11** 4 
         
5. 4-Factor Model         
     Sharing Bad News and 
     Issue Selling combined 
2368.59** 686 .11 .75 .73 .19 1056.22** 4 
         
6. 1-Factor Model 3172.17** 692 .13 .63 .60 .16 1858.80** 10 
Note. * p < .10, ** p < .05 
  
    
1
4
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Table 3 
Comparison of Shared Variance and AVE (Study 1, Scale 
Development)  
 
r r2 
AVE 
SHARING 
BAD 
NEWS 
Sharing Bad News  
and Promotive Voice .56 .31 .53 
    
Sharing Bad News 
and Prohibitive Voice .48 .23 .53 
    
Sharing Bad News  
and Whistle-blowing .34 .12 .53 
    
Sharing Bad News  
and Issue Selling .26 .07 .53 
    
Note. AVE = Average variance extracted.  
  
    
1
4
2 
Table 4 
Evaluation of model fit (Study 2, Field) 
Models χ2 df RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR Δχ2 Δdf 
1. 4-Factor Model 556.17** 189 .10 .87 .85 .07   
         
2. 3-Factor Model         
     Challenge and Hindrance  
     Appraisal combined  
870.06** 210 .13 .78 .76 .11 313.89** 21 
         
3. 3-Factor Model         
     Challenge and Hindrance  
     Appraisal combined 
802.57** 209 .12 .80 .78 .08 246.40** 20 
     Leader-Member Exchange and 
     Evaluations of Effectiveness   
     combined   
        
         
4. 1-Factor Model 1500.31** 212 .17 .57 .54 .30 944.14** 23 
Note. * p < .10, ** p < .05 
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Table 5 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Study 2, Field) 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Sharing Bad News 4.26 .66 (.93)         
            
2. Timeliness 3.51 1.00 .00 -        
            
3. Offering solutions 3.52 .88 .09 .46** -       
            
4. Challenge Appraisal 3.77 .80 .14** .38** .67** (.86)      
            
5. Hindrance 
Appraisal 
2.36 .91 -.07 -.58** -.12 -.26** (.66)     
            
6. Responsibility 3.80 .83 .13 .52** .64** .66** -.30** -    
            
7. Leader-Member 
Exchange 
4.37 .67 .10 .32** .34** .41** -.33** .42** (.83)   
            
8. Evaluations of 
Employee 
Effectiveness 
3.68 .93 .15** .38** .69** .79** -.20** .68** .40** -  
            
9. Prior Evaluations of 
Employee 
Effectiveness 
3.75 .96 .13 .34** .72** .72** -.11 .65** .43** .80** - 
Note. N = 201. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation. Reliabilities of each variable are reported along the diagonal.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05.  
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Table 6 
Indirect Effects of Sharing Bad News (Study 2, Field) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Leader-Member Exchange 
Evaluations of Employee 
Effectiveness 
Mechanism 
Indirect 
Effect SE 95%CI 
Indirect 
Effect SE 95%CI 
Hypothesis 4:       
   Sharing Bad News  
   via LMX 
   .002 .002 -.002, .01 
       
Hypothesis 7a and 7b:       
   Sharing Bad News  
   via Challenge Appraisal 
-.00 .01 -.01, .01    
       
   Sharing Bad News  
   via Hindrance Appraisal 
-.01 .01 -.03, .02    
       
Note. SE = Standard error, CI = Confidence interval. Reported indirect effects are unstandardized indirect effects.  
Confidence intervals have been bootstrapped (5,000 iterations) to correct for bias.   
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Table 7 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for Hypotheses 8a and 8b (Study 2, Field) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Challenge Appraisal Hindrance Appraisal 
Variables 
Model 1 
B(SE) 
Model 2 
B(SE) 
Model 3 
B(SE) 
Model 4 
B(SE) 
Intercept   3.77   2.34 
     
Controls     
Prior Performance .67**(.06) .62**(.10) -.20*(.12) -.11(.08) 
     
Independent Variables     
Sharing Bad News -.01(.05) .01(.05) .02(.04) .00(.03) 
Timeliness  .12(.07)  -.26**(.13) 
Sharing Bad News x 
Timeliness 
 .17(.11)  .06(.14) 
     
R2 .54**(.09) .41**(.06) .11(.09) .06(.04) 
Note. SE = Standard error. The values reported for R2 indicate the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the predictors included in the 
model.  
* p < .10; ** p < .05 
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Table 8 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for Hypothesis 9a and 9b (Study 2, Field) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Challenge Appraisal Hindrance Appraisal 
Variables 
Model 1 
B(SE) 
Model 2 
B(SE) 
Model 3 
B(SE) 
Model 4 
B(SE) 
Intercept   3.76   2.34 
     
Controls     
Prior Performance .67**(.06) .49**(.09) -.20*(.12) -.11(.10) 
     
Independent Variables     
Sharing Bad News -.01(.05) -.01(.05) .02(.04) .02(.04) 
Offering Solutions  .27**(.08)  -.15*(.09) 
Sharing Bad News x 
Offering Solutions 
 .18**(.06)  .00(.13) 
     
R2 .54**(.09) .44**(.06) .11(.09) .04(.04) 
Note. SE = Standard error. The values reported for R2 indicate the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the predictors included in the 
model.  
* p < .10; ** p < .05 
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Table 9 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for Hypotheses 10a and 10b (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 Leader-Member Exchange 
Variables 
Model 1 
B(SE) 
Model 2 
B(SE) 
Model 3 
B(SE) 
Model 4 
B(SE) 
Intercept  .00  .00 
     
Controls     
Prior Performance .04(.04) .01(02) .05*(.03) .16**(.07) 
     
Independent Variables     
   Challenge Appraisal .12*(.07) .11(.08)   
   Hindrance Appraisal   -.34**(.15) -.44**(.14) 
   Responsibility  .03(.07)  -.07(.11) 
  Challenge Appraisal 
  x Responsibility 
 -.06(.07)   
  Hindrance Appraisal 
  x Responsibility 
   .07(.20) 
     
R2 .11*(.06) .55**(.09) .29(.20) .10(.09) 
Note. SE = Standard error. The values reported for R2 indicate the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the predictors included in the 
model.  
* p < .10; ** p < .05  
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Table 10 
Moderated Mediation of Sharing Bad News with Offering Solutions (Study 2, Field) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Leader-Member Exchange 
Evaluations of Employee 
Effectiveness 
Mechanism 
Indirect 
Effect SE 95%CI 
Indirect 
Effect SE 95%CI 
Sharing Bad News  
via Challenge Appraisal  
-.00 .01 -.01, .01 -.003 .02 -.05, .04 
     High Levels of Offering Solutions .03 .02 -.01, .06 .12 .06 .01, .23 
     Low Levels of Offering Solutions -.03 .02 -.06, .00 -.13 .07 -.25, .00 
     Difference .05 .03 -.01, .12 .24 .10 .05, .44  
       
Sharing Bad News  
via Challenge Appraisal and LMX 
   .00 .001 -.00, .00 
     High Levels of Offering Solutions    .02 .02 -.01, .05 
     Low Levels of Offering Solutions    -.02 .01 -.05, .00 
     Difference    .04 .03 -.01, .09 
Note. SE = Standard error, CI = Confidence interval. Reported indirect effects are unstandardized indirect 
effects.  Confidence intervals have been bootstrapped (20,000 iterations) to correct for bias.   
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Table 11 
List of Conditions (Study 3) 
Condition Severity Timeliness Offering Solutions Responsibility 
1 Severe Timely Solution Responsible 
2 Severe Timely No solution Responsible 
3 Severe Timely Solution Not responsible 
4 Severe Timely No solution Not responsible 
5 Severe Untimely Solution Responsible 
6 Severe Untimely No solution Responsible 
7 Severe Untimely Solution Not responsible 
8 Severe Untimely No solution Not responsible 
9 Not severe Timely Solution Responsible 
10 Not severe Timely No solution Responsible 
11 Not severe Timely Solution Not responsible 
12 Not severe Timely No solution Not responsible 
13 Not severe Untimely Solution Responsible 
14 Not severe Untimely No solution Responsible 
15 Not severe Untimely Solution Not responsible 
16 Not severe Untimely No solution Not responsible 
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Table 12 
Results of Manipulation Check (Study 3, Lab) 
Condition 
t-test 
Manipulation 
Sample confederate statement 
Mean(SD) 
Severity 
t(96) = -2.87, p < .01 
SEVERE: 
“I have really bad news. We won’t 
have enough water to put out the fires.” 
3.30(1.14) 
MILD: 
“Hey. We might have an issue with our 
water supply.” 
2.56(1.39) 
   
Timeliness 
t(108) = -1.77, p < .10 
TIMELY:  
“I just realized. . . ” 
2.92(1.22) 
UNTIMELY: 
“I should have said something earlier, 
but I noticed when we started. . .” 
2.54(1.04) 
   
Offering Solutions 
t(109) = -4.28, p < .01 
SOLUTION: 
“I have a solution...” 
3.96(.99) 
NO SOLUTION: 
3.05(1.20) 
   
Responsibility for Bad News 
t(109) = -2.44, p < .01 
RESPONSIBLE: 
“This is completely my fault. I should 
have read my instructions.” 
2.94(1.17) 
NOT RESPONSIBLE: 
“This is not my fault.  It wasn’t in my 
instructions.” 
2.39(1.16) 
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Table 13 
Evaluation of model fit (Study 3, Lab) 
Models χ2 df RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR Δχ2 Δdf 
1. 4-Factor Model 162.26 113 .06 .94 .93 .07   
         
2. 3-Factor Model         
     Challenge and Hindrance  
     Appraisal combined  
299.73** 116 .12 .78 .74 .11 137.47** 3 
         
3. 2-Factor Model         
     Challenge and Hindrance  
     Appraisal combined 
375.79** 118 .14 .69 .64 .13 213.54** 5 
     Leader-Member Exchange and 
     Evaluations of Effectiveness   
     combined   
        
         
4. 1-Factor Model 711.57 129 .20 .30 .27 .25 549.31** 16 
Note. * p < .10, ** p < .05 
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Table 14 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Study 3, Lab) 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Sharing Bad News - - -      
         
2. Timeliness - - -.10 -     
         
3. Offering Solutions - - .13 .06 -    
         
4. Challenge Appraisal 3.98 .78 -.04 .13 .22** (.89)   
         
5. Hindrance Appraisal 2.79 .98 -.07 -.10 .02 -.10 (.83)  
         
6. Responsibility - - .04 -.14 -.05 -.08 .22** - 
         
7. Leader-Member 
Exchange 
3.73 .65 .07 -.01 -.09 .40** -.05 -.10 
         
8. Evaluations of 
Employee Effectiveness 
3.72 .59 -.07 -.02 .08 .45** -.21** -.06 
         
9. Psychological Safety 3.73 .61 -.03 .13 -.03 .09 -.26** -.11 
         
10.  Goal Commitment 4.23 .63 -.03 -.05 -.16* .40** -.18* -.12 
         
Note. N = 111. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation. Reliabilities of each variable are reported along the diagonal.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05 
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Table 14, continued 
Variable 7 8 9 10 
7. Leader-Member 
Exchange 
(.87)    
     
8. Evaluations of 
Employee Effectiveness 
.41** (.73)   
     
9. Psychological Safety .33** .32** (.63)  
     
10.  Goal Commitment .45** .32** .33** (.89) 
     
Note. N = 111. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation. Reliabilities of each variable 
are reported along the diagonal.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05 
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Table 15 
Indirect Effects of Sharing Bad News (Study 3, Lab)  
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Leader-Member Exchange 
Evaluations of Employee 
Effectiveness 
Mechanism 
Indirect 
Effect SE 95%CI 
Indirect 
Effect SE 95%CI 
Hypothesis 4:       
   Sharing Bad News  
   via LMX    
.03 .04 -.04, .10 
       
Hypothesis 7a and 7b:       
   Sharing Bad News  
   via Challenge Appraisal 
-.00 .04 -.07, .07    
       
   Sharing Bad News  
   via Hindrance Appraisal 
-.01 .02 -.04, .03    
Note. SE = Standard error, CI = Confidence interval. Reported indirect effects are unstandardized indirect 
effects.  Confidence intervals have been bootstrapped (5,000 iterations) to correct for bias.   
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Table 16 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for Hypotheses 8a and 8b (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Challenge Appraisal Hindrance Appraisal 
Variables 
Model 1 
B(SE) 
Model 2 
B(SE) 
Model 3 
B(SE) 
Model 4 
B(SE) 
Intercept 3.98 3.97 2.79 2.75 
     
Controls     
   Psychological Safety .21**(.09) -.09(.15) -.45**(.16) -.43**(.16) 
   Goal Commitment .39**(.11) .53**(.13) -.20(.14) -.19(.14) 
   Confederate (1) .02(.17) .06(.16) -.64**(.19) -.65**(.19) 
   Confederate (2) .26(.18) .14(.19) -.42(.28) -.50*(.28) 
     
Independent Variables     
   Sharing Bad News -.02(.15) -.02(.14) -.11(.17) -.10 (.17) 
   Timeliness  .22(.14)  -.08(.20) 
   Sharing Bad News x     
   Timeliness 
 -.35(.30)  -.65*(.38) 
     
Note. SE = Standard error.  
* p < .10; ** p < .05 
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Table 17 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for Hypotheses 9a and 9b (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Challenge Appraisal Hindrance Appraisal 
Variables 
Model 1 
B(SE) 
Model 2 
B(SE) 
Model 3 
B(SE) 
Model 4 
B(SE) 
Intercept 3.98 3.98 2.79 2.75 
     
Controls     
Psychological Safety .21**(.09) -.06(.13) -.45**(.16) -.43**(.16) 
Goal Commitment .39**(.11) .57**(.12) -.20(.14) -.19(.14) 
Confederate (1) .02(.17) .05(.16) -.64**(.19) -.65**(.19) 
Confederate (2) .26(.18) .20(.18) -.42(.28) -.50*(.28) 
     
Independent Variables     
Sharing Bad News -.02(.15) -.09(.14) -.11(.17) -.10(.18) 
Offering Solutions  .46**(.13)  -.06(.20) 
Sharing Bad News x 
Offering Solutions 
 -.07(.29)  .73*(.40) 
     
Note. SE = Standard error.  
* p < .10; ** p < .05 
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Table 18 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for Hypotheses 10a and 10b (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 Leader-Member Exchange 
Variables 
Model 1 
B(SE) 
Model 2 
B(SE) 
Model 3 
B(SE) 
Model 4 
B(SE) 
Intercept .00 .00 .00 .00 
     
Controls     
Psychological Safety .22**(.10) .22**(.10) .23**(.09) .23**(.09) 
Goal Commitment .27**(.11) .27**(.11) .40**(.11) .37**(.10) 
Confederate (1) -.07(.11) -.08(.11) -.02(.11) -.06(.12) 
Confederate (2) -.16(.19) -.17(.20) -.08(.20) -.07(.19) 
     
Independent Variables     
Challenge Appraisal .23**(.06) .23**(.07)   
Hindrance Appraisal   .05(.06) .07(.06) 
Responsibility  -.05(.11)  -.11(.10) 
Challenge Appraisal 
x Responsibility 
 .00(.14)   
Hindrance Appraisal 
x Responsibility 
   .25**(.12) 
     
Note. SE = Standard error.  
* p < .10; ** p < .05 
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Table 19 
Moderated Mediation of Sharing Bad News with Timeliness (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Leader-Member Exchange 
Evaluations of Employee 
Effectiveness 
Mechanism 
Indirect 
Effect SE 95%CI 
Indirect 
Effect SE 95%CI 
Sharing Bad News  
via Hindrance Appraisal  
-.01 .02 -.04, .03 .01 .02 -.03, .04 
     High Levels of Timeliness -.04 .06 -.16, .07 -.22 .13 -.47, .03 
     Low Levels of Timeliness -.01 .02 -.04, .03 -.03 .06 -.14, .08 
     Difference -.03 .05 -.14, .07 -.19 .12 -.42, .04 
       
Sharing Bad News  
via Hindrance Appraisal and LMX 
   -.002 .005 -.01, .01 
     High Levels of Timeliness    -.01 .02 -.04, .02 
     Low Levels of Timeliness    -.00 .01 -.01, .01 
     Difference    -.01 .01 -.04, .02 
Note. SE = Standard error, CI = Confidence interval. Reported indirect effects are unstandardized indirect effects.  
Confidence intervals have been bootstrapped (5,000 iterations) to correct for bias.   
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Table 20 
Moderated Mediation of Sharing Bad News with Offering Solutions (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Leader-Member Exchange 
Evaluations of Employee 
Effectiveness 
Mechanism 
Indirect 
Effect SE 95%CI 
Indirect 
Effect SE 95%CI 
Sharing Bad News  
via Hindrance Appraisal  
-.01 .02 -.04, .03 .01 .02 -.03, .04 
     High Levels of Offering Solutions .03 .05 -.07, .12 .18 .13 -.07, .39 
     Low Levels of Offering Solutions -.01 .02 -.04, .02 -.03 .06 -.14, .06 
     Difference .04 .06 -.07, .13 .21 .12 -.03, .40 
       
Sharing Bad News  
via Hindrance Appraisal and LMX 
   -.002 .005 -.01, .01 
     High Levels of Offering Solutions    .01 .02 -.02, .03 
     Low Levels of Offering Solutions    -.00 .00 -.01, .01 
     Difference    .01 .02 -.02, .04 
Note. SE = Standard error, CI = Confidence interval. Reported indirect effects are unstandardized indirect effects.  
Confidence intervals have been bootstrapped (5,000 iterations) to correct for bias.   
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Table 21 
Moderated Mediation of Hindrance Appraisal with Responsibility (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 
Evaluations of Employee 
Effectiveness 
Mechanism 
Indirect 
Effect SE 90%CI 
Hindrance Appraisal 
via Leader-Member Exchange 
.02 .02 -.01, .06 
     High Levels of Responsibility .10 .05 -.00, .20 
     Low Levels of Responsibility .02 .02 -.01, .06 
     Difference .08 .05 -.01, .17 
    
Sharing Bad News  
via Hindrance Appraisal and LMX 
-.002 .005 -.01, .01 
     High Levels of Responsibility -.01 .02 -.05, .03 
     Low Levels of Responsibility -.00 .01 -.01, .01 
     Difference -.01 .02 -.04, .02 
Note. SE = Standard error, CI = Confidence interval. Reported indirect effects 
are unstandardized indirect effects.  Confidence intervals have been 
bootstrapped (5,000 iterations) to correct for bias. 
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Figure 1 
 
Conceptual Model of Sharing Bad News 
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Figure 2 
 
Sharing Bad News x Offering Solutions on Challenge Appraisal (Study 2, Field) 
 
 
Note. * p < .10, ** p < .05 
 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Low Sharing Bad News High Sharing Bad News
C
h
a
ll
en
g
e 
A
p
p
ra
is
a
l
Low Solutions
High Solutions-.16** 
.15** 
    
1
6
3 
Figure 3 
 
Summary of Hypotheses (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. * p < .10; ** p < .05 
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Figure 4 
 
Sharing Bad News x Timeliness on Hindrance Appraisal (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 
Note. * p < .10, ** p < .05  
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Figure 5 
 
Sharing Bad News x Offering Solutions on Hindrance Appraisal (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 
Note. * p < .10, ** p < .05  
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
Low Sharing Bad News High Sharing Bad News
H
in
d
ra
n
ce
 A
p
p
ra
is
a
l
Low Solutions
High Solutions
-.10 
.61 
    
1
6
6 
Figure 6 
 
Hindrance Appraisal x Responsibility on Leader-Member Exchange (Study 3, Lab) 
 
 
Note. * p < .10, ** p < .05
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APPENDIX A  
IRB APPROVAL FORMS FOR SCALE DEVELOPMENT (STUDY 1)
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EXEMPTION GRANTED 
Jeffery LePine 
Management 
480/965-8652 
Jeff.LePine@asu.edu 
 
Dear Jeffery LePine: 
 
On 2/3/2016 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
 
Type of Review: Initial Study 
Title: A Measure of Sharing Bad News 
Investigator: Jeffery LePine 
IRB ID: STUDY00003825 
Funding: Name: Management 
Grant Title:  
Grant ID:  
Documents Reviewed: • Bad News Scale Protocol, Category: IRB Protocol; 
• Recruitment script, Category: Recruitment 
Materials; 
• Scale survey, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions); 
• Consent form, Category: Consent Form; 
 
 
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 2/3/2016.  
 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
 
Sincerely, 
 
IRB Administrator 
cc: Melissa Chamberlin 
Melissa Chamberlin  
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EXEMPTION GRANTED 
Jeffery LePine 
Management 
480/965-8652 
Jeff.LePine@asu.edu 
 
Dear Jeffery LePine: 
 
On 1/20/2017 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
 
Type of Review: Initial Study  
Title: Scale Validation of Sharing Bad News Measure 
Investigator: Jeffery LePine 
IRB ID: STUDY00005572 
Funding: None 
Grant Title: None 
Grant ID: None 
Documents Reviewed: • Recruitment Script, Category: Recruitment 
Materials; 
• Survey, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions); 
• Leader survey, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions); 
• Protocol, Category:  IRB Protocol;  
• Consent form, Category: Consent Form; 
 
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 1/20/2017.  
 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
 
Sincerely, 
 
IRB Administrator 
cc: Melissa Chamberlin 
Melissa Chamberlin 
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APPROVAL: EXPEDITED REVIEW 
Jeffery LePine 
Management 
480/965-8652 
Jeff.LePine@asu.edu 
 
Dear Jeffery LePine: 
 
On 9/30/2017 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
 
Type of Review: Initial Study  
Title: Communication between employees and supervisors 
Investigator: Jeffery LePine 
IRB ID: STUDY00005043 
Category of review: (7)(b) Social science methods, (7)(a) Behavioral 
research 
Funding: None 
Grant Title: None 
Grant ID: None 
Documents Reviewed: • Supervisor survey, part 2, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview 
guides/focus group questions); 
• Supervisor consent form, Category: Consent Form;  
• Employee consent form, Category: Consent Form;  
• Employee survey, part 2, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview 
guides/focus group questions); 
• Employee survey, part 1, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview 
guides/focus group questions); 
• Recruitment Script, Category: Recruitment 
Materials; 
• Protocol, Category:  IRB Protocol; 
• Consent from organization, Category: Other (to 
reflect anything not captured above); 
• Supervisor survey, part 1, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview 
guides/focus group questions); 
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The IRB approved the protocol from 9/30/2016 to 9/29/2017 inclusive. Three weeks 
before 9/29/2017 you are to submit a completed Continuing Review application and 
required attachments to request continuing approval or closure.  
 
If continuing review approval is not granted before the expiration date of 9/29/2017 
approval of this protocol expires on that date. When consent is appropriate, you must use 
final, watermarked versions available under the “Documents” tab in ERA-IRB. 
 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
 
Sincerely, 
 
IRB Administrator 
 
cc: Melissa Chamberlin 
Melissa Chamberlin 
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APPROVAL: EXPEDITED REVIEW 
Jeffery LePine 
Management 
480/965-8652 
Jeff.LePine@asu.edu 
 
Dear Jeffery LePine: 
 
On 8/26/2016 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
 
The IRB approved the protocol from 8/26/2016 to 8/25/2017 inclusive. Three weeks 
before 8/25/2017 you are to submit a completed Continuing Review application and 
required attachments to request continuing approval or closure.  
 
If continuing review approval is not granted before the expiration date of 8/25/2017 
approval of this protocol expires on that date. When consent is appropriate, you must use 
final, watermarked versions available under the “Documents” tab in ERA-IRB. 
 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
 
Type of Review: Initial Study  
Title: Team Leader Responses to Sharing Bad News 
Investigator: Jeffery LePine 
IRB ID: STUDY00004581 
Category of review: (7)(b) Social science methods, (7)(a) Behavioral 
research 
Funding: None 
Grant Title: None 
Grant ID: None 
Documents Reviewed: • Consent form, Category: Consent Form;  
• Survey items, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions); 
• Protocol, Category:  IRB Protocol; 
• Recruitment Script, Category: Recruitment 
Materials; 
• Debrief consent form, Category: Consent Form; 
• Sample confederate protocol, Category: Participant 
materials (specfic directions for them);  
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Sincerely, 
 
IRB Administrator 
 
cc: Melissa Chamberlin 
Melissa Chamberlin 
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APPROVAL: EXPEDITED REVIEW 
Jeffery LePine 
Management 
480/965-8652 
Jeff.LePine@asu.edu 
 
Dear Jeffery LePine: 
 
On 1/26/2017 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
 
Type of Review: Modification  
Title: Team Leader Responses to Sharing Bad News 
Investigator: Jeffery LePine 
IRB ID: STUDY00004581 
Category of review: (mm) Minor modification 
Funding: None 
Grant Title: None 
Grant ID: None 
Documents Reviewed: • Sample confederate protocol, Category: Participant 
materials (specfic directions for them);  
• Consent form, Category: Consent Form;  
• Survey items, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions); 
• Debrief consent form, Category: Consent Form; 
• Protocol, Category:  IRB Protocol; 
• Message to part participants, Category: Other (to 
reflect anything not captured above);  
• Recruitment Script, Category: Recruitment 
Materials; 
 
The IRB approved the protocol from 8/26/2016 to 8/25/2017 inclusive. Three weeks 
before 8/25/2017 you are to submit a completed Continuing Review application and 
required attachments to request continuing approval or closure.  
 
If continuing review approval is not granted before the expiration date of 8/25/2017 
approval of this protocol expires on that date. When consent is appropriate, you must use 
final, watermarked versions available under the “Documents” tab in ERA-IRB. 
 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
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Sincerely, 
 
IRB Administrator 
 
cc: Melissa Chamberlin 
Melissa Chamberlin 
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Sharing bad news. Original set of items developed for this study. 
 
1. I advise my supervisor of serious work-related errors that s/he might not know 
about. 
2. If my supervisor is not aware of a critical error at work, I make sure s/he knows.  
3. I have no problem sharing bad news with my supervisor. 
4. If a non-trivial mistake is made at work, I’m the one who usually tells the 
supervisor. 
5. I alert my supervisor when s/he is not aware of an important mistake that needs 
her/his attention. 
6. I let my supervisor know when I have made a critical error that could negatively 
affect work tasks or effectiveness, even if that error may not be noticed right 
away. 
7. I notify my supervisor when my work team/unit has made a meaningful error that 
could negatively affect work tasks or effectiveness, even if that error may not be 
noticed right away.   
8. I inform my supervisor about significant work-related mistakes that are not 
immediately obvious. 
9. I make my supervisor aware of important errors, even though the errors might not 
be detected for a while. 
10. I communicate bad news regarding work tasks or outcomes to the supervisor. 
11. I apprise my supervisor when a crucial event occurs that could negatively affect 
work tasks. 
12. If an unexpected deviation in our plan of work occurs such that work tasks will be 
negatively impacted, I alert my supervisor.  
13. I brief my supervisor on important events at work that interrupt work tasks and 
may negatively influence work outcomes.  
14. When there is bad news regarding work tasks or outcomes, I tell the supervisor. 
15. I avoiding telling my supervisor bad news. (R) 
16. If an important mistake is made at work, I let someone else tell the supervisor. (R) 
 
Additional constructs examined in item-sort task 
 
Promotive and prohibitive voice. Liang, J., Farh, C. I., & Farh, J.-L. (2012). 
Psychological antecedents of promotive and prohibitive voice: A two-wave examination. 
Academy of Management Journal, 55(1), 71-92.  
 
Promotive voice 
1. Proactively develop and make suggestions for issues that may benefit the work 
unit. 
2. Proactively suggest new projects which are beneficial to the work unit. 
3. Raise suggestions to improve the unit’s working procedure. 
4. Proactively voice out constructive suggestions that help the unit reach its goals. 
5. Make constructive suggestions to improve the unit’s operation. 
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Prohibitive voice 
1. Advise other colleagues against undesirable behaviors that would hamper job 
performance. 
2. Speak up honestly with problems that might cause serious loss to the work unit, 
even when/though dissenting opinions exist. 
3. Dare to voice out opinions on things that might affect efficiency in the work unit, 
even if that would embarrass others. 
4. Dare to point out problems when they appear in the unit, even if that would 
hamper relationships with other colleagues. 
5. Proactively report coordination problems in the workplace to management. 
 
Whistle-blowing. Rusbult, C. E., Farrell, D., Rogers, G., & Mainous, A. G. (1988). 
Impact of exchange variables on exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect: An integrative 
model of responses to declining job-satisfaction. Academy of Management 
Journal, 31(3), 599-627.  
 
1. When I think of an idea that will benefit my company I make a determined effort 
to implement it. 
2. I have at least once contacted an outside agency (e.g., union) to get help in 
changing working conditions here. 
3. I sometimes discuss problems at work with my employer. 
4. When things are seriously wrong and the company won’t act, I am willing to 
“blow the whistle.” 
5. I have made several attempts to change the working conditions here. 
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Sharing bad news. Final set of items following evaluation of substantive validity 
 
1. I advise my supervisor of serious work-related errors that s/he might not know 
about. 
2. If my supervisor is not aware of a critical error at work, I make sure s/he knows.  
3. I have no problem sharing bad news with my supervisor. 
4. If a non-trivial mistake is made at work, I’m the one who usually tells the 
supervisor. 
5. I alert my supervisor when s/he is not aware of an important mistake that needs 
her/his attention. 
6. I let my supervisor know when I have made a critical error that could negatively 
affect work tasks or effectiveness, even if that error may not be noticed right 
away. 
7. I notify my supervisor when my work team/unit has made a meaningful error that 
could negatively affect work tasks or effectiveness, even if that error may not be 
noticed right away.   
8. I inform my supervisor about significant work-related mistakes that are not 
immediately obvious. 
9. I make my supervisor aware of important errors, even though the errors might not 
be detected for a while. 
10. I communicate bad news regarding work tasks or outcomes to the supervisor. 
11. I apprise my supervisor when a crucial event occurs that could negatively affect 
work tasks. 
12. If an unexpected deviation in our plan of work occurs such that work tasks will be 
negatively impacted, I alert my supervisor.  
13. I brief my supervisor on important events at work that interrupt work tasks and 
may negatively influence work outcomes.  
14. When there is bad news regarding work tasks or outcomes, I tell the supervisor. 
15. I avoiding telling my supervisor bad news. (R) 
 
Additional constructs examined for discriminant validity of sharing bad news 
 
Promotive and prohibitive voice. Liang, J., Farh, C. I., & Farh, J.-L. (2012). 
Psychological antecedents of promotive and prohibitive voice: A two-wave examination. 
Academy of Management Journal, 55(1), 71-92.  
 
Promotive voice 
1. Proactively develop and make suggestions for issues that may benefit the work 
unit. 
2. Proactively suggest new projects which are beneficial to the work unit. 
3. Raise suggestions to improve the unit’s working procedure. 
4. Proactively voice out constructive suggestions that help the unit reach its goals. 
5. Make constructive suggestions to improve the unit’s operation. 
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Prohibitive voice 
1. Advise other colleagues against undesirable behaviors that would hamper job 
performance. 
2. Speak up honestly with problems that might cause serious loss to the work unit, 
even when/though dissenting opinions exist. 
3. Dare to voice out opinions on things that might affect efficiency in the work unit, 
even if that would embarrass others. 
4. Dare to point out problems when they appear in the unit, even if that would 
hamper relationships with other colleagues. 
5. Proactively report coordination problems in the workplace to management. 
 
Whistle-blowing. Rusbult, C. E., Farrell, D., Rogers, G., & Mainous, A. G. (1988). 
Impact of exchange variables on exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect: An integrative 
model of responses to declining job-satisfaction. Academy of Management 
Journal, 31(3), 599-627.  
 
1. When I think of an idea that will benefit my company I make a determined effort 
to implement it. 
2. I have at least once contacted an outside agency (e.g., union) to get help in 
changing working conditions here. 
3. I sometimes discuss problems at work with my employer. 
4. When things are seriously wrong and the company won’t act, I am willing to 
“blow the whistle.” 
5. I have made several attempts to change the working conditions here. 
 
Issue selling.  Ashford, S. J., Rothbard, N. P., Piderit, S. K., Dutton, J. E. (1998). Out on 
a limb: The role of context and impression management in selling gender-equity issues. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(1), 23-57.  
 
1. I have a positive track record for selling issues. 
2. I have been successful in the past in selling issues to organizations. 
3. I am known as a successful issue seller.  
4. I am confident that I could sell this issue successfully in my work organization. 
5. I believe that I could get the critical decision makers in my work organization to 
buy this issue. 
6. I am confident that I could get the critical decision makers in my work 
organization to pay attention to this issue. 
7. How much effort would you be willing to devote to selling this issue in your 
organization? 
8. How much energy would you be willing to devote to selling this issue in your 
organization? 
9. How much time would you be willing to devote to selling this issue in your 
organization? 
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Survey Items for Employee Survey 
 
Sharing bad news. Developed in Study 1. Note: For this study, item number 15 (reverse-
coded) was removed from the scale when it exhibited poor factor loading relative to the 
other items.  
 
1. I advise my supervisor of serious work-related errors that s/he might not know 
about. 
2. If my supervisor is not aware of a critical error at work, I make sure s/he knows.  
3. I have no problem sharing bad news with my supervisor. 
4. If a non-trivial mistake is made at work, I’m the one who usually tells the 
supervisor. 
5. I alert my supervisor when s/he is not aware of an important mistake that needs 
her/his attention. 
6. I let my supervisor know when I have made a critical error that could negatively 
affect work tasks or effectiveness, even if that error may not be noticed right 
away. 
7. I notify my supervisor when my work team/unit has made a meaningful error that 
could negatively affect work tasks or effectiveness, even if that error may not be 
noticed right away.   
8. I inform my supervisor about significant work-related mistakes that are not 
immediately obvious. 
9. I make my supervisor aware of important errors, even though the errors might not 
be detected for a while. 
10. I communicate bad news regarding work tasks or outcomes to the supervisor. 
11. I apprise my supervisor when a crucial event occurs that could negatively affect 
work tasks. 
12. If an unexpected deviation in our plan of work occurs such that work tasks will be 
negatively impacted, I alert my supervisor.  
13. I brief my supervisor on important events at work that interrupt work tasks and 
may negatively influence work outcomes.  
14. When there is bad news regarding work tasks or outcomes, I tell the supervisor. 
15. I avoiding telling my supervisor bad news. (R) 
 
Survey Items for Supervisor Survey 
 
Trust propensity. MacDonald, A. P., Kessel, V. S., & Fuller, J. B. (1972). Self-
disclosure and two kinds of trust. Psychological Reports, 30, 143-148. 
 
1. I expect other people to be honest and open. 
2. I have faith in human nature. 
3. I feel that other people can be relied upon to do what they say they will do. 
4. I believe in the promises or statements of other people. 
5. I am more trusting than a lot of people. 
   186 
 
Neuroticism. Donnellan, M. B., Oswald, F. L., Baird, B. M., & Lucas, R. E. (2006). The 
mini-IPIP scales: Tiny-yet-effective measures of the big five factor of personality. 
Psychological Assessment, 18(2), 192-203.  
 
1. I have frequent mood swings. 
2. I get upset easily. 
3. I often feel blue. 
4. I get stressed out easily. 
5. I worry about things. 
6. I get irritated easily. 
7. I grumble about things. 
 
Overall performance. 1 item from:  Motowidlo, S. J. & Van Scotter, J. R. (1994). 
Evidence that task performance should be distinguished from contextual performance. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 79(4), 475-480.  
 
1. This employee exceeds standards for overall job performance. 
 
Challenge and hindrance appraisals. 2-items (each) adapted from:  LePine, M. A., 
Zhang, Y., Crawford, E. R., & Rich, B. L. (2016). Turning their pain to gain: Charismatic 
leader influence on follower stress appraisal and job performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 59(3), 1036-1059.  
 
Challenge Appraisal 
1. This employee shares information that helps me achieve the goals of our work 
group. 
2. This employee communicates knowledge that assists me in improving the growth 
and well-being of our work group. 
Hindrance Appraisal 
1. This employee shares information that prevents me from achieving the goals of 
our work group. 
2. This employee speaks to me about issues that hinder me in improving the growth 
and well-being of our work group. 
Offering solutions. Developed for this study. 
 
1. This employee includes a solution when s/he shares a work-related problem with 
me. 
 
Timeliness.  Developed for this study. 
 
1. This employee waits too long to share information about slip-ups that occur on 
the job. 
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Perceived responsibility.  1-item adapted from: Morrison, E. W., & Phelps, C. C. 
(1999). Taking charge at work:  Extrarole efforts to initiate workplace change.  Academy 
of Management Journal, 42(4), 403-419. 
 
1. This employee takes responsibility for correcting problems. 
 
LMX. 2 items adapted from:  Graen, G. B. & Uhl-Bien, M. (1995). Relationship-based 
approach to leadership: Development of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory of 
leadership over 25 years: Applying a multi-level multi-domain perspective. Leadership 
Quarterly, 6(2), 219-247.  
 
1. I would let this individual know where I stand with him/her.  
2. I would use my power to help this individual solve problems in his/her work.  
 
Prior performance. 1 item from:  Motowidlo, S. J. & Van Scotter, J. R. (1994). 
Evidence that task performance should be distinguished from contextual performance. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 79(4), 475-480.  
 
1. During the prior performance period, this employee exceeded standards for 
overall job performance. 
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Firefighting Simulation 
Instructions 
 
Overview: 
Your four-person team will be playing a computer-generated game in which a forest fire 
is burning. The game begins when your team receives an emergency alarm in the chat 
window that tells you that a fire has been spotted somewhere in the simulated world. 
During the game one or more fires will start. The initial alarm alerts you to only the first 
of those fires.  
 
The team’s goal is to control and extinguish the fire, as well as save as many houses, 
schools, and hospitals as possible in the process. Your task is to work as an efficient and 
effective team to accomplish these goals. The importance of these tasks are reflected in 
the scoring system below. Hospitals and schools result in the most points lost when they 
are burned down, followed by houses, water tanks, trees, and normal grass vegetation. 
 
 Grass Pine/Birch 
Tree 
Water 
Tanks 
House School/ 
Hospital 
Points 
Deducted 
0.25 1 5 25 50 
 
The Simulation World: 
The figure below represents the firefighting simulation. At the top left, you can see your 
unit information (current position, where you are going, current activity, and amount of 
water you have).  
 
Below that is the unit property information or the statistics of your unit. For example, a 
moving time of 5 indicates that it takes 5 seconds to move one cell, a fire fighting time of 
10 indicates that it takes 10 seconds to put out a fire, and so on.  
 
At the bottom left of your screen is the chat window, which is how you will exclusively 
interact with fellow team members. You may not communicate verbally, only via the chat 
window. In order to send a chat, type a message in the bottom window and click on the 
person you want to send it to.  
 
On the right hand side of the screen, you can see the position of your mouse pointer, unit 
position information (red is your current position, white where you are moving to), and a 
palette explaining each icon.  
 
At the very bottom of the right hand side of the screen, the simulation provides a colored 
code for each type of fire. Red means the fire is currently burning, brown represents fires 
that have been successfully put out, and black indicates that the fire has burnt out that 
cell.  
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Roles: 
Each firefighting team has four members, each with unique and different roles. Each 
member of the team has the unique ability to see and do things that other members of the 
team cannot do or see.  
 
You are the FIRE CHIEF.  The Chief controls unit 1 in the map and can see the position 
of the fire as well as his/her fellow team members within the map. It is the Chief’s 
responsibility to coordinate the team’s actions in order to effectively fight the fire. 
Although the Chief can fight the fire, his/her firefighting abilities are relatively weak. In 
addition, the Chief is very slow in moving from point A to point B.  
 
In addition to fighting fires, it is also important that you ensure your team has a supply 
of water at all times. Running out of water will prevent you from fighting fires, which 
will ultimately result in more areas getting burned and reduce your team’s chances of 
meeting your goal. 
 
Playing the Simulation: 
In order to move your unit, simply click on your number and drag it to another cell. A 
white numbered icon should appear on that cell, telling you where your destination is. In 
order to change your destination before you arrive, simply click on the white number icon 
and drag it to another cell. Firefighting occurs automatically when your unit is in a red, 
burning cell. When that cells turns brown, the fire in that cell has been extinguished.  
 
In addition, firefighting units need water to fight fires. You can only refill your water 
supply by receiving water from the Water Carrier. In order to refill water, you need to 
stand next to the Water Carrier unit for a certain amount of time. In addition, water 
cannot be refilled when you’re simultaneously fighting a burning fire.   
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Firefighting Simulation 
Instructions 
 
Overview: 
Your four-person team will be playing a computer-generated game in which a forest fire 
is burning. The game begins when your team receives an emergency alarm in the chat 
window that tells you that a fire has been spotted somewhere in the simulated world. 
During the game one or more fires will start. The initial alarm alerts you to only the first 
of those fires.  
 
The team’s goal is to control and extinguish the fire, as well as save as many houses, 
schools, and hospitals as possible in the process. Your task is to work as an efficient and 
effective team to accomplish these goals. The importance of these tasks are reflected in 
the scoring system below. Hospitals and schools result in the most points lost when they 
are burned down, followed by houses, water tanks, trees, and normal grass vegetation. 
 
 Grass Pine/Birch 
Tree 
Water 
Tanks 
House School/ 
Hospital 
Points 
Deducted 
0.25 1 5 25 50 
 
The Simulation World: 
The figure below represents the firefighting simulation. At the top left, you can see your 
unit information (current position, where you are going, current activity, and amount of 
water you have).  
 
Below that is the unit property information or the statistics of your unit. For example, a 
moving time of 5 indicates that it takes 5 seconds to move one cell, a fire fighting time of 
10 indicates that it takes 10 seconds to put out a fire, and so on.  
 
At the bottom left of your screen is the chat window, which is how you will exclusively 
interact with fellow team members. You may not communicate verbally, only via the chat 
window. In order to send a chat, type a message in the bottom window and click on the 
person you want to send it to.  
 
On the right hand side of the screen, you can see the position of your mouse pointer, unit 
position information (red is your current position, white where you are moving to), and a 
palette explaining each icon.  
 
At the very bottom of the right hand side of the screen, the simulation provides a colored 
code for each type of fire. Red means the fire is currently burning, brown represents fires 
that have been successfully put out, and black indicates that the fire has burnt out that 
cell.  
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Roles: 
Each firefighting team has four members, each with unique and different roles. Each 
member of the team has the unique ability to see and do things that other members of the 
team cannot do or see.  
 
You are the FIREFIGHTER.  This player controls unit 2 in the map and is very 
effective in putting out fires. However, this unit can only see fires and other units that 
are in one of the 9 surrounding cells. For example, if unit 2 is at B2, he/she can only see 
fires and players that are in cell A1~3, B1~3, and C1~3. In addition, the Firefighter can 
move faster than the Fire Chief and Water Carrier.  
 
Playing the Simulation: 
In order to move your unit, simply click on your number and drag it to another cell. A 
white numbered icon should appear on that cell, telling you where your destination is. In 
order to change your destination before you arrive, simply click on the white number icon 
and drag it to another cell.  
 
Firefighting occurs automatically when your unit is in a red, burning cell. When that cells 
turns brown, the fire in that cell has been extinguished.  
 
In addition, firefighting units need water to fight fires. You can only refill your water 
supply by receiving water from the Water Carrier. In order to refill water, you need to 
stand next to the Water Carrier unit for a certain amount of time. In addition, water 
cannot be refilled when you’re simultaneously fighting a burning fire.  
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Firefighting Simulation 
Instructions 
 
Overview: 
Your four-person team will be playing a computer-generated game in which a forest fire 
is burning. The game begins when your team receives an emergency alarm in the chat 
window that tells you that a fire has been spotted somewhere in the simulated world. 
During the game one or more fires will start. The initial alarm alerts you to only the first 
of those fires.  
 
The team’s goal is to control and extinguish the fire, as well as save as many houses, 
schools, and hospitals as possible in the process. Your task is to work as an efficient and 
effective team to accomplish these goals. The importance of these tasks are reflected in 
the scoring system below. Hospitals and schools result in the most points lost when they 
are burned down, followed by houses, water tanks, trees, and normal grass vegetation. 
 
 Grass Pine/Birch 
Tree 
Water 
Tanks 
House School/ 
Hospital 
Points 
Deducted 
0.25 1 5 25 50 
 
The Simulation World: 
The figure below represents the firefighting simulation. At the top left, you can see your 
unit information (current position, where you are going, current activity, and amount of 
water you have).  
 
Below that is the unit property information or the statistics of your unit. For example, a 
moving time of 5 indicates that it takes 5 seconds to move one cell, a fire fighting time of 
10 indicates that it takes 10 seconds to put out a fire, and so on.  
 
At the bottom left of your screen is the chat window, which is how you will exclusively 
interact with fellow team members. You may not communicate verbally, only via the chat 
window. In order to send a chat, type a message in the bottom window and click on the 
person you want to send it to.  
 
On the right hand side of the screen, you can see the position of your mouse pointer, unit 
position information (red is your current position, white where you are moving to), and a 
palette explaining each icon.  
 
At the very bottom of the right hand side of the screen, the simulation provides a colored 
code for each type of fire. Red means the fire is currently burning, brown represents fires 
that have been successfully put out, and black indicates that the fire has burnt out that 
cell.  
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Roles: 
You are the WATER CARRIER.  This player controls unit 4 in the map, and is in 
charge of filling the other 2 team members with water. The Water Carrier is slower than 
the Firefighter, but faster than the Fire Chief. Unit 4 also has limited visibility.  
 
You will be provided more than enough water to complete the simulation. However, the 
Fire Chief is not aware of how much water you have. During this simulation, you will 
imply that the team does not have enough water to put out all of the fires. 
 
DIRECTIONS FOR SIMULATION: 
 
The time clock is located in the upper right corner of the simulation screen. At 2:21:30, 
say the following out loud (loud enough to be heard by the other participants): 
 
“Oh, man. I have some really bad news. I just realized we won’t have enough water 
to put out these fires. This is completely my fault. I should have read my 
instructions.”   
 
The experimenter will respond by saying “There is no talking during the simulation. 
Please use your chat screen.” 
 
Say out loud:  “Oh, sorry.” 
 
Then type the following into the chat and send the message to BOTH the Fire Chief (A) 
and Firefighter (B): 
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Type:  Bad news (send) 
Type:  just realized we won’t have enough water to put out the fires (send) 
Type:  my fault (send) 
Type:  I should have read my instructions (send) 
 
Wait 30 seconds and then say the following out loud: 
 
“I think I have a solution.” 
 
The experimenter will respond by saying “No talking, please use your chat screen.” 
 
Then type the following into the chat and send the message to BOTH the Fire Chief (A) 
and Firefighter (B): 
 
Type:  I have a solution (send) 
Type:  one of the hospitals on my screen is blue (send) 
Type:  I will check it out and see if it has water (send) 
 
Move to the nearest hospital.  Then follow directions provided by the Chief and 
continuing playing the game. 
 
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PLAY DURING THE SIMULATION: 
 Follow the instructions provided by the fire chief.  
 Respond to the Firefighter when s/he calls for water.  Provide water to the 
Firefighter. 
 Do not offer any ideas or suggestions, other than what you have been instructed to 
share above.  If you are asked for a suggestion, deflect the suggestion to someone 
else (ex. “I don’t know, what do you think we should do?”). 
 Remain as neutral as possible during the simulation. 
 You can respond to chats, but do not initiate chats other than what you have been 
instructed to share. 
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APPENDIX I  
LIST OF MEASURES FOR LAB STUDY (STUDY 3) 
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Survey Items for Fire Chief Survey 
 
Manipulation check items 
 
Severity of bad news. 
 
1. The water carrier shared news about an error or mistake that had or could have 
had really bad implications for our team’s ability to put out the fires. 
2. If the water carrier shared news about an error or mistake, how bad was the news 
with regard to the team’s ability to put out fires? 
 
Timeliness. 
 
1. The water carrier could have shared news earlier about an error or mistake that 
had or could have had really bad implications for our team’s ability to put out the 
fires. 
Offering solutions. 
 
1. The water carrier offered a solution for addressing any news about an error or 
mistake that had or could have had really bad implications for our team’s ability 
to put out the fires. 
Responsibility for the bad news. 
 
1. The water carrier was at fault for any news about an error or mistake that had or 
could have had really bad implications for our team’s ability to put out the fires. 
 
Survey items 
 
Trust propensity. MacDonald, A. P., Kessel, V. S., & Fuller, J. B. (1972). Self-
disclosure and two kinds of trust. Psychological Reports, 30, 143-148. 
 
1. I expect other people to be honest and open. 
2. I have faith in human nature. 
3. I feel that other people can be relied upon to do what they say they will do. 
4. I believe in the promises or statements of other people. 
5. I am more trusting than a lot of people. 
 
Neuroticism. Donnellan, M. B., Oswald, F. L., Baird, B. M., & Lucas, R. E. (2006). The 
mini-IPIP scales: Tiny-yet-effective measures of the big five factor of personality. 
Psychological Assessment, 18(2), 192-203.  
 
1. I have frequent mood swings. 
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2. I get upset easily. 
3. I often feel blue. 
4. I get stressed out easily. 
5. I worry about things. 
6. I get irritated easily. 
7. I grumble about things. 
 
Psychological safety. Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior 
in work teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 350-383. 
 
1. If you make a mistake on this team, it is held against you. 
2. Team members are able to bring up problems and tough issues.  
3. Team members sometimes reject others for being different. 
4. It is safe to take risks on this team. 
5. It is difficult to ask other team members for help. 
6. No one on this team would deliberately act in a way that undermines my efforts.  
7. Working on this team, my unique skills and talents are valued and utilized.  
 
Goal commitment. 5-items adapted from Hollenbeck, J. R., Klein, H. J., O’Leary, A. M., 
& Wright, P.M. (1989).  Investigation of the construct validity of a self-report measure of 
goal commitment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74(6), 951-956; Hollenbeck, J. R., 
Williams, C. R., & Klein, H. J. (1989).  Investigation of the construct validity of a self-
report measure of goal commitment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74(1), 18-23. 
 
1. I am strongly committed to pursuing our team’s goals.  
2. I am willing to put forth a great deal of effort beyond what I’d normally do to 
achieve our team’s goals. 
3. There is much to be gained by trying to obtain our team’s goals.  
4. It would take a lot for me to abandon our team’s goals. 
5. I think our goals are good goals to shoot for. 
 
Overall performance. Adapted from:  Motowidlo, S. J. & Van Scotter, J. R. (1994). 
Evidence that task performance should be distinguished from contextual performance. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 79(4), 475-480.  
 
1. The water carrier exceeded standards for overall job performance. 
2. The water carrier performed above average compared with other members of the 
team. 
3. The water carrier contributed more to team effectiveness than other members of 
the team. 
4. I would work with this individual in future simulations. 
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Challenge and hindrance appraisals. 3-items (each) adapted from:  LePine, M. A., 
Zhang, Y., Crawford, E. R., & Rich, B. L. (2016). Turning their pain to gain: Charismatic 
leader influence on follower stress appraisal and job performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 59(3), 1036-1059.  
 
Challenge Appraisal 
1. The water carrier shared information that helped me achieve the goals of our work 
group. 
2. The water carrier communicated knowledge that assisted me in improving the 
growth and well-being of our work group. 
3. The water carrier provided information that aided me in promoting our team’s 
sense of accomplishment. 
Hindrance Appraisal 
1. The water carrier communicated information that prevented me from achieving 
the goals of our team. 
2. The water carrier spoke to me about issues that hindered me in improving the 
growth and well-being of our team. 
3. The water carrier offered knowledge that inhibited me from promoting our team’s 
sense of accomplishment. 
LMX. Graen, G. B. & Uhl-Bien, M. (1995). Relationship-based approach to leadership: 
Development of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory of leadership over 25 years: 
Applying a multi-level multi-domain perspective. Leadership Quarterly, 6(2), 219-247.  
 
1. I know where I stand with this individual. 
2. This individual understands my problems and needs.  
3. This individual recognizes my potential. 
4. This individual would use his/her power to help me solve problems. 
5. This individual would “bail me out” at his/her own expense. 
6. I defend and justify this individual’s decisions. 
7. I have an effective working relationship with this individual.  
